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ABSTRACT
Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) begins with the
following simple idea: the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms
due to adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs. If this notion is even
possibly true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not
veridical and that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are
merely evolutionarily advantageous).
Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus
called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s
cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition
of what one is trying to prove). The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this,
realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties,
and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in
naturalism). So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current
evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e.,
irrational) position. It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical
naturalism.
Plantinga’s argument is not a globally skeptical one. His ultimate goal is to
persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism
instead. EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for
some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism.
In this paper, I attempt to:
(1) explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement;
(2) examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN
(along with some of Plantinga’s responses);
(3) put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form;
(4) comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing the
premises, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of EAAN;
and,
(5) conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain
why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introducing EAAN
In 1993, Alvin Plantinga published the first two books of his eventual trilogy on
epistemic warrant.1 The first book, Warrant: The Current Debate,2 was a survey of many
important contemporary accounts of warrant.3 Plantinga found all of these accounts
unsatisfactory for various reasons. In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function,4
he explicated his own version of warrant, defined there briefly by him as that “… elusive
quality or quantity enough of which, together with truth and belief, is sufficient for
knowledge …”.5 In the last chapter of WPF there appeared an argument where Plantinga
maintained that the holding of metaphysical naturalism and current evolutionary theory6
is epistemically faulty in an important sense. This argument, dubbed by him the
Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (hereafter EAAN) was refined in the third
book of his trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief,7 and in later articles.8

1

The third and final book of the trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief, was published seven years later, in
2000.
2
Hereafter WCD.
3
Warrant being defined here as “that, whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the
difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 3.
4
Hereafter WPF.
5
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) v.
6
I.e., holding these two beliefs together at the same time.
7
Hereafter WCB; Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000).
8
See principally Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2008); Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Alvin
Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in James Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) 204-275; and Alvin Plantinga,
“Respondeo” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of
Knowledge, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) 307-378. For an
extensive list of articles responding early on to EAAN, see Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in
Beilby, 204, footnote 1.
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Plantinga argued in EAAN that it is irrational for a reflective person to accept the
conjoining of naturalism with current evolutionary theory (roughly understood).9 He has
summed up his argument as follows:
… naturalism and contemporary evolutionary theory are at serious odds with one
another – and this despite the fact that the latter is ordinarily thought to be one of
the main pillars supporting the edifice of the former … I am not attacking the
theory of evolution … I am instead attacking the conjunction of naturalism with
the view that human beings have evolved in that way … I have argued that the
conjunction of naturalism with the belief that we human beings have evolved in
conformity with current evolutionary doctrine … is in a certain interesting way
self-defeating or self-referentially incoherent. Still more particularly, I argued
that naturalism and evolution – ‘N&E’ for short – furnishes one who accepts it
with a defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable – a defeater
that can’t be defeated. But then this conjunction also furnishes a defeater for any
belief produced by our cognitive faculties, including, in the case of one who
accepts it, N&E itself: hence its self-defeating character.10

Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism begins with the following
simple idea: the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms due to
adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs. If this notion is even possibly
true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not veridical and
that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are merely
evolutionarily advantageous).

9

Plantinga’s argument has many affinities with a line of thinking in the philosophy of religion sometimes
called the Argument from Reason. The Argument from Reason has often been presented as an argument
for the existence of God, positing that theism provides a better grounding for our reasoning capacities than
does naturalism (or something close to that). James Beilby notes that Plantinga’s argument (although much
more developed) has affinities to arguments put forth by Richard Taylor (in chapter 10 of his book
Metaphysics) and C. S. Lewis (in chapters 3 and 13 of the second edition of Miracles). James Beilby,
“Preface” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed.
James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) ix.
10
Alvin Plantinga, “Introduction” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument
Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby, (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) 1-2.
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Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus
called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s
cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition
of what one is trying to prove). The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this,
realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties,
and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in
naturalism). So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current
evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e.,
irrational) position. It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical
naturalism.
Although EAAN is about questioning the reliability of our noetic structures,11
Plantinga’s purpose in wielding it is not for global skeptical ends. His ultimate goal is to
persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism
instead. EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for
some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism.
In this paper, I attempt to:
(1) explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement;
(2) examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN
(along with some of Plantinga’s responses);
(3) put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form;
(4) comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing each

11

“Noetic structures” is here a rough synonym for “cognitive faculties” (i.e., noetic is not operating in a
technical Husserlian way).
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premise, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of
EAAN; and,
(5) conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain
why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.

A Preliminary Issue: The Definition of “Naturalism”
What does “naturalism” mean in Plantinga’s argument? Historically, the term
“naturalism” (in the philosophical sense) has had a very wide semantic range. Perhaps
this quick overview by Dallas Willard will provide a helpful starting point, surveying
some of the important variations:
… What might be called “generic naturalism” has a long history that includes:
classical naturalism, with figures such as Democritus, Epicurus, Aristotle and
Lucretius; Renaissance naturalism, with Bruno, Campanella, and Telesio, and –
born too late – Spinoza; empiricist/nominalist naturalism, with Hobbes, Hume,
D’Holbach and most of the French Encylopedists and Comte; nineteenth-century
materialistic naturalism, with Jakob Moleschott, Karl Vogt, Ernst Haeckel,
Ludwig Büchner, Herbert Spencer, and, it is often presumed, Charles Darwin;
mid-twentieth century (largely anti-materialistic) naturalism, with Santayana,
Dewey, and others; and late-twentieth century (“identity thesis”) naturalism,
which wavers between scientism and physicalism, with Quine, David Armstrong,
Paul and Patricia Churchland, John Searle, etc.12
Arthur Danto has stated that recent usage in philosophy of the term “naturalism”
has referred to:
… a species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or
happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through
methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are
continuous from domain to domain of objects and events. Hence, naturalism is
polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could exist any

12

Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism” in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, ed. William Lane Craig
and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000) 44-45.
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entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of scientific
explanation.13
Robert Audi gives the following overview: naturalism is “… in rough terms …
the view that nature is all there is and all basic truths are truths of nature.”14 (However,
this disposes one to immediately ask: (1) what nature is, (2) what kind of identity with
all there is does the “is” signify, and (3) what basic truths are.)15 Audi asserts that
naturalism is, perhaps, “more often presumed than stated [or argued for]”; that might
account for at least some of the differences in positions held.16
Paul Moser and David Yandell distinguish between ontological naturalism and
methodological naturalism. They also believe that most contemporary adherents of
naturalism can be helpfully further subdivided into three subtypes: eliminative
ontological (or methodological) naturalists, non-eliminative reductive ontological (or
methodological) naturalists, and non-eliminative non-reductive ontological (or
methodological) naturalists.17
Eliminative ontological naturalism (EON) is defined by Moser and Yandell as
follows:
[EON:] … every real entity is capturable by the ontology of the hypothetically
completed empirical sciences, and language independent of those sciences is
eliminable from discourse without cognitive loss.18

13

Arthur C. Danto, “Naturalism” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volumes 5-6, ed. Paul Edwards (New
York: Simon & Shuster Macmillan, 1996) 448.
14
Robert Audi, “Naturalism” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, ed. Paul Edwards (New
York: Simon & Shuster Macmillan, 1996) 372. Emphasis mine.
15
Audi, 372.
16
Audi, 372.
17
Paul K. Moser and David Yandell, “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism” in Naturalism: A Critical
Analysis, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000) 8-9.
18
Examples given of adherents of EON are W. V. Quine, Paul Churchland, and Daniel Dennett. Moser and
Yandell, 8.
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Non-eliminative reductive ontological naturalism (NERON) is defined as:
[NERON:] … every real entity either is capturable by the ontology of the
hypothetically completed sciences or is reducible to something capturable by that
ontology.19
Non-eliminative non-reductive ontological naturalism (NENRON) is defined as:
[NENRON:] … some real entities neither are capturable by the ontology of the
hypothetically completed empirical sciences nor are reducible to anything
capturable by that ontology, but all such entities supervene on entities capturable
by that ontology.20
In contrast to the ontological categories, “methodological naturalism” is taken to
refer to various views about “the range of legitimate inquiry”.21 Although there are
methodological analogues for each of the above ontological categories, they might all
share a certain core thought, namely: “every legitimate method of acquiring knowledge
consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical
sciences (that is, in natural methods).”22
Assuming that these groupings of Moser and Yandell are helpful and that they
describe most contemporary metaphysical naturalists, one is struck with the remarkable
plasticity of the terms “naturalism” and “naturalist”. Plantinga knows that the word
“naturalism” is used in many different ways and that it would be extremely difficult to
come up with a precise definition. He writes:
… naturalism is not at all easy to characterize … Indeed, some who think about
naturalism believe that it isn’t a doctrine at all; it isn’t a belief, or a proposition.
According to Bas van Fraassen,[23] for example, … to be a naturalist is to adopt a
19

A proponent of NERON would be J.J.C. Smart. Moser and Yandell, 8.
Examples of adherents of NENRON would be Donald Davidson and David Papineau. Moser and
Yandell, 8.
21
Moser and Yandell, 9.
22
Moser and Yandell, 9.
23
See Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) 49ff. Plantinga
and Tooley, KOG, 18, note 20. Also, and especially, see Bas van Fraassen, “Science, Materialism, and

20

6

certain attitude, an attitude involving among other things an exclusive
commitment to science in guiding one’s opinions … I’d like to think of it, for
present purposes, as fundamentally a way of looking at the world, a high-level
belief about the world … I’ll use the term ‘philosophical naturalism’ to refer to
this way of thinking.24
Plantinga then quotes a passage from Bertrand Russell that helps in focusing upon
the kind of position he is opposing with his EAAN:
… That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs
are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism,
no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the
grave, that all labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the
noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death
of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must
inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins – all of these things,
if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which
rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only
on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation
henceforth be safely built.25
Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (1917)
Plantinga thinks that, although Russell’s statement may be a bit extravagant, “it
does serve to give the flavor of the view I mean to attack.”26 Additionally, Plantinga
thinks that perhaps the best way to understand the kind of naturalism that he is opposing
is to contrast it with theism:
… The basic idea of philosophical naturalism (which from now on I’ll just call
‘naturalism’) is that there is no such person as God, or anything at all like him …
If you are a naturalist, you don’t believe in God, but you also don’t believe in the
Stoic’s Mind, or Fichte’s Absolute I, or Plato’s Idea of the Good, or Aristotle’s
Unmoved Mover, or Hegel’s Absolute. This account of naturalism suffers a

False Consciousness” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory
of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) 149-181.
24
Plantinga and Tooley, KOG, 18.
25
Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1917) 47-8. Quoted in Plantinga
and Tooley, KOG, 18.
26
Plantinga and Tooley, KOG, 18.
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certain vagueness (nothing at all similar to God, but just how similar?), but in
practice I doubt that there is much of a problem here.27
Similarly, Dallas Willard suggests:
“… the single unifying theme of all Naturalisms is anti-transcendentalism. Their
steady point of reference is … “nature” in extension … [although what] “nature”
is in intension has never been agreed upon among naturalists.”28
Hopefully, most readers will have a sufficient feel for what Plantinga is attacking.
As crucial as it initially seems to have a detailed definition of naturalism for EAAN to get
off the ground, there isn’t very much in the literature critical of EAAN that aims to give
Plantinga a hard time concerning the precise definition of naturalism. So, perhaps he is
correct in assuming that this definitional tangle is not necessarily an obstacle. At any
rate, it looks to me like Plantinga’s argument will apply to all of the Moser/Yandell
categories of contemporary naturalists (eliminative ontological naturalists, noneliminative reductive naturalists, and non-eliminative non-reductive naturalists, along
with their respective methodological analogues).29
One can imagine that EAAN has generated a lot of critical fire. Many
philosophers have attacked EAAN by disallowing one of the main premises of the
argument – that natural selection is only “interested” in the adaptive behavior of an
organism, not necessarily true beliefs. A few mathematically-minded philosophers have
criticized Plantinga regarding his calculations of the probabilities involved in some
27

Plantinga and Tooley, KOG, 19. For further discussion involving attempts to define naturalism,
Plantinga recommends Chapters 2 and 3 of Michael Rea’s World without Design (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2002) and Bas van Fraassen’s The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2002) 49ff.
28
Willard, 45. Willard goes on to say: “… Some [naturalists] look very much like pantheists, and yet
others (Santayana, Dewey) reach very far to incorporate “the divine” and all that is humanly unique into
“nature.”
29
Moser and Yandell, 8-9. It will become much more clear later why all these categories are susceptible to
Plantinga’s argument, but a quick preview of why this is so has to do with the fact that there is no design
plan involved regarding cognitive faculties that are successfully aimed at truth.
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versions of EAAN. Some other philosophers have noted that Plantinga’s argument is
reminiscent of problems that interested Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, and others about
knowledge, and make their attacks along these lines. (For instance, there are similarities
between the issues that Plantinga highlights with matters involved in the Cartesian
Circle.) Still other philosophers have opposed EAAN by way of arguments involving
varying analyses of Plantinga’s concept of epistemic defeat.
I survey and comment upon several important epistemological issues that are
raised by the EAAN and some of its critics. In brief, I proceed as follows:
Chapter 2 – EAAN AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
I will begin by explaining the basics of Plantinga’s argument, including a
brief history of what has happened in the literature regarding EAAN since
Plantinga launched it in 1993.
Chapter 3 – SOME CONCERNS ABOUT EAAN AND EVOLUTION
I will survey some of the main lines of attack with regard to matters that
pertain to current evolutionary theory. Then I assess the strengthening or damage
that has been done to Plantinga’s argument. It will become apparent that I don’t
feel that this is the most important problem area regarding EAAN.
Chapter 4 – SOME CONCERNS ABOUT PROBABILITY
I look at certain issues involving probability and EAAN, especially the
problem of what conditionalization setting should be used for an argument such as
this.
Chapter 5 – EAAN AND SOME ISSUES CONCERNING SKEPTICISM AND
EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY
This chapter will highlight how EAAN trades upon a certain circularity
issue that has been historically intractable in philosophy.
Chapter 6 – REMARKS ON INTUITIONS REGARDING EAAN AND
SIMILARITIES WITH SOME IMPORTANT RELATED ARGUMENTS

9

In this chapter I discuss some arguments that are closely related to the type
that Plantinga is giving in EAAN. This brings out some important intuitions that
they all share, but also highlights what Plantinga is doing that is new.
Chapter 7 – SOME THOUGHTS ON DEFEATERS GIVEN THE PROBABILITY
THESIS
This chapter focuses on certain critics of EAAN who do not think that
EAAN yields a defeater given the Probability Thesis. Michael Bergmann’s
critique is singled out and analyzed.
Chapter 8 – AN EXTENDED SUMMARY OF EAAN IN LOGICAL FORM, WITH
DISCUSSION OF PREMISES (1) THROUGH (6)
In this chapter I summarize EAAN into an argument with 23 premises.
While commenting upon summary, I narrow down the major points of contention
to two premises. Of the first six premises, I pick out one to be especially
controversial.
Chapter 9 – AN EXTENDED SUMMARY OF EAAN IN LOGICAL FORM:
DISUCSSION OF SOME PREMISES AFTER PREMISE (6), WITH
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO PREMISE (10)
In this chapter I continue to discuss the SUMMARY, and focus upon
Premise (10) as the second of two main points of contention regarding EAAN. I
conclude that Plantinga’s argument revolves crucially around the thought
experiments used as analogies to support Premise (10). As these analogies are
intuitionally supported, Plantinga’s overall argument will only be persuasive to
the extent one shares certain crucial intuitions with him.
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CHAPTER TWO
EAAN and Its Development
As has been noted, Plantinga initially stated EAAN in Warrant and Proper
Function in 1993.30 There have been revisions due to feedback and various objections,
but in 2002 (almost a decade after he launched it) Plantinga wrote that he considered the
argument to have “emerged unscathed – or if a bit scathed, then at least bloody but
unbowed.”31
The latest version of EAAN appeared in 2008, when Plantinga and Michael
Tooley published a debate between them entitled Knowledge of God.32 In this book,
Plantinga’s affinities with EAAN are obvious, as he leans heavily upon it in his
arguments against naturalism. Thus, in the fifteen years or so since Plantinga first
launched EAAN in Warrant and Proper Function, in spite of all the criticisms and minor
revisions, Plantinga’s confidence in EAAN seemed unfazed. Actually, his conviction
that EAAN is a good argument seems to have grown even stronger over the years.
I will concentrate mostly upon the versions of EAAN which appeared in between
the bookend years of 1993 (WPF) and 2008 (KOG), primarily as Plantinga presented it in
“Introduction” and “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in Naturalism Defeated?33 However, a
history of how the argument reached this form is in order.
30

So says Plantinga, in Beilby, 1. However, James Beilby notes [in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) ix] that
an even earlier Plantinga version appeared in Alvin Plantinga, “An Evolutionary Argument Against
Naturalism”, Logos 12 (1991) 27-49.
31
Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in Beilby, 204-205.
32
Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008).
33
Alvin Plantinga, “Introduction -- The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism: An Initial Statement of
the Argument” and “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts”, in Beilby, 1-12, 205-275.
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Beginnings of EAAN: The Final Chapter of Warrant and Proper Function (1993)
In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga began by noting that
we have some true beliefs:
Most of us think (or would think on reflection) that at least a function or
purpose of our cognitive faculties is to provide us with true beliefs …
Qualifications are necessary, of course. There are various exceptions and special
cases … Nevertheless over a vast area of cognitive terrain we take it that the
purpose (function) of our cognitive faculties is to provide us with true or
verisimilitudinous beliefs, and that, for the most part, that is just what they do …
We think our faculties much better adapted to reach the truth in some areas than
others; we are good at elementary arithmetic and logic, and the perception of
middle-sized objects under ordinary conditions. We are also good at
remembering certain sorts of things: I can easily remember what I had for
breakfast this morning … .34
But Plantinga thinks that placing these truths in a naturalistic metaphysical
framework brings about a certain dilemma:
But isn’t there a problem, here, for the naturalist? At any rate for the naturalist
who thinks that we and our cognitive capacities arrived upon the scene after some
billions of years of evolution (by way of natural selection, genetic drift, and other
blind processes working on such sources of genetic variation as random genetic
mutation)? ... If our cognitive faculties have … [thus originated], then their
ultimate purpose or function (if they have a purpose or function) will be
something like survival (of individual, species, gene, or genotype); but then it
seems initially doubtful that among their functions – ultimate, proximate, or
otherwise – would be the production of true beliefs.”35
In this vein, Plantinga quotes Patricia Churchland:
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to
succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle
chore of the nervous system is to get the body parts where they should be in order
that the organism may survive. … Improvements in sensorimotor control confer
an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long
as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances

34
35

Plantinga, WPF, 216, 217.
Plantinga, WPF, 218.
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of survival [Churchland’s emphasis]. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the
hindmost.36
The point here is that current evolutionary theory (hereafter E) sensibly paints a
picture of organisms being selected for adaptive behavior, but not necessarily true beliefs.
As Plantinga says, “… our beliefs might be mostly true or verisimilitudinous … but there
is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested not in truth,
but in appropriate behavior.”37
When E is conjoined with metaphysical naturalism (hereafter N), Plantinga thinks
we have reason to doubt at least two things: (1) that the purpose of our noetic faculties is
to provide us with true beliefs, and (2) “… that they do, in fact, furnish us with mostly
true beliefs.”38 (It is extremely important to note that Plantinga is not asserting that we
do, in fact, have mostly false beliefs. We will see that such a misunderstanding will crop
up many times over. He is arguing that, given N&E, we have reason to doubt that they
do furnish us with mostly true beliefs.)
Plantinga envisions that someone might respond in the style of Karl Popper – that,
since we have evolved, “we may be pretty sure that our hypotheses and guesses as to
what the world is like are mostly correct.”39 Plantinga goes on to also quote W. v. O.
Quine:
What does make clear sense is this other part of the problem of induction: why
does our innate subjective spacing of qualities accord so well with the
36
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functionally relevant groupings in nature as to make our inductions tend to come
out right? Why should our subjective spacing of qualities have a special purchase
on nature and a lien on the future?
There is some encouragement in Darwin. If people’s innate spacing of
qualities is a gene-linked trait, then the spacing that has made for the most
successful inductions will have tended to predominate through natural selection.
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy
tendency to die before reproducing their kind.40

However, Plantinga notes that Darwin himself had doubts about this very issue.
Late in his life, less than one year before he died, Darwin wrote in a letter to William
Graham Down:
With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind,
which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or
at all trustworthy. Who would trust the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there
are any convictions in such a mind?41
Plantinga calls this “Darwin’s Doubt.” He then comments on the insights of
Churchland and Darwin:
… One possibility: perhaps Darwin and Churchland mean to propose that a
certain objective conditional probability is relatively low: the probability of
human cognitive faculties’ being reliable (producing mostly true beliefs), given
that human beings have cognitive faculties (of the sort we have) and given that
these faculties have been produced by evolution (… blind evolution, unguided by
the hand of God or any other person). If metaphysical naturalism and this
evolutionary account are both true, then our cognitive faculties will have resulted
from blind mechanisms like natural selection, working on such sources of genetic
variation as random genetic mutation. Evolution is interested, not in true belief,
but in survival or fitness. It is therefore unlikely that our cognitive faculties have
the production of true belief as a proximate or any other function, and the
probability of our faculties’ being reliable (given naturalistic evolution) would be
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fairly low. Popper and Quine, on the other side, judge that probability fairly
high.42
This leads Plantinga to abbreviate by way of a formula: P(R/(N&E&C)) is fairly
low. N stands for metaphysical naturalism and E means “current evolutionary theory”.
C is a complex proposition “… which states what cognitive faculties we have – memory,
perception, reason … and what sorts of beliefs they produce.” R is the claim that these
faculties are, for the most part and with a few qualifications, reliable (“… in the sense
that they produce mostly true beliefs in the sorts of environments that are normal for
them”).43
To address concerns like the ones put forth by Popper and Quine, Plantinga refers
to Stephen Stich. Stich is suspicious of the idea that the evolutionary process guarantees
that organisms which do not have mostly true beliefs do not survive and reproduce. Stich
sees this idea to involve at least these two premises:
P1: “[E]volution produces organisms with good approximations to optimally
well-designed characteristics or systems”;
P2: “[A]n optimally well-designed cognitive system is a rational cognitive
system” and a rational system is a reliable system (i.e., producing a preponderance of true
beliefs).44
Stich questions both of these premises in order “to make it clear that there are
major problems to be overcome by those who think that evolutionary considerations
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impose interesting limits on irrationality …”.45 Concerning P1, Stich points out that
types of random genetic drift may result in the survival of the less-fit organisms.
Additionally, because of pleiotropy (where a gene codes for multiple traits or systems), a
negative trait might be perpetuated by its link with a positive trait.46 Therefore, an
optimal system may never arrive in time for selection to work on it within the current
development of the life form.47
Concerning P2, Stich questions whether reliable cognitive systems are
necessarily more fitness-enhancing than unreliable ones. Cognitive System A might be
more reliable than Cognitive System B, but A might “cost too much by way of energy or
memory capacity; alternatively, [… B] might produce more by way of false beliefs but
nonetheless contribute more to survival.”48
If some proponents of positions of N&E think that evolution guarantees or insures
reliable cognitive systems, arguments à la Stich seem to cast doubt on such positions.
However, Plantinga thinks it is possible that Popper and Quine meant something less
strong, like “it is fairly or highly probable, given that we and our cognitive faculties have
evolved according to the processes endorsed by contemporary evolutionary theory, that
those faculties are reliable.”49
Plantinga continues:
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… What Stich shows is that it is perfectly possible both that we and our cognitive
faculties have evolved in the ways approved by current evolutionary theory, and
that those cognitive faculties are not reliable. But that does not address Quine’s
argument taken as an implicit argument for the claim that P(R/(N&E&C)) is fairly
high, and a fortiori it does not serve as an argument for Darwin’s Doubt, that is,
for the claim P(R/(N&E&C)) is fairly low.50
So then, what would be the best way to analyze this weaker claim? Plantinga
thinks it would be helpful to construct a thought experiment about a hypothetical group of
creatures in some possible world:
Suppose these creatures have cognitive faculties, hold beliefs, change beliefs,
make inferences, and so on; and suppose these creatures have arisen by
way of the selection processes endorsed by contemporary evolutionary
thought. What is the probability that their faculties are reliable? What is
P(R/(N&E&C)), specified not to us, but to them? According to Quine and
Popper, the probability in question would be rather high: belief is connected
with action in such a way that extensive false belief would lead to
maladaptive behavior, in which case it is likely that the ancestors of those
creatures would have displayed that pathetic but praiseworthy tendency Quine
mentions. 51
But, Plantinga says, even if it is likely that their behavior is adaptive, nothing as
yet follows about their beliefs. This possible world scenario hasn’t yet stated a condition
as to a causal connection between beliefs and behavior. Beliefs may here be just
epiphenomena.52 The Popper/Quine type objection assumes that there is a causal
connection between beliefs and behavior; however, it is important to realize that such a
position isn’t at all a necessary part of N.
Plantinga then anticipates a problem looming over the definition of “belief”
(which is important enough to quote at length, because a significant amount of his later

50

Plantinga, WPF, 222.
Plantinga, WPF, 223.
52
Plantinga, WPF, 223.
51

17

argument will have to do with problems about the linkage between behavior and
thoughts, beliefs, and propositions):
You may object that as you use 'belief', beliefs just are among the processes
(neural structures, perhaps) that (together with desire, fear, and the like) are
causally efficacious. Fair enough … but then my point can be put as follows:
in that use of `belief' it may be that things with propositional contents are not
beliefs, that is, do not have causal efficacy. It can't be a matter of definition
that there are neural structures or processes displaying both propositional content
and causal efficacy with respect to behavior; and perhaps the things that
display causal efficacy do not display the sort of relation to content (to a
proposition) that a belief of the proposition p must display toward p. You say
that in that case the things, if any, that stand in that relation to a proposition
would not be beliefs (because, as you see it, beliefs must have causal efficacy).
Well, there is no sense in arguing about words: I'll give you the term 'belief'
and put my case using other terms. What I say is possible is that the things
(mental acts, perhaps) that stand in that relation to content (to propositions)
do not also enjoy causal efficacy. Call those things whatever you like: they
are the things that are true or false, and it is about the likelihood of their
truth or falsehood that we are asking. If these things, whatever we call them,
are not causally connected with behavior, then they would be, so to speak,
invisible to evolution; and then the fact that they arose during the
evolutionary history of these beings would confer no probability on the
idea that they are mostly true, or mostly nearly true, rather than wildly false.
Indeed, the probability of their being for the most part true would have to be
estimated as fairly low.53
So, it is possible that the creatures in the thought experiment have beliefs that are
merely epiphenomenal, in such a way that they are not connected with behavior. But that
is only the first possibility among many that Plantinga canvasses. A second possibility
Plantinga considers with regard to the creatures (in a possible world close to ours) is that
the beliefs of the hypothetical creatures are effects of their behavior, but not causes of
their behaviors. As in the option before this, beliefs then would not necessarily have any
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function related to truth. Therefore, P(R/N&E&C) would be low.54
The third possibility (with regard to the creatures) is that beliefs are causally
connected to behavior, but not by way of the content of the beliefs:
… in currently fashionable jargon, this would be the suggestion that while
beliefs are causally efficacious, it is only by virtue of their syntax, not by
virtue of their semantics. Indeed just this thesis is part of a popular
contemporary view: the computational theory of mind … I read a poem very
loudly, so loudly as to break a glass … the sounds I utter have meaning, but
their meaning is causally irrelevant to the breaking of the glass. In the same
way it might be that these creatures' beliefs have causal efficacy, but not by way
of the content of those beliefs.55
Plantinga notes that this category represents a widely-held view, and he references
several accounts, including those of Jerry Fodor, Stephen Stich, Patricia Churchland,
Fred Dretske, Brian Loar, and Zenon Pylyshyn.

Plantinga remarks that “Robert

Cummins goes so far as to call this view—the view that representations have causal
efficacy only with respect to their syntax, not with respect to their semantics or
content—the 'received view'”. 56
It seems likely that, under such a scenario, the possibility that the creatures’
beliefs are mostly true would be low.57
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A fourth possibility is that the beliefs of the creatures are causally connected
to their behavior (syntactically and semantically), but prove to be maladaptive to a
substantial extent.58 Plantinga argues:
… it is quite possible … that a system or trait that is in fact maladaptive – at
any rate less adaptive than available alternatives – should nonetheless become fixed and survive. Perhaps the belief systems of these creatures are like the
albinism found in many arctic animals, or like sickle-cell anemia: maladaptive,
but connected with genes coding for behavior or traits conducive to survival.
They could be maladaptive in two ways. First, perhaps their beliefs are a sort a
energy-expensive distraction, causing these creatures to engage in survival enhancing behavior, all right, but in a way less efficient and economic than if the
causal connections by-passed belief altogether. Second, it could be that
beliefs in fact produce maladaptive behavior. Perhaps a mildly maladaptive
belief-behavior structure is coded for by the same genetic structure that produces some adaptive behavior. Suppose these creatures' beliefs do not for the
most part produce adaptive behavior: the mechanisms that produce them
might nonetheless survive. Perhaps on balance their behavior is sufficiently
adaptive, even if not every segment of it is.59

Under this fourth possible scenario, where beliefs and behaviors are causally
connected but are significantly maladaptive, it seems that the probability of the creatures’
cognitive faculties being reliable would also be low. The fifth and last possibility
Plantinga considers is one in which the beliefs of the creatures are causally connected to
their behaviors in a way that is adaptive. Wouldn’t the probability that their cognitive
faculties were reliable be quite high in this instance? Not necessarily, Plantinga holds.
This is because there are many different belief/behavior pairings that will result in the
same behavior (which in this case is also adaptive), and some of these pairings will be
founded upon beliefs which are false.60 For instance, take Paul, a prehistoric hominid.
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To survive in his environment, he needs to “display tiger-avoidance behavior”.61 Think
of some successful tiger-avoidance behavior B: we think that Paul does B because Paul
doesn’t want to be eaten by a tiger and thinks B is a good way to avoid such an end.62
But that might be too hasty a conclusion:
… But clearly this avoidance behavior could be the result of a thousand other
belief-desire combinations: indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B
equally well. (Here let me ignore the complication arising from the fact that
belief comes in degrees.) Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten,
but whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect,
because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his
body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving
much by way of true belief. (Of course we must postulate other changes in Paul’s
way of reasoning, including how he changes belief in response to experience, to
maintain coherence.)63
In other words, it seems clearly possible that the behavior which is observable of
Paul does not necessarily have to result from the kinds of beliefs that an observer (who
presupposes that Paul’s cognitive faculties are reliable) might suppose. Some unexpected
belief-behavior pairings could involve false beliefs. As long as the behavior is adaptive,
natural selection will (all other things being equal) select Paul in spite of (or because of)
the false beliefs.
Plantinga anticipates a rebuttal which posits that such counterexamples are
ridiculous. When we think of the belief-desire combinations of other persons (so the
criticism goes), we must “ … make use of ‘principles of humanity,’ whereby we see
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others as resembling what we take ourselves to be.”64 Following David Lewis, we might
require these principles of humanity in order to rule out belief-desire pairs that are deeply
irrational and/or unthinkable for us.65
Plantinga agrees that we must do so when we ascribe content to the beliefs of
other people. (One of the beliefs we will ascribe to them, incidentally, is the belief that
the “purpose or function of their cognitive systems, like that of ours, is the production of
[mostly] true beliefs.”)66 But that is beside the point in this thought experiment, because
we aren’t given that the creatures are humans. Therefore, we aren’t given that such
principles of humanity apply to them.67 Indeed, one of the main purposes of the thought
experiment’s focus upon another world (containing creatures in many ways like us but
not necessarily human) was to help clear away some of our biases, and help us to think
about what the processes posited by E merely under N could provide:
… We must ask what sorts of belief-desire systems are possible for these creatures,
given only that they have evolved according to the principles of contemporary
evolutionary theory; clearly these gerrymanders are perfectly possible. So
perhaps their behavior has been adaptive, and their systems of belief and desire
such as to fit that adaptive behavior; those beliefs could nonetheless be wildly
wrong. There are indefinitely many belief-desire systems that fit adaptive
behavior, but where the beliefs involved are not for the most part true. A share of
probability has to be reserved for these possibilities as well.68
Now, if these possibilities apply to these other creatures, they might possibly apply
to us as well. The foregoing five scenarios examined and exhausted the possibilities
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concerning the linkages of beliefs with behavior. Upon pondering these situations, there
appeared some reasons to believe that the probability of R would be low on many of them.
If we don’t know which of the scenarios applies to us, that yields an additional reason to let
some doubt be introduced about R with respect to us.
The main question before us is whether or not, given N &E, we can trust our
cognitive faculties. Once a doubt is allowed to enter concerning R, a problem is manifested
concerning how to restore confidence in R. Attempting to provide an argument to assuage
the accompanying epistemic dissonance seems inappropriate. We would be assuming our
faculties’ trustworthiness in order to argue for their trustworthiness.
It is at this point in the development of his thoughts on the matter that Plantinga
launched what he called the Preliminary Argument against Naturalism (which is not the
Main EAAN … that comes later). This Preliminary Argument assigned probabilities to
variables and placed them in a Bayesian calculation. This was all supposed to lead one
eventually to the conclusion that naturalism is false.69 (The conclusion of the Preliminary
Argument differs from what we will see to be the conclusion of Main Argument of EAAN.
In the Main Argument, Plantinga will contend that it is irrational to believe in metaphysical
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naturalism, not that N is false).
As it turned out, the Preliminary Argument against Naturalism made use of
probability assignments that were problematic even for Plantinga. In a work published
about 7 years after Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga wrote in Warranted
Christian Belief (WCB) that the Preliminary Argument was a straightforward
argument for the falsehood of naturalism that was also straightforwardly incorrect.70
He stated that the reason that his argument was faulty is because he confused the
absolute (logical or objective) probability of R with the probability of R on our
background information B. In other words, he was “… confusing P(R/B) with P(R)
simpliciter.”71
In WCB he proposed a repair for the Preliminary Argument, but he thought
that the repair left it even less persuasive.72 Therefore, later writings of Plantinga
regarding EAAN have abandoned all mention of the Preliminary Argument, in favor
of the Main Argument.

The Main Argument of EAAN in Warrant and Proper Function
In order to avoid the pitfalls of the Preliminary Argument, Plantinga now
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reasons as follows:
Suppose we think N&E is true: we ourselves have evolved according to the
mechanisms suggested by contemporary evolutionary theory, unguided and
unorchestrated by God or anyone else. Suppose we think, furthermore,
that there is no way to determine P(R/(N&E&C)) (specified to us). What
would be the right attitude to take to R? Well, if we have no further
information, then wouldn't the right attitude here, just as with respect to that
hypothetical population [i.e., the creatures in the thought experiment
involving the various belief-behavior explanations], be agnosticism,
withholding belief?73
Plantinga then asks what we should think of a religious believer who, from
“an injudicious reading of Freud,”74 comes to think that religious beliefs (and
especially theistic religious beliefs) are most often the result of wish-fulfillment.
What would she say if she was asked about the objective probability that wishfulfillment is a reliable belief-producing mechanism?75

She may think that the

probability of the reliability of her cognitive faculties with respect to beliefs formed
by wish fulfillment is low (I’ll call this case (A)). Or, she might think that there is
no way to know what the probabilities are in such a case, and so the best course of
action is to remain agnostic on the issue of the reliability of her cognitive faculties
when it comes to religious belief (I’ll call this case (B)). But, either way, Plantinga
thinks that she has a defeater for any of her religious beliefs, since she thinks they
are produced by the mechanism of wish-fulfillment.76
In case (A), Plantinga sees the beleaguered believer to be in a similar
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situation to the person in the following example:
[… a] person … comes into a factory, sees an assembly line carrying
apparently red widgets, and is then told by the shop superintendent that these
widgets are being irradiated by a variety of red lights, which makes it possible
to detect otherwise undetectable hairline cracks. She should take it that the
probability that a widget is red, given that it looks red, is fairly low; and she
then has a reason, with respect to any particular widget coming down the line,
to doubt that it is red, despite the fact that it looks red. To use John Pollock's
terminology … she has an undercutting defeater (rather than a rebutting defeater).
It isn't that she has acquired some evidence for that widget's being nonred, thus
rebutting the belief that it is red; it is rather that her grounds for thinking it red
have been undercut.77
This seems correct. Take Proposition W to be the proposition the apparently red
widget that I see before me is indeed a red widget.78 What is the probability that W is
true?79
That depends upon what kind of probability is involved. If it is some kind of
objective probability about which we are asking, it would seem difficult to see how such
a figure could be obtained. On the other hand, if it is epistemic probability (to her) that
we want, even then it would be hard, if not practically impossible, to arrive at a precise
quantitative measurement (or even an imprecise one). Having said that, if we had to
make a guess either way (objective or epistemic), wouldn’t it seem that the probability of
W’s being true would at least be somewhat lower than ½?
77
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Now if she knew that there were only two kinds of widgets (e.g., red and blue), or
ten kinds of widgets with red widgets in the vast majority, etc., we might reconsider the
epistemic probability of W for her. But we are given none of these additional evidences,
nor are we given any frequencies resulting from any tests she has been able to perform by
taking some of them outside into natural light, etc.. She doesn’t know much at all about
these widgets, apparently. At the beginning of the story we are simply told that she
“comes into a factory.”
If I were in her situation, and someone pointed to one of the widgets on the
conveyer belt and asked me “What do you think are the chances that that really is a red
widget?”, what would I say? I think that I would say, “Pretty slim”, and I think that most
people would also answer that way. So maybe Plantinga is right in saying that the
specified probability in this case is low.
Plantinga thinks that beleaguered believer (who has been convinced that perhaps
most of her religious beliefs are the result of wish-fulfillment) is in an analogous situation
to the woman in the irradiated widget case. Exactly why is that?
She has reasons to suspect that beliefs generated by wish-fulfillment are likely
untrue, but no reasons to believe that they are all untrue. But, she has no way to sort out
the true beliefs from the false ones, just like the woman viewing the assembly line has no
way to ascertain which widgets are truly red. It seems justifiable if she should give a low
probability assessment to a proposition that positively asserted the actual status of the
belief or widget.
Instead of thinking the relevant probability to be low, the woman in the factory
27

could decide that it is inscrutable (like the Beleaguered Believer in Case (B)). She might
wonder why she is supposed to trust the man who told her about the irradiation. The
vice-president of the widget company might come along and tell her that the shop
superintendent (who originally informed her about the red light) suffers from
hallucinations. Can she still trust the superintendent? But then, can she trust the vicepresident? As she ponders issues like these:

… she doesn't know what to believe about those alleged red lights. What will
she properly think about the color of the widgets? She will presumably be
agnostic about the probability of a widget's being red, given that it looks red;
she won't know what that probability might be; for all she knows it could be
very low, but also, for all she knows, it could be high … She has an
undercutting defeater for the proposition a is red; this defeater gives her a
reason to be agnostic with respect to that proposition. If she has no defeater for
that defeater, and no further evidence for the proposition, then on balance the
right attitude for her to take toward it would be agnosticism.80

The take-home point of both case (A) and case (B) is that the reliability of her
cognitive faculties with respect to widgets seems either low or inscrutable. Plantinga
thinks this is analogously the situation of the struggling believer who encountered Freud.
She, too, has an undercutting defeater for her religious beliefs such that, “if that
defeater remains itself undefeated and if she has no other source of evidence, then the
rational course would be to reject belief in God.”81 That doesn’t mean that she
would in fact discard her belief in God, but that would seem to be the epistemically
right thing to do.82
If these conclusions are correct about the Case of the Irradiated Widgets and
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the Case of the Beleaguered Believer, then why isn’t the person who thinks that
P(R/N&E&C) is fairly low or inscrutable in the same situation? Plantinga writes:
… But now suppose we return to the person convinced of N&E who is agnostic about P(R/(N&E&C)): something similar goes for him. He is in the same
position with respect to any belief B of his, as is that believer in God. He is in
the same condition, with respect to B, as the widget observer who didn't know
what or who to believe about those red lights. So he too has a defeater for B,
and a good reason for being agnostic with respect to it. If he has no defeater for
that defeater, and no other source of evidence, the right attitude toward B
would be agnosticism. That is not to say that he would in fact be able to reject
B … still, agnosticism is what reason requires. Here, then, we have another
way of developing Darwin's Doubt, a way that does not depend upon
estimating P(R/(N&E&C)) as low, but requires instead only agnosticism about
that probability.83

Now we have the argument in a significantly different form than the
Preliminary Argument. If P(R/N&E&C) is either low or inscrutable, then a person
reflecting upon this has some kind of a defeater for any belief B that he holds, even
the belief N&E. Plantinga notes:
… our devotee of N&E has an undercutting defeater for N&E, a reason to
doubt it, a reason to be agnostic with respect to it. (This also holds if he isn't
agnostic about P(R/(N&E&C)) but thinks it low … he has a defeater either
way.) If he has no defeater for this defeater and no independent evidence—if
his reason for doubting N&E remains undefeated—then the rational course
would be to reject belief in N&E.84
An adherent of N&E might try to escape such a conclusion by arguing that,
since experience seems to vindicate so many of her beliefs as true, she can therefore
conclude that her faculties are reliable. Plantinga anticipates this and responds as
follows:
83
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… The friend of N&E does no better, arguing this way, than the theist who
argues that wish fulfillment must be a reliable belief-producing mechanism
by running a similar argument with respect to the beliefs he holds that he
thinks are produced by wish fulfillment. He does no better than the widget
observer who, by virtue of a similar argument, continues to believe that those
widgets are red, even after having been told by the building superintendent
that they are irradiated by red light. Clearly this is not the method of true
philosophy. 85
Similarly, someone might attempt to argue that the scientific findings of our
day should assure us about the trustworthiness of R. Plantinga holds out little hope
for this option, either:
… consider any argument from science (or anywhere else) he might produce.
This argument will have premises; and these premises, he claims, give him
good reason to believe R (or N&E). But note that he has the very same
defeater for each of those premises that he has for R and for N&E; and he has
the same defeater for his belief that those premises constitute a good reason
for R (or N&E). For that belief, and for each of the premises, he has a reason
for doubting it, a reason for being agnostic with respect to it. This reason,
obviously, cannot be defeated by an ultimately undefeated defeater. For
every defeater of this reason he might have, he knows that he has a defeaterdefeater: the very undercutting defeater that attached itself to R and to N&E
in the first place.86
So then, the reflective adherent of N&E cannot seem to offer an argument for
the reliability of her cognitive faculties without already presupposing the
trustworthiness of those very same cognitive faculties. That is the central hub of
EAAN. In a very important passage that might serve well in describing the gist of
the whole argument, Plantinga writes:
… We could also put it like this: any argument he offers, for R, is in this
context delicately circular or question-begging. It is not formally circular; its
conclusion does not appear among its premises. It is instead … circular in
85
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that it purports to give a reason for trusting our cognitive faculties, but is
itself trustworthy only if those faculties (at least the ones involved in its
production) are indeed trustworthy. … Once I come to doubt the reliability
of my cognitive faculties, I can't properly try to allay that doubt by
producing an argument; for in so doing I rely on the very faculties I am
doubting. The conjunction of evolution with naturalism gives its adherents a
reason for doubting that our beliefs are mostly true; perhaps they are mostly
wildly mistaken. But then it won't help to argue that they can't be wildly
mistaken; for the very reason for mistrusting our cognitive faculties generally
will be a reason for mistrusting the faculties generating the beliefs involved
in the argument.87
If this is so, it seems the main ways for an adherent of N&E to escape from
this dilemma would be to (1) avoid doubting R, or (2) adopt a pragmatic stance
toward R. Concerning (1), notice that, for Plantinga’s argument to get started, he
only needs for some adherent of N&E to entertain the possibility of ~R. With
regard to (2), it seems that Plantinga has no argument with the pragmatist, but only
with those who are claiming N. If someone takes only a pragmatic stance (which
does not assert N to be metaphysically the case), this argument is not directed at her.
Now, doesn’t this manner of doubting of our cognitive faculties involve a
kind of infinite regress of defeaters? Yes, says Plantinga. It does, indeed, put one
into a situation where one should doubt the defeater (since it is produced by the
same questionable cognitive faculties), and then doubt the doubt of the defeater, and
then doubt the doubt of the doubt of the defeater, etc.. Plantinga writes that “…
[w]hat we really have here is one of those nasty dialectical loops to which Hume
calls our attention …”.88 He then goes on to quote a relevant passage from Hume:
The skeptical reasonings, were it possible for them to exist, and were they
87
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not destroy'd by their subtlety, wou'd be successively both strong and weak,
according to the successive dispositions of the mind. Reason first appears in
possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims, with an
absolute sway and authority. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take shelter
under her protection, and by making use of rational arguments to prove the
fallaciousness and imbecility of reason, produces in a matter, a patent under
her hand and seal. This patent has at first an authority, proportioned to the
present and immediate authority of reason, from which it is deriv'd. But as it
is suppos'd to be contradictory to reason, it gradually diminishes the force of
that governing power, and its own at the same time; till at last they both
vanish away into nothing by a regular and just diminution … .89
Plantinga thinks that the adherent of N&E is in an irrational position when he
notices that he is in a situation such as Hume described. Plantinga continues:
When the devotee of N&E notes that he has a defeater for R, then at that stage
he also notes (if apprised of the present argument) that he has a defeater for
N&E; indeed, he notes that he has a defeater for anything he believes. Since,
however, his having a defeater for N&E depends upon some of his beliefs, what
he now notes is that he has a defeater for his defeater of R and N&E; so now he
no longer has that defeater for R and N&E. So then his original condition of
believing R and assuming N&E reasserts itself: at which point he again has a
defeater for R and N&E. But then he notes that that defeater is also a defeater
of the defeater of R and N&E; ... So goes the paralyzing dialectic … The
point remains, therefore: one who accepts N&E (and is apprised of the
present argument) has a defeater for N&E, a defeater that cannot be
defeated by an ultimately undefeated defeater. And isn't it irrational to
accept a belief for which you know you have an ultimately undefeated
defeater?90

The situation of a person being in the loop that is described above (noting that the
defeater has a defeater which has a defeater, and so on) is called by Plantinga as having
a “Humean defeater.” (This is now a technical term in the argument that will later on
become very important.) An adherent of N&E has a reason to discard the belief in N
89
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because it places one into the position of having an undefeated defeater and, from an
epistemic point of view, that is bad.
Remember, this is not an argument for the falsity of N, but rather an argument to
the effect that the holding of N leads to irrationality.91 Plantinga compares it to a
similar case made against classical foundationalism:
… classical foundationalism is either false or such that I would be unjustified
in accepting it; so (given that I am aware of this fact) I can't justifiably accept
it. But of course it does not follow that classical foundationalism is not
true; for all this argument shows, it could be true, though not rationally
acceptable. Similarly here; the argument is not for the falsehood of
naturalism, but for the irrationality of accepting it. The conclusion to be
drawn, therefore, is that the conjunction of naturalism with evolutionary theory is
self-defeating … .92
On the other hand, someone who holds T&E (where T stands for traditional
theism e.g., Jewish, Christian, or Muslim), is considered by Plantinga to not necessarily
be saddled with the same problem. Someone might believe that God is the Premier
Cognizer, that we are made in God’s image as cognizers,93 and that consequently there
are good reasons to believe94 that our cognitive faculties are significantly aimed at the
truth when they are properly functioning.95 (It should be kept in mind that arguing for T
is not a part of EAAN. It is beyond the scope of my project here to examine Plantinga’s
overall arguments for T.)
But isn’t the theist in the same boat with the naturalist, in that neither one of them
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can provide a non-circular argument for R? True, says Plantinga, a theist cannot escape
that problem either, using R to establish R.

Plantinga continues:

Of course he [a theist] can't sensibly argue that in fact our beliefs are mostly
true, from the premise that we have been created by God in his image. More
precisely, he can't sensibly follow Descartes, who started from a condition
of general doubt about whether our cognitive nature is reliable, and then used his
theistic belief as a premise in an argument designed to resolve that doubt. Here
Thomas Reid is surely right:
[quoting Reid] … Descartes certainly made a false step in this
matter, for having suggested this doubt among others—that
whatever evidence he might have from his consciousness, his
senses, his memory, or his reason, yet possibly some malignant
being had given him those faculties on purpose to impose
upon him; and therefore, that they are not to be trusted without
a proper voucher. To remove this doubt, he endeavours to prove the
being of a Deity who is no deceiver; whence he concludes, that the
faculties he had given him are true and worthy to be trusted. It is
strange that so acute a reasoner did not perceive that in this reasoning
there is evidently a begging of the question. For, if our faculties be
fallacious, why may they not deceive us in this reasoning as well as
in others?96

So what is someone to do if she finds that she has these kinds of doubts about our
cognitive faculties and their reliability? If she recognizes that there is no non-circular
argument for R, then Plantinga says:
Here no argument will help you; here [epistemic] salvation will have to be by
grace, not by works. But the theist has nothing impelling him in the direction
of such skepticism in the first place; no element of his noetic system points
in that direction; there are no propositions he already accepts just by way of
being a theist, which together with forms of reasoning (the defeater system,
for example) lead to the rejection of the belief that our cognitive faculties
have the apprehension of truth as their purpose and for the most part fulfill
that purpose.97
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Further Refinement of the Argument: 1994-2000
This is basically where Plantinga leaves the argument at the end of Warrant
and Proper Function. The next major restatement of the argument appeared in 1994
in an unpublished manuscript that Plantinga entitled Naturalism Defeated.98 Here
Plantinga laid out the argument in similar form as in WPF, and responded to various
objections.
In 1996, a collection of articles regarding Plantinga’s ideas on warrant was
published as Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of
Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge.99 Although most of this work is about
Plantinga’s wider views on warrant, some of it also relates specifically to EAAN.
Plantinga’s Respondeo in this volume contains many lessons learned that he
incorporated into later versions.100
The next major presentation and refinement of the argument appeared in the
year 2000 in Warranted Christian Belief.101 The main section of WCB that relates to
EAAN begins by the admission of the problem (and the proposed repair) with the
Preliminary Argument.102 Then Plantinga swiftly moves to the Main Argument,
which he has now streamlined as follows:
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… In essence, the main argument is for the conclusion that
P(R/N&E&C) (which I'll abbreviate as P(R/N)) … is either low or
inscrutable; in either case, so I argued, one who accepts N (and also
grasps the argument for a low or inscrutable value of P(R/N)) has a
defeater for R. This induces a defeater, for him, for any belief produced by
his cognitive faculties, including N itself, hence, ordinary naturalism is
self-defeating. Now I argued that P(R/N) is low or inscrutable by noting
first that natural selection isn't interested in true belief but in adaptive behavior (taken broadly), so that everything turns on the relation between belief
and behavior. I then presented five mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
possibilities for the relation between belief and behavior, arguing with
respect to each possibility P i that P(R/N&P i ) is low or inscrutable,
yielding the result that P(R/N) is low or inscrutable.103
In WCB, Plantinga expands his discussion of the five possibilities (from his
thought experiment in WPF regarding the possible world similar to our own). Again,
the five exhaustive possibilities regarding the relation between behavior and beliefs were:

P1 :

Epiphenominalism (where beliefs are not causally connected with

behavior).104

P2 :

Beliefs as “decoration” (where beliefs are mere effects of behavior, or

“effects of proximate causes that also cause behavior”, that are “like a sort of
decoration that isn’t involved in the causal chain leading to action”).105
P 3:

Semantic epiphenomenalism (where beliefs are causally linked with

behavior, but not because of the content of the beliefs).106
P 4:

Maladaptive causal links, where beliefs are causally linked with

behavior, “semantically” (i.e., content) as well as “syntactically,” but the
103
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belief results in a maladaptive situation.107
P5: Adaptive causal links, where beliefs are causally linked with behavior
and the results are adaptive.108
In each of these possible scenarios, Plantinga believes that P(R/N) is either
low or inscrutable.

That seems obvious enough under P2 and P4, so Plantinga

concentrates on discussing epiphenomenalism (P1), semantic epiphenomenalism
(P3), and the folk-psychological/common sense view (P5).
Plantinga now argues further for the low value of P(R/N) under P1 –
epiphenominalism. (Plantinga uses the term “epiphenomenalism” to “denote any
view according to which belief isn’t involved in the causal chain leading to
behavior …”.)109 He begins by reasserting that epiphenomenalism, though counter
to our intuitions, is very popular among many thinkers. He quotes T. H. Huxley as a
classic exemplar of this position:
… It may be assumed ... that molecular changes in the brain are the causes of
all the states of consciousness.... [But is] there any evidence that these stages of
consciousness may, conversely, cause . . . molecular changes [in the brain]
which give rise to muscular motion? I see no such evidence....
[Consciousness appears] to be … completely without any power of
modifying [the] working of the body, just as the steam whistle . . . of a
locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery … .110
… To the best of my judgment, the argumentation which applies to brutes
holds equally good of men; and therefore ... all states of consciousness in us,
as in them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brainsubstance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that
107
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any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the
matter of the organism.... We are conscious automata … .111
For purposes of EAAN, if beliefs are not causally connected with behavior, it
seems “evolution would not have been able to mold and shape our beliefs …
weeding out falsehood and encouraging truth; for then our beliefs would be, so to
speak, invisible to evolution.”112

So, what would P(R/N) be on this scenario?

Plantinga thinks it is reasonable to judge it to be very low, since any set of beliefs
that humans are capable of having would seem just as likely as any other.113
Turning to the next possibility under consideration, P3 (semantic
epiphenomenalism), we remember here that beliefs are causally connected with
behavior, but only by virtue of the “syntax” of the beliefs, not the “semantics” of the
beliefs.114 While thinking about this option, Plantinga firsts wonders what do most
people believe human beings to be, given N? A likely answer would be, “material
objects”. Although it has been historically very difficult to philosophically say
exactly what material objects are,115 Plantinga grants here for argument’s sake that
humans are material objects. But then, what is the ontological status of a belief that
these material human beings might have?
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Take the belief Cartesian dualism is false116 … presumably many adherents
of N might hold such a belief to be basically a neural event with electrochemical
properties.

These properties might together be called the belief’s “syntax”.

Plantinga then writes:
… [o]f course it is easy to see how these properties of this neuronal event
should have causal influence on behavior … [But] … if this belief is really a
belief, then it will also have other properties, properties in addition to its syntax
or neurophysiological properties. In particular, it will have content; it will be
the belief that p, for some proposition p — in this case, the proposition
Cartesian dualism is false. But how does the content of this neuronal event —
that proposition — get involved in the causal chain leading to behavior? Under
this scenario, it will be difficult or impossible to see how a belief can have
causal influence on our behavior or action by virtue of its content.117
… A question just as pressing, of course, is 'How does this neuronal event have a
content at all?' What is it that assigns to this neuronal event the proposition that
Cartesian dualism is false, as opposed, for instance, to the proposition that it is true,
or interesting, or obsolete, or vaguely obscene?118
Plantinga is highlighting the fact that the peculiar properties of beliefs
(and the properties of the contents of those beliefs) are hard to locate on N’s
metaphysical map. Just what is an ontological status of the contents of beliefs
(given N and semantic epiphenomenalism)?

Continuing along this line,

Plantinga presses further in a passage which is extremely important in
understanding one of the most critical issues of EAAN:
… Suppose the belief had had the same electrochemical properties but
116
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some entirely different content, perhaps the proposition Cartesian dualism is true; would that have made any difference to its role in the causation of behavior? It is certainly hard to see how … there seems to be no
way in which content can get its foot in the door. Of course, it is the content
of my beliefs, not their electrochemical properties, that is the subject of
truth and falsehood: a belief is true just if the proposition that constitutes
its content is true. As in the epiphenomenalist scenario, therefore, the
content of belief would be invisible to evolution. Accordingly, the fact that
we have survived and evolved, that our cognitive equipment was good
enough to enable our ancestors to survive and reproduce—that fact
would tell us nothing at all about the truth of our beliefs or the reliability of
our cognitive faculties. It would tell something about the
neurophysiological properties of our beliefs; it would tell us that, by virtue
of these properties, those beliefs have played a role in the production of
adaptive behavior. But it would tell us nothing about the contents of
these beliefs, and hence nothing about their truth or falsehood. On this
scenario as on the last, therefore, we couldn't sensibly claim a high probability for R. As with the last scenario, the best we could say, I think, is
that this probability is either low or inscrutable … .119
So, under either epiphenomenalism (P1) or semantic epiphenomenalism (P3),
the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (in the sense of pointing toward
truth in a preponderance of cases) seems low or inscrutable. That leaves only the folk
psychology option (P5) to consider.
Under P5, beliefs are often (at least partially) causally linked to behavior, just
like we often intuitively think. So it would seem at first glance that P(R/N) would be
high in this case. However, Plantinga asks, “[c]an we mount an argument from the
evolutionary origins of the processes, whatever they are, that produce these beliefs to
the reliability of those processes?”120 He continues:
… Could we argue, for example, that these beliefs of ours are connected with
behavior in such a way that false belief would produce maladaptive
behavior, behavior which would tend to reduce the probability of the
believers' surviving and reproducing? No. False belief doesn't by any means
119
120

Plantinga, WCB, 234.
Plantinga, WCB, 234.

40

guarantee maladaptive action.121
It doesn’t? Many people think that it’s fairly clear that false beliefs would
ultimately yield maladaptive results; recall the quotations from Popper and Quine, where
organisms that were characterized too much by way of false belief displayed the pathetic
but praiseworthy tendency to die off before reproducing.122 Plantinga has already
responded to this, though, via quoting Churchland and Stich, and now adds this example:
… Perhaps a primitive tribe thinks that everything is really alive, or is a witch or
a demon of some sort; and perhaps all or nearly all of their beliefs are of the
form this witch is F or that demon is G: this witch is good to eat, or that demon
is likely to eat me if I give it a chance. If they ascribe the right properties to
the right witches, their beliefs could be adaptive while nonetheless
(assuming that in fact there aren't any witches) false. 123
Some might retort that, if the tribe members are at least consistently ascribing the
right properties to the right entities, then there is enough truth at work (in a loose sense)
to consider their behavior to be linked with true belief. Plantinga anticipated this idea,
and responded as follows:
… by further gerrymandering, we can easily find schemes under which their
beliefs would lead to adaptive behavior … but are not accurate even in this
loose sense. There are schemes of this sort, in fact, in which the properties
ascribed are logically incapable of exemplification. They think everything is a
witch; perhaps, then, their analogue of property ascriptions involves ascribing
certain sorts of witches (rather than properties). (One of these witches, for
example, is such that, as we would put it, if a thing has it, then that thing is
red.) Then their beliefs will not be accurate in the above sense and will indeed
be necessarily false.124

Beliefs and desires are often paired in ways that affect behavior. Plantinga thinks
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there are examples that easily show many belief-desire combinations containing false
beliefs that could result in the same adaptive behavior as other combinations containing
true beliefs. He states:
… clearly there could be many different systems of belief and desire that yield
the same bit of adaptive behavior, and in many of those systems the belief
components are largely false; there are many possible belief-desire systems
that yield the whole course of my behavior, where in each system most of the
beliefs are false. The fact that my behavior (or that of my ancestors) has
been adaptive, therefore, is at best a third-rate reason for thinking my beliefs
mostly true and my cognitive faculties reliable—and that is true even given the
commonsense view of the relation of belief to behavior. So we can't sensibly
argue from the fact that our behavior (or that of our ancestors) has been
adaptive, to the conclusion that our beliefs are mostly true and our cognitive
faculties reliable. 125

Now, after all this, how would one try to estimate P(R/N)? Plantinga agrees that a
numerical value is problematic. He decides to consider it inscrutable, or to give it a
probability of .9 in order to concede as much as reasonable to the opposition.
Since P1 and P3 both involve no causal connection between beliefs and behavior,
Plantinga designates them together to be -C (representing the contents of beliefs having
no causal efficacy).126 Now the other possibility, C, will represent option P5 (where there
is a causal connection between beliefs and behaviors). Then:
… What we have so far seen is that the probability of R on N&-C is low or
inscrutable and that the probability of R on N&C is also inscrutable or at best
… [.9]. Now what we are looking for is P(R/N). Because C and -C are jointly
exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the calculus of probabilities tells us that
P(R/N) = P(R/N&C) × P(C/N) + P(R/N&-C) × P(-C/N),
that is, the probability of R on N is the weighted average of the probabilities of R
on N&C and N&-C … . We have already noted that the left-hand term of the
first of the two products on the right side of the equality is either
moderately high or inscrutable; the second is either low or inscrutable. What
remains is to evaluate the weights, the right-hand terms of the two
125
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products.127

So, we are now looking for the values of P(C/N) and P(-C/N). In thinking about
the probabilities associated with the two choices, Plantinga first notes that it is difficult to
see how epiphenomenalism (either type P1 or P3) can be avoided given N. He notes that
Robert Cummins128 has called epiphenomenalism the “received view”, since under
materialism it is difficult to envision how beliefs and behavior could otherwise be
connected.129 The reason for this is because:
… it is extremely hard to envisage a way, given materialism, in which the
content of a belief could get causally involved in behavior. If a belief just
is a neural structure of some kind—a structure that somehow possesses
content—then it is exceedingly hard to see how content can get involved in
the causal chain leading to behavior: had a given such structure had a
different content, its causal contribution to behavior, one thinks, would be the
same. By contrast, if a belief is not a material structure at all but a
nonphysical bit of consciousness, it is hard to see [given N] that there is any
room for it in the causal chain leading to behavior; what causes the muscular
contractions involved in behavior will be states of the nervous system, with no
point at which this nonphysical bit of consciousness makes a causal
contribution.130

If this is so, then the probability of P(-C/N) is going to be higher than P(C/N), but
how much higher? Assuming one thinks that the probabilities are not inscrutable, and
given the foregoing discussion of the different types of epiphenomenalism, Plantinga
ventures .7 for P(-C/N) and .3 for P(C/N). He admits these numbers could be off …
perhaps the best thing to do is to consider the valuation to be inscrutable. If, however, the
127

Plantinga, WCB, 236.
Robert Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989) 130. Referenced
in Plantinga, WCB, 236.
129
On the development of a view which could top epiphenomenalism on this point (given N) Plantinga
says, “There have been some valiant efforts, but things don't look hopeful.” Plantinga, WCB, 236.
130
Plantinga, WCB, 236.
128

43

figures seem to be generally reasonable, what does this do to the overall probability
calculation? With .7 and .3 as valuations for P(-C/N) and P(C/N), we only need now a
figure for P(R/N&-C), for which Plantinga hazards an estimation of .2. (For
P(R/N&C), remember, Plantinga already assigned it a (generous, he feels)
figure of .9.) Even with such a large figure for P(R/N&C), the overall result
for P(R/N) will be in the neighborhood of .41, as follows:131
P(R/N) = P(R/N&C) × P(C/N) + P(R/N&-C) × P(-C/N)
.41
.9
.3
.2
.7

These numbers are very speculatively and tentatively posited.

However,

Plantinga notes that they can be shifted significantly without really changing the result:
… Of course these figures are the merest approximations; others might make
the estimates somewhat differently; but they can be significantly altered without
significantly altering the final result. For example, perhaps you think
P(R/N&C) is higher, perhaps even 1; then (retaining the other assignments)
P(R/N) will be in the neighborhood of .44. Or perhaps you reject the thought
that P(-C/N) is more probable than P(C/N), thinking them about equal. Then
(again, retaining the other assignments) P(R/N) will be in the neighborhood of
.55 [which is still not enough to represent enough of a preponderance for
reliability].132
On the other hand, if one feels the probabilities above to be inscrutable, then
P(R/N) will be inscrutable, too. Therefore, says Plantinga, it is reasonable to think
that P(R/N) is either low or inscrutable. 133
Now say that someone reflects upon this and does indeed think that P(R/N)
is either low or inscrutable. Either way, Plantinga thinks that that person has a
defeater for R (if she believes N). In order to display this more clearly, Plantinga
131
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refers back to various analogies from WPF (e.g., the Beleaguered Believer and the
Irradiated Widgets). 134 In WCB he offers a few more. One of them is the case of
the Mysterious Radio Device in Space. 135
In this example, imagine being on a space voyage and finding a radio-like
device which emits sounds you recognize to be sentences in English. You do not
know the truth values of these sentences, but at first glance you tend to believe
them.

However, upon reflection, you realize that you know nothing about the

makers of this instrument, nor its purpose.

What is the probability that the

propositions sounded by the instrument are trustworthy?

Plantinga says the

probability is low or inscrutable (illustrating his position that, often, agnosticism
with respect to origins endangers knowledge). You have a defeater for your initial
belief that the instrument was reliable. 136
Now isn’t the supporter of N in such a position? Plantinga believes:
… The same goes for the naturalist who realizes that P(R/N) is low or
inscrutable. With respect to those factors crucially important for coming to a
sensible view of the reliability of his belief-producing mechanisms—how they
were formed and what their purpose is, if any — he must concede that the
probability that those faculties are reliable is at best inscrutable. Unless he has
some other information, the right attitude would be to withhold R. 137
Someone might seize on the phrase “unless he has some other information”
and assert that this gesture toward additional evidence is a promising avenue
toward restoring confidence in R.

However, that would seem to ignore the

particular nature of this kind of defeater. This defeater is tied in a very special way
134
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to all of the output from one’s cognitive processes (at least the parts that involve
propositions). Plantinga writes:
… And how could he have or get other information? Any such information would
consist in beliefs that were a product of his cognitive faculties, but he has a defeater
for the reliability of those faculties and hence for any belief produced by them.138

Don’t we have here again the same situation illustrated by the Humean
defeater mentioned earlier? The reflective adherent of N&E seems placed into the
nasty dialectical loop. Not only are her beliefs questioned, but also her doubts
about these beliefs, and her doubts about her doubts, and any other proposition to
which she might look for relief, ad infinitum. This also affects the beliefs about N.
Therefore, “we might say that N is self-defeating, in that if it is accepted in the
ordinary way, it provides a defeater for itself, a defeater that can't be defeated.”139
As we recall, Plantinga believes that this is not only the case when we believe
P(R/N) to be low, but also when we remain agnostic about N.

We have seen that he

hopes to make this point more persuasive by analogizing with several examples. Here in
WCB he presents another one, the case of the Suspicious Barometer.140 Say you come
upon an instrument, like a barometer, that you believe to be in one of two conditions.
You think that the likelihood that it is in either condition is .5. In Condition 1, the
likelihood that the instrument is reliable is so high that you would “unhesitatingly accept
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its deliverances.”141 But, if it is in Condition 2, you have no idea whether or not the
instrument is reliable. Now, asks Plantinga, given this situation, would you accept the
instrument as reliable? He thinks you should not. Why wouldn’t the rational stance be to
withhold belief?
Likewise, Plantinga says, is the situation of our reflective adherent of N; because
of the lack of knowledge about the origins and purpose of her cognitive faculties, should
she think that P(R/N) is .5? Or should she think the probability is inscrutable? Either
way she has a defeater for her ordinary belief R. If she doesn’t have a defeater-defeater
(and, in this situation, how could she have one?), she seems stuck.
“… just as Hume sees, the rational attitude [in this situation] is to be agnostic
with respect to any of the deliverances of … [her] cognitive faculties … [She]
may not, in fact, be able to be agnostic with respect to them, but agnosticism is
what rationality requires.”142
This is basically the argument as it stands at the end of WCB. There is, however,
a brief response in WCB to one of Keith Lehrer’s criticisms where Plantinga illustrates
how he would handle some tu quoque objections.143 Lehrer’s point (which Plantinga
believes to be perhaps the most challenging tu quoque against his argument) involves the
problem of evil and develops in the manner, below.
Consider theism (T), the kind that includes the proposition that we are made by a
loving and just God and that we and our cognitive faculties somehow reflect God’s
image. What would be P(R/T)? Maybe not so high, given all the evils which plague our
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existence. Some of these evils (e.g., cognitive diseases) could very easily damage the
reliability of our cognitive faculties. Furthermore, since Plantinga’s version of T involves
the existence of a malevolent supernatural being, on that scenario it seems that God
allows Satan to disseminate widespread error which gives further reason to doubt our
cognitive faculties under T. So, Lehrer writes:
Compare …
S

Satan and his cohorts produce incredible deceps [where a decep is a unit of
deception144] of error
with
E Evolutionary processes produce incredible deceps of error.
… I find little to choose between them. A naturalist wishing to assign a high
probability to the conclusion that the proper functioning of our faculties yields
truth because they are the result of evolution must assign a low probability to
E, while a supernaturalist wishing to assign a high probability to the
conclusion that the proper functioning of our faculties yields truth because
they are designed by God must assign a low probability to S.145
Plantinga’s response is that, actually, something like this has indeed happened
under T. However, the Christian doesn’t accept merely T, but the other relevant aspects
of the T account, including “… fall (along with corruption of the image of God),
redemption, regeneration, and the consequent repair and restoration of that
image.”146 The Christian believes she knows these things, in part, by way of divine
revelation. (Warranted Christian Belief has extended discussions in various places
concerning how these beliefs might be warranted, propositionally and nonpropositionally.) Therefore, Plantinga says, she does not necessarily have a defeater
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for T.

He continues by discussing the following example involving Feike the

Millionaire. Suppose that someone tells you the following about Feike:

(1) Feike is a very wealthy eccentric who loves to wear dilapidated old clothes
from the local Goodwill.
Because of this, you believe (2):
(2) Feike wears dilapidated old clothes.
But, you have also believed for a long time that:
(3) Feike is a millionaire.147
Plantinga comments:
… But now I note that P((3)/(2)) is low (most people who wear dilapidated old
clothes are not millionaires); I conclude in considerable puzzlement that (2) is a
defeater, for me, of (3), and do my best to refrain from believing (3). My error is
plain: (2) isn't, in fact, a defeater for (3), for me. Why not? Well, for one thing,
because I see that the warrant (2) has for me is derivative from the warrant (1) has
for me, and obviously (1) is not, for me, a defeater for (3). But that means that (2)
is not a defeater of (3). If you would like a principle, try: (4) If (i) S believes A,
B, and C, and (ii) S believes that the warrant B has for her is derivative from the
warrant A has for her, and (3) S believes that A is not a defeater, for her, of C, then
B is not a defeater, for S, of C.
This principle, as I say, delivers R from defeat, for the Christian theist … believes
that she knows the whole Christian story, or that at any rate it has some considerable
warrant for her. Theism is part of that story, and the warrant theism has for her is
derivative from the warrant had for her of the whole Christian story. Hence by (4)
theism won't be a defeater of R for her unless the whole Christian story is. But it
isn't. Therefore, theism isn't a defeater of R, for her, and the objection crumbles.148

In this way, Plantinga feels that the tu quoque mentioned by Lehrer doesn’t hurt his
argument. With that, the sections in WCB dealing with EAAN are finished. The next major
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published restatement and refinement of the overall argument of EAAN appears in
Naturalism Defeated?, to which I now turn.149

EAAN in Naturalism Defeated? (2002)
Naturalism Defeated? is a collection of papers which are all specifically
critiquing some aspect of EAAN. Plantinga himself contributed two chapters to the
volume: a chapter of introduction in which he gives an overview of the argument (in
roughly 12 pages),150 and a chapter of responses to various points made by the other
contributors.151
In the introductory chapter, Plantinga presents the argument in compacted form,
with no substantial additions to what he had said in WPF and WCB. He reminds the
reader that his argument contains no detailed analysis on the question of what exactly
philosophical naturalism is, nor does his argument attempt to analyze in depth the
concept of reliability. He hopes that, for the purpose of EAAN, general conceptions of
these terms will suffice.152 The idea of “naturalism” with which he works is roughly
taken to mean that there is no such person as God (as traditionally conceived by
Christians, Jews, and Muslims).153 The concept of a reliable cognitive system is
generally taken to mean one that “produces a preponderance of true beliefs.”154
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He does, however, include an important comment concerning reliability that we
will see come into play later when he responds to various critics:
Very roughly: a thermometer stuck on seventy-two degrees isn’t reliable even
if it is located somewhere (San Diego?) where it is seventy-two degrees nearly all
of the time. What the thermometer (and our cognitive faculties) would do if
things were different in certain (hard to specify) respects is also relevant. Again,
if our aim were to analyze reliability much more would have to be said. Note that
for reliability thus construed, it is not enough that the beliefs produced be fitness
enhancing.155

Important Objections to EAAN in Naturalism Defeated?
It is time now to look at some important objections to EAAN in Naturalism
Defeated?, which is probably the single most important book with which to interact
regarding EAAN. The volume begins with a remark by James Beilby about the multifaceted nature of the argument. As Beilby has noticed:
… One of the most fascinating aspects of Plantinga’s evolutionary argument
against naturalism is its multilayered nature. It raises issues of interest to
epistemologists, philosophers of mind, evolutionary biologists, and philosophers
of religion, just to name a few. The diversity of philosophical questions raised by
Plantinga’s argument also contributes to its complexity.156

EAAN is not straightforward or simplistic; it touches upon many overlapping
areas of interest in philosophy. Such interweaving may be part of its attraction, but it also
exposes it to challenge from a myriad of positions. This makes difficult the attempt to
group and categorize the possible objections. However, many (perhaps most) of the sofar published challenges do seem to fall into fairly recognizable areas. Beilby helpfully
and loosely categorizes some of the major criticisms as follows: (1) those having to do
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with science and evolution, (2) those concerning skepticism, (3) critiques regarding
conditional probabilities, and (4) assessments about the nature of defeaters.157 In the next
chapter, I discuss the first category, science and evolution; in later chapters other
categories will be addressed.
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CHAPTER THREE
Some Concerns about EAAN and Evolution
Perhaps the first reaction of many people, when they initially hear of Plantinga’s
argument, is one of puzzlement … why would Plantinga believe that current evolutionary
theory doesn’t have a mechanism to weed out organisms that have mostly false beliefs?
In this vein, they are thinking similarly to Popper and Quine, quoted earlier.158 As we
remember Quine putting it, “… [c]reatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.”159
By responding to various criticisms EAAN has received concerning current
evolutionary theory, Plantinga has had the opportunity to refine his argument in that
respect. This refinement primarily consists in additional exposition in order to avoid
misunderstandings (as opposed to any substantive changes). In this chapter I will look at
some important critiques of EAAN regarding evolutionary theory. I will conclude this
chapter by pointing out how the criticisms surveyed here help in grasping Plantinga’s
main intentions in EAAN.

William Ramsey’s Objections to EAAN
William Ramsey’s critique revolves around the idea of “evolutionary reliabilism”,
the view that “natural selection tends to favor reliable belief-producing mechanisms”.160
Ramsey believes that Plantinga’s EAAN does not sufficiently call into doubt
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evolutionary reliabilism. Although Ramsey grants that “… a belief’s truth value, though
partly dependent upon what is going on inside the head, is not reducible to neurological
matters”, he nevertheless feels that “a relational property [like truth] that fails to
supervene on physical features can … [still] be a casually [sic]161 salient property that
brings about a certain state of affairs.”162 How so?
Ramsey gives an example: Bob is one of 10 creatures competing for a scarce
resource, in this case food. Bob’s cognitive equipment works along the lines of (as
Plantinga calls it) semantic epiphenomenalism.163 The truth values of his beliefs are not
causally connected with his behavior.
Now, if all you want to do is explain Bob’s immediate behavior, you only need to
look at the neurophysiological aspects. There’s no need to look into his beliefs.164 But if
we want to know why Bob survived while the others died out, then it is perfectly
plausible to explain the situation by noting that Bob’s beliefs were based on truths (about
where the food was located). So, in one sense, beliefs and behavior might not be causally
connected (because truths aren’t reducible to physical properties), but in another sense,
since the truth values of beliefs can affect the consequences of behavior (i.e., making it
successful behavior), “… truth and reliability are exactly the sort of features for which
there can indeed be considerable selection pressure.” In other words, “truth doesn’t make
the behavior, it makes the behavior better.” 165 Therefore, truths can still be relevant to
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the explanations of adaptations although they are not directly causally connected with the
behavior of an organism.
Plantinga, in response, thinks that Ramsey must be mistakenly assuming that
EAAN depends upon a proposition like relational properties cannot be selected for.
Plantinga states that EAAN does not require this proposition, because “fitness itself is a
relational property that is not reducible to and does not supervene on intrinsic
neurophysiological properties … and fitness can certainly be selected for.”166 Rather,
EAAN (in the context of the semantic epiphenomenalism that Ramsey is espousing,
where only the syntaxes of beliefs and not the semantics are involved in the link between
belief and behavior of an organism) stresses that:
… [when the content of a belief] does not enter into the causal chain leading to
behavior … [then] it is not the case that a belief produces adaptive behavior by
way of being true, or maladaptive behavior by way of being false. So natural
selection can’t, directly at any rate, mold belief-producing mechanisms in the
direction of the production of reliability by rewarding adaptive behavior and
penalizing maladaptive behavior … What counts here is not whether truth is a
relational property (which it is) but whether belief is causally efficacious by way
of its content.167
About the example of Bob, Plantinga notes that Ramsey’s illustration seems to
conflate two different types of mental representations: indicator representations and
belief representations. An indicator representation is like a mercury thermometer, where
different temperatures result in different lengths of the mercury column. Thus, one could
say that the thermometer “indicates” or “represents” a certain temperature. You could
even say that the representation is accurate in a sense (i.e., “a representation r … is
accurate if the state that r is in is the one with which r is correlated – in this case, the
166
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ambient temperature”).168 However, this is a trivial kind of accuracy. This “indicator”
kind of a representation “… is or course very different from a belief; it is not that this
device … believes that the temperature is so and so.” 169 He continues:
… Now it is not so much as remotely plausible to suggest that the indicator
content of an indicator representation does not (in general) enter the causal chain
that leads to behavior. On the contrary: it is because the state in question
represents what it does that it causes the behavior that it does; there is an easy
explanation of its causing that temperature in terms of what it represents. It is
because it represents that temperature that, when it occurs, it causes shivering.
Furthermore, since indicator representations are automatically accurate, natural
selection will not be able to select for mechanisms that produce inaccurate
representations. But none of this, so far, has anything to do with belief, or with
the truth of a belief.170
If I am reading both men correctly, I understand Ramsey’s point and Plantinga’s
rebuttal to be something like this: suppose Bear A shows a predilection for a certain kind
of tree. Bear B likes to climb in a different type of tree. Now Bear A, for some reason,
ends up in firmer looking trees, while Bear B, more often than not, ends up in softer,
more flexible trees that lean out over precipices. Although (let’s say) there are no beliefs
with truth values at work (in the sense of a rational deliberation resulting in a certain type
of behavior), we can expect the Bear A to more often be in the position, all other things
being equal, to survive and reproduce. This is because a truth is at work, namely, that
bears in soft, flexible trees which lean out over precipices tend to fall more often than
bears which are not so positioned. That’s Ramsey’s point.
Plantinga grants all of this, but wonders how it is supposed to hurt EAAN.
EAAN is an argument that, in part, says that natural selection does not necessarily select
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for true beliefs of an organism when that belief’s truth value is associated with behavior
by way of the content of that belief. Is there a belief (with a content that has a truth
value) at work here in the case of either bear? No. That’s Plantinga’s point.
Ramsey then tries a different tack. He questions Plantinga’s examples of how the
process of natural selection might result in the selection of organisms because of their
fitness-enhancing behavior based upon false beliefs. He complains that the examples
don’t provide instances of a preponderance of false beliefs.171 Remember Plantinga’s
example of the prehistoric hominid Paul, who runs away from tigers? Plantinga said in
WPF:
… clearly this avoidance behavior could be a result of a thousand other beliefdesire combinations: indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B equally
well. (Here let me ignore the complication arising from the fact that belief
comes in degrees.) Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but
whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect,
because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his
body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving
much by way of true belief.172
Plantinga’s point was that there are many belief-desire combinations (which are
based upon false beliefs) that can produce behavior that can be fitness-enhancing.
However, Ramsey thinks that this establishes little. Sure, every now and then a being
might have strange belief-behavior combinations that luckily become adaptive. But
Ramsey thinks that, to question evolutionary reliabilism, Plantinga owes an account that
shows how a mechanism or process “… (a) could come about through evolution, and (b)
generate … mostly false beliefs over time, and (c) nevertheless prove … [to be]
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adaptive.”173 It is hard for Ramsey to see how a being can, over the long run, persist in
false beliefs without getting into significant trouble leading to maladaptivity. This is,
once again, the strong echo of the earlier mentioned thoughts of Popper and Quine.
Plantinga responds that it is relatively easy to provide examples of how “ … entire
systems [as opposed to a few occurrences] of mainly false beliefs can be adaptive, and
adaptive by virtue of their content.”174 He notes that several naturalists (like E. O.
Wilson and Michael Ruse) “… have argued that belief in God, while false, is nonetheless
adaptive.”175 Now entertain the following possible world: say naturalism is true (in the
sense that there is no God, as traditionally described earlier). Also suppose that there is a
group of people, and that each person in this group believes in God and thinks that
everything (other than God) is a contingent created thing; say, a “creature”.176 Imagine
that their only possible way of referring to these things is by way of definite descriptions
like “the tree creature before me” or “the tiger creature approaching me.”177 Now:
… Suppose still further that all their beliefs are properly expressed by singular
sentences whose subjects are definite descriptions expressing properties that entail
the property of creaturehood – such sentences as ‘The tiger creature approaching
me is dangerous’, or ‘The tree creature before me is full of apple creatures’.
Suppose, finally, that their definite descriptions work the way Bertrand Russell
thought definite descriptions work: ‘The tallest man is Boston is wise’ …
abbreviates ‘There is exactly one tallest man in Boston, and it is wise’. Then
from the naturalist perspective all their beliefs are false. Yet these can still be
adaptive: all they have to do is ascribe the right properties to the right
‘creatures’.178

173

Ramsey, in Beilby, 20; emphasis mine.
Plantinga, in Beilby, 260.
175
Plantinga, in Beilby, 260.
176
A very large number of people in the world who are traditionally-described theists believe something
like this very proposition: every existing thing, other than God, is a “creature” entity.
177
Plantinga, in Beilby, 260.
178
Plantinga, in Beilby, 260.
174

58

Or, imagine that the each person in this group thinks that:
… for any situation calling for action, there is just one action which has the
nonnatural property of being right … [g]iven that there isn’t any nonnatural
property of being right, their judgments about actions will for the most part be
mistaken – though adaptive, if they ascribe nonnatural rightness to fitnesspromoting actions and take the actions they think are nonnaturally right.179
Or, Plantinga, says, try another example:
… Michael Rea argues that naturalism implies an ontology of gunk, an ontology
according to which there really aren’t any objects (although there is a sort of
continuous gunk or goo which may … be ‘propertied’ differently in different
places). Suppose Rea is right: then since most of our beliefs imply that there are
objects, most of our beliefs will be false. Still, our natural way of cutting the
world up into objects could be adaptive …”.180
Now remember Ramsey had protested that although some of an organism’s
beliefs may be false, that doesn’t mean that mostly false beliefs are guiding the organism.
He charged that Plantinga implicitly subscribes to one or both of the following premises:
P1: If any of your beliefs about some subject are false, then all (or most) of your
beliefs about that subject are false.
P2: If you suffer from a deep misconception of some subject, then all (or most) of
your beliefs about that subject are false.181
But Plantinga denies holding either premise, and doesn’t think his examples use them:
… Instead, I say that it is certainly possible that there be creatures all of whose
beliefs are of the above form, and who are also such that their definite
descriptions function Russelianly; in which case all or nearly all of their beliefs,
from a naturalistic point of view, would be false (though still adaptive) …
[Furthermore, imagine annexing] creaturehood to the properties expressed by the
predicates of these speakers instead of to their referring devices … [t]hen once
more the bulk of their beliefs will be false, from a naturalistic perspective, but
could nonetheless be adaptive. And couldn’t this easily happen … that a tribe
comes to believe that there is such a person as God … [and that] this could have
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adaptive advantages[?] … It could also easily happen that their predicates come to
express only properties that entail creaturehood.182
What has been revealed through the exchange between Ramsey and Plantinga?
First of all, (and this is an important point) we have been reminded that EAAN is an
argument about the relation of true beliefs to adaptive behavior, not truths (in general) to
adaptive behavior. There is no change here from Plantinga’s original formation, so in a
sense Ramsey’s point about “Bob” belongs more properly to a case being made against
some other argument.
Secondly, we have examined the charge that the onus is on Plantinga to show that
it is possible to have mostly untrue beliefs and that the behavior resulting from those
beliefs be adaptive. Plantinga believes that there are infinitely many pairings of untrue
beliefs and behaviors that could be adaptive. (However, he offers these only as
possibilities, because one of the main points of the argument is that no one knows for
sure whether these pairings of untrue beliefs and adaptive behaviors have actually
happened.) He presented an example involving theistic beliefs that a naturalist would
take to be false, but noted that those beliefs seemed to be able nonetheless to become
involved with adaptive behavior.
Has Plantinga shown that the belief system of the group of theists was so
drastically false that that R was threatened? Plantinga feels that he has, by way of
crafting the thought experiment in such a way that all (or almost all) propositions that
each person in the group might believe are false. However, we will see (below) that
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Ramsey’s type of objection does not die easily, as it will be repeated and refined in some
critiques of Jerry Fodor, Elliot Sober, and Branden Fitelson.

Jerry Fodor’s Objections to EAAN
Jerry Fodor begins his critique of EAAN by stating that he is an adherent of
Scientism, which he claims to be the view that “… on the one hand, that the goals of
scientific inquiry include the discovery of objective empirical truths … and, on the other
hand, that science has come pretty close to achieving this goal, at least from time to
time.”183 He thinks that Scientism (defined this way) is obviously and certainly true, but
nonetheless is puzzlingly under attack by various groups of people like some relativists,
pragmatists, idealists, a priorists, fundamentalists, feminists, etc..184 Additionally, if that
isn’t enough, he notes that currently even some Darwinists are attacking Scientism:
“… [n]ot all Darwinists, to be sure; or even, I should think, a near majority. Still, the
following rumor is definitely abroad in the philosophical community: … Darwinism …
undermines the scientific enterprise.”185 In Fodor’s essay on EAAN, he claims that
“[there is] nothing at all in evolutionary theory that entails, or suggests, or even gives one
grounds to contemplate, denying the commonsense thesis that scientific inquiry quite
generally lead to the discovery of objective empirical truths [i.e., Scientism].”186
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As Plantinga’s EAAN is one of these supposedly undermining positions, Fodor
begins to look at Plantinga’s contention, which Fodor takes to be something like this:
Argument A: Our minds evolved, so we can assume that our behavior is mostly
adaptive. But our behavior could be mostly adaptive even if our beliefs were
mostly false. So there’s no reason to think that most of our beliefs are true.187
Fodor notes that this probably is not exactly Plantinga’s argument, but that there is an
important argument somewhere “in the immediate vicinity of Argument A.”188 Fodor
states:
… Plantinga’s point is that you can imagine the mind’s succeeding as a beliefmaking mechanism even if the beliefs that it makes aren’t true. Still, I don’t think
that Argument A could be exactly what Plantinga has in mind; not, at least, if
what he has in mind is an argument against Scientism (or what he calls
“naturalism,” which, at least for present purposes, we may take to be much the
same thing).189
… What Plantinga really needs (and what I haven’t any doubt is what he really
intends) is argument A* … [which is] just like Argument A except that the
conclusion is stronger [e.g., an argument that concludes there is reason to think
that most of our beliefs are false].190
Fodor continues by saying that “… Plantinga thinks (as I do not) that there is
some serious chance it will turn out that we don’t act out of the content of our mental
states at all, a fortiori that the truth of our beliefs can’t be what explains our behavioral
successes.”191
To begin analyzing Plantinga’s case, Fodor examines some of Plantinga’s
examples which countenance living beings exhibiting adaptive behavior that is based
upon false beliefs. Fodor, however, doubts that these examples show what Plantinga
187
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thinks that they show. Consider the Plantingian illustration about creatures who think
that everything is a witch (e.g., they think that witchcat on the witchmat is asleep.)192
Rather than this illustrating a situation involving a massive amount of false beliefs, Fodor
thinks that these creatures still have mostly true beliefs:
Let it be that that appletree witch is blooming is false, or lacks a truth value …
[s]till much of what a creature believes in virtue of which it believes that that
appletree witch is blooming (and in virtue of which the thought that that appletree
witch is blooming leads to behavioral success) are perfectly straightforwardly
true. For example: that’s an appletree; that’s blooming; that’s there; something
is blooming; something is there, and so on indefinitely).193
Fodor thinks that it is just not clear that these creatures have mostly false beliefs,
although he admits that there is no agreed upon way of counting beliefs. Nonetheless,
Fodor thinks that Plantinga’s case requires “… that it not be in doubt that a system of
mostly false beliefs could be adaptive. If there were anything wrong with the notion of a
system of mostly false but adaptive beliefs, Plantinga’s Darwinian argument against
Scientism[194] couldn’t get off the ground.”195 However, Fodor acknowledges: “… I
haven’t an argument for what I strongly suspect, that there is no way of constructing such
a system.”
Like Ramsey, Fodor thinks that it is up to Plantinga to show how our adaptive
success has been based upon mostly false beliefs. “What’s needed”, Fodor says, “… is
some independent reason for thinking that many of our behavioral successes have
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actually have been predicated on false beliefs …”. However, there is a lot of inductive
evidence against this.196
What is the inductive evidence? Fodor goes on:
… this morning I managed to get my teeth brushed; a small behavioral success, to
be sure, but mine own. Such as it was, I’m quite certain that it was prompted and
guided by a host of true beliefs including, inter alia: true beliefs about my teeth
needing a brush; true beliefs about the spatiotemporal location of my tooth brush,
true beliefs about the spatiotemporal location of my teeth, true beliefs about the
spatiotemporal location of my limbs with respect to my toothbrush and my teeth,
and so on. Certainly short of philosophical skepticism, I can think of no reason in
the world to deny any of this.197

This isn’t to say that untrue beliefs can’t be successful, but that we normally and rightly
think that such occurrences (i.e., successful false beliefs) are the exceptions, not the rule:
… What we all believe is that when actions out of false beliefs are successful,
that’s generally a lucky accident; and, correspondingly, that a policy of acting on
false beliefs, even when it works in the short run, generally gets you into trouble
sooner or later …The inductive evidence is that, though some of our actions on
false beliefs have succeeded from time to time, pretty generally our actions on
false beliefs have failed; and they’ve failed precisely because they were actions
on false beliefs.198
A global philosophical skepticism might cause one to doubt all of this. But since
Fodor does not consider extreme philosophical skepticism as a viable option, he thinks
that “there is no reason on God’s green earth why a proper Darwinism should reject this
commonsense view.”199
Plantinga responds by first noting that, on Fodor’s definition of Scientism,
Plantinga is himself an adherent of Scientism. Plantinga agrees with the thought that
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science strives to (and often does) discover objective truths about the world. This idea
fits well within theism. He states that “… when I say that the naturalist has a defeater for
R, I certainly don’t mean to say that a defeater for R afflicts just anyone who thinks that
science aims at the discovery of objective true beliefs and sometimes succeeds in that
aim.”200 So, Plantinga does not accept Fodor’s equating of Scientism with naturalism;
Plantinga does not see himself arguing against Scientism, so defined.
Likewise, regarding another of Fodor’s assertions, it is worth noting that
Plantinga would not doubt that the Toothbrushing Behavior was based on mostly true
beliefs. Plantinga agrees that we know many things. Once again (and it bears repeating
many times), EAAN isn’t an argument Plantinga is using to support global skepticism,
but a specific argument to reject naturalism. It is an argument questioning whether N&E
can coherently provide the basis for what we know. EAAN assumes that we know many
things … we just can’t account for the things that we know given N&E.
Plantinga reminds us:
Recall that according to EAAN, (a) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, and (b) this
gives the naturalist a defeater (a Humean defeater) for R, and hence a (Humean)
defeater for anything else he believes, including N&E itself. The argument for (a)
… [came from the formula:]
P(R/N&E) = [P(R/N&E&C) × P(C/N&E)] + [P(R/N&E&-C) × P(-C/N&E)].[201]
Now Fodor’s attention is directed entirely at … [the terms in the first bracket,
since Fodor apparently considers -C to be negligible] … Fodor thinks there is no
serious chance that … the content of our beliefs does not enter into the causal
chain leading to behavior. Right, I agree … [b]ut of course that does nothing to
show that P(-C/N&E) is negligible. The probability of semantic
epiphenomenalism may still be high on N&E … no matter how strongly we
commonsensically accept its denial … .202
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In other words, -C might be improbable given our strong intuitions that there is a
causal link between our beliefs and our behavior. But, Plantinga believes that he has
presented an argument that P(-C) is high given N&E. Therefore, “so much the worse for
N&E”.203 “[T]here is no guarantee, after all, that N&E supports common sense. Indeed,
the heart of my argument is that it does not.”204
This is in part because of some concerns Plantinga laid out in WPF and WCB
regarding the difficulties of ontologically accounting for the content of propositions in a
naturalistic framework.205 If the relevant leading theory in the philosophy of mind
(among the various naturalistic ones) is semantic epiphenomenalism, then a belief is in
the causal chain by way of “its neurophysiological properties, not its content.”206 Under
such a scenario, it seems very difficult indeed to ontologically account for the content,
but the content is needed in order to have true and false propositions.
So, Plantinga believes P(-C/N&E) is high, and if so, then it is reasonable to think
that P(R/N&E&-C) is low.207 Assuming this is correct, then it wouldn’t matter very
much what value is associated with P(R/N&E&C):
Suppose, for example, P(R/N&E&-C) is .2 and P(-C/N&E) is .8. Then P(C/N&E)
will be .2; and then even if we assign P(R/N&E&C) a value of 1, P(R/N&E) will
be less and ½ (.36, to be exact) – certainly low enough to be a defeater, for R, for
the naturalist.208
However, Plantinga did also give an argument that P(R/N&E&C) was, at best,
only moderately high. Plantinga thinks that Fodor is correct in noting that this part of
203
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EAAN “depends upon the claim that it is quite possible, and perfectly compatible with
N&E, that there be creatures with adaptive but mainly false beliefs.”209 Fodor’s
misgivings about this were illustrated by his objections to Plantinga’s thought experiment
about beings who think everything is a witch. Fodor thought that most of these creatures’
beliefs were still true, or at least that it wasn’t clear that most of their beliefs were false.
About Fodor’s criticisms, Plantinga writes:
[Fodor] … overlooks the fact that, as I constructed the case (and whose case is it,
after all?), these creatures form beliefs only of the form ‘that P-witch has Q’ for
properties P and Q. (We may add, if we like, that they form general beliefs of the
form all (some) P-witches are Q, together with propositions appropriately
constructible out of these general and singular beliefs.) So the creature in
question doesn’t believe that’s an appletree (though he may believe that witch is
an appletree) or that’s blooming (though he may believe that witch is blooming).
Why couldn’t there be creatures like that? … surely [the creature’s] behavioral
successes can be explained as well by virtue of its believing that witch is
blooming … as by virtue of its believing that’s blooming … .210
Plantinga then takes issue with Fodor’s claim that Plantinga is reasoning from the
mere possibility that our behavior could be adaptive while most of our beliefs are false to
the conclusion that most of our beliefs, then, are false. Plantinga responds:
What I actually said is that there are indefinitely many systems of belief and
desire that will yield the same (adaptive) behavior; among these there are
indefinitely many where most of the beliefs involved are mostly false; and then,
“Here one doesn’t know what to say about the probability that their cognitive
systems would produce mostly true beliefs, but perhaps it would be reasonable to
estimate it as somewhat more than ½” (WPF, 227). No claim here that we have
reason to think most of our beliefs are false; and certainly no argument to the
claim from the premise that it is possible.211
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Now, what about Fodor’s assertion that Plantinga needs to provide independent
evidence for the claim that most of our behavior is linked to false beliefs? Plantinga
wonders why it needs to be independently plausible:
… Independent of what? I’m not sure what he means, but perhaps it’s this: if the
naturalist has a defeater for R in N&E and the Probability Thesis,[212] it must be
because he has something like evidence independent of N&E that as a matter of
fact -R is true with respect to him. But why think a thing like that? I learn that
my sphygmomanometer was fabricated by a wealthy eccentric who wants to do in
the medical establishment; as far as I can see, the probability of its being reliable,
given this origin, is low or inscrutable; I have no other evidence for its reliability.
Doesn’t that just in itself give me a defeater for my initial assumption that the
sphygmomanometer is reliable? Why do I need independent evidence that it is
unreliable? Suppose I’ve ingested that reliability-inhibiting drug XX and I think
that the probability of R, given that fact, is low or inscrutable. Then don’t I have
a defeater for R, with respect to me, even if I don’t have independent evidence
that my cognitive faculties are unreliable?213
Plantinga here brings up a point redolent of a problem we encountered earlier;
once one is in Hume’s dialectical loop, how could one present any independent
evidence in order to get out of it? Once one has admitted the possibility that one’s
cognitive faculties might be unreliable, how can one allay that fear by presenting
“independent” evidence which uses those same faculties? How could one possibly
acquire “independent” evidence in such a situation? What could possibly be the
criteria be for knowing that the evidence is “independent”?
At the end of Fodor’s article there is a significant admission by him which seems
to concede a lot to EAAN. He agrees that E, just by itself, doesn’t provide a reason to
think we’re “true believers”. He writes:
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I propose to conclude with a caveat … I also want to warn against the … fallacy
… of arguing from “Darwinism doesn’t imply that most of our beliefs are false”
to “it’s therefore likely that most of our beliefs are true.”214
… Since, for all we know, evolution would have chosen false believers if it had
been given the chance, the fact that evolution chose us isn’t, in and of itself, a
reason for thinking that we’re true believers. There is, as far as I can tell, no
Darwinian reason for thinking that we’re true believers. Or that we aren’t …
Darwin isn’t in the epistemology business, and evolution doesn’t care whether
most of our beliefs are true.215

Fodor thinks it is possible that we were once selected (long ago in the past)
because of adaptive behavior based upon false beliefs (evolution doesn’t care), but that
it’s pretty clear that it just doesn’t work that way right now. Because of the predictive
success of so many of our scientific theories, clearly “it’s mostly true beliefs that
eventuate in adaptive behavior now”.216 In other words, Fodor agrees that the theory of
natural selection does not entail adaptive behavior based upon true beliefs, but it just so
happens that (now anyway) that is how the process is working. He states:
[Why] … do I believe that the lunar theory of the tides … [is] pretty close to
being true? … [O]n account of my (casual, to be sure) acquaintance with the
evidence that has been alleged for … [it]. And, of course, the evidence that has
been alleged for the lunar theory of the tides isn’t that human cognition evolved;
it’s that, for example, the lunar theory correctly predicts that (all else equal) the
tides are highest when the moon is full … What on earth does whether or not our
minds evolved have to do with whether or not it’s the moon that pulls the tides
around?217
So, for Fodor, evolution doesn’t care one way or another whether or not we’re
true believers. But, we can tell that, at least now, we are. How can we tell? Because, for
the most part, our theories work, Fodor says.
214

Fodor, in Beilby, 40.
Fodor, in Beilby, 42.
216
Fodor, in Beilby, 41.
217
Fodor, in Beilby, 42.
215

69

This inductive strategy seems to fall prey to Plantinga’s earlier general points
about the problems associated with inductive evidence coming from the same
questionable faculties. Even granting Fodor the point, however, doesn’t seem to get at
the heart of Plantinga’s argument. This is because Plantinga agrees that most of our
theories work, and Plantinga agrees (in EAAN) that our minds did evolve. The crucial
question is the probability of whether they evolved in a strictly naturalistic framework,
and this is something that Fodor seems to just be assuming.
What have we learned from Fodor’s critique and from Plantinga’s response to
him? First of all, Fodor illustrates what I have found to be a frequent misunderstanding
of EAAN … that it is questioning our knowledge of the world. This is a significantly
large misunderstanding of the argument; maybe Plantinga was originally not as clear
about this as he could have been, but it is important to remember that EAAN is not a
skeptical argument. Plantinga claims that we have knowledge, but asserts that there is
something peculiar about the combination of N&E that corrodes our knowledge, or takes
away the basis for us to know.
Another way to get at this point is to revisit the question with which I began this
chapter: “why would Plantinga believe that current evolutionary theory doesn’t have a
mechanism to weed out organisms that have mostly false beliefs?”218 The fact is, he
doesn’t. As can be seen from his remarks to Fodor about himself subscribing to
Scientism (as defined by Fodor), Plantinga does think that natural selection could weed
out organisms that have mostly false beliefs. It’s just that Plantinga thinks that an
adherent of naturalism can’t account for this fact, because when N is conjoined with E
218
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one is put in a curious epistemic muddle … one has been saddled with an undefeated
defeater (which doesn’t necessarily happen when E is conjoined with some other things,
say, like the proposition T).
Secondly, Fodor’s critique brings up the question of how Plantinga’s argument
treats other evidence that we have besides N&E. This, in turn, brings up the question of
“independent evidence”, which Fodor thinks we could have and Plantinga thinks we
could not have (merely given N&E). Fodor admits that, given just E, we have no reason
for thinking R. He says: “There is, as far as I can tell, no Darwinian reason for thinking
that we’re true believers. Or that we aren’t … Darwin isn’t in the epistemology business,
and evolution doesn’t care whether most of our beliefs are true.”219 (One might take this
last sentence to be a good popular summary of EAAN if one adjusts it to “evolution given
N doesn’t care …”.)
However, Fodor thinks that adding additional evidence to N&E helps us to see
that we can hold R. At least some of this additional evidence is inductively acquired (i.e.,
typically unquestioned gains of science). But Plantinga asks how we can trust this if it
comes from the questioned faculties. Fodor retorts that we can trust it because it works.
Plantinga agrees that a lot of it works, but doesn’t see how that rescues the naturalist.
This is because, for Plantinga, the metaphysical naturalist still has a defeater that should
take away the basis for her confidence in R in spite of the inductive evidence. Sure, a lot
of our scientific evidence works for us, but Plantinga never questioned that. Sure, the
naturalist can function pragmatically in the world on Fodor’s inductive evidence, but that
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doesn’t mean that someone cannot have a Humean defeater.220 Plantinga thinks the
reflective adherent of N&E does have a Humean defeater, that it is bad to have a Humean
defeater; and that we should strive to disabuse ourselves of ideas that put us in such a
position.
We shall see that the issue of inductive evidence still gets a lot of play later on, as
the charge that Plantinga has ignored certain evidences is also part of the critique of
Fitelson and Sober, below.

Branden Fitelson’s and Elliott Sober’s Critique of EAAN
Branden Fitelson and Elliott Sober (hereafter F&S) have criticized both
Plantinga’s Preliminary Argument and his Main Argument of EAAN.221 F&S’s remarks
on the Preliminary Argument were factors in Plantinga’s revision of that argument.222
However, for reasons I’ve already stated, I am mainly interested here in their critiques of
the Main Argument.
Like the evaluations of Ramsey and Fodor, F&S’s criticisms and Plantinga’s
responses are, at the very least, helpful in bringing EAAN into sharper focus. F&S take
Plantinga’s Main Argument to be as follows:
1. Pr (R/E&N) is low or its value is inscrutable.
2. Therefore, E&N is a defeater of R – if you believe E&N, then you should
withhold assent from R.
3. If you should withhold assent from R, then you should withhold assent from
anything else you believe.
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4. If you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from E&N (E&N is selfdefeating).
∴ You should not believe E&N.223
However, they state that even if the probability in question is low “that would not
entail that R suffices to reject E&N.”224 Adherents of E&N could have other reasons for
holding R (e.g., R is a basic proposition, or R is reasonable because of something other
than E). Similarly, this applies for those who think that the matter at hand is
inscrutable.225 F&S say:
… We suspect that many people who are well acquainted with the theory of
special relativity and who think that birds fly still don’t know what value to assign
to Pr(Special relativity | birds fly), especially if probability has to be an objective
quantity; however, that doesn’t show that they should withhold belief in special
relativity. The Principle of Indifference is flawed because it claims to obtain
probabilities from ignorance; the start of Plantinga’s main argument makes the
complementary mistake of holding that ignorance of probabilities is a guide to
belief.226
… Notice that Plantinga assumes that evolutionary naturalists have no basis for
deciding what to think about R, other than the proposition E&N itself. This
crucial assumption is never defended in either Warrant and Proper Function or
“Naturalism Defeated.”227
… [Naturalism] must be evaluated in the light of all the evidence, not just with
respect to proposition R.228

Additionally, F&S hold that even if the naturalist is in a situation where she ought
to withhold R, that doesn’t mean that she should also withhold assent from anything else
she believes. R is a proposition like the great bulk of our beliefs are true. Someone
223
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could withhold R and still believe that many of her beliefs are true. Additionally, even if
E&N defeats the claim most of our beliefs are true, it does not follow that it also defeats
the claim half of our beliefs are true. Accordingly, F&S think that Plantinga must “show
that E&N not only defeats R, but also defeats the claim that “at least a non-negligible
minority of our beliefs are true.”229
Although F&S do not think that Plantinga’s argument works, nor that N&E is
self-defeating, they do take care to point out that this does not mean that E is selfguaranteeing. (This is reminiscent of Fodor’s closing admission.) F&S note that many
cognitive scientists believe human reasoning to be subject to various biases. They refer
to the work of Kahneman, Tversky, and Solvic which asserts that “[i]t isn’t just that
people occasionally make mistakes, but that the human reasoning faculty seems to follow
heuristics that lead to systematic error.”230 Given this to be so, perhaps it plausible
(under E) to expect human reasoning to be more reliable on matters affecting survival and
reproduction but to be less reliable on more theoretical matters (e.g., philosophy,
theology, and theoretical science). About this, F&S say:
Anyhow, if evolutionary theory does say that our ability to theorize about the
world is apt to be rather unreliable, how are evolutionists to apply this point to
their own theoretical beliefs, including their belief in evolution? One lesson that
should be extracted is a certain humility— an admission of fallibility. This will
not be news to evolutionists who have absorbed the fact that science in general
is a fallible enterprise. Evolutionary theory just provides an important part of
the explanation of why our reasoning about theoretical matters is fallible.
Far from showing that evolutionary theory is self-defeating, this consideration
should lead those who believe the theory to admit that the best they can
do in theorizing is to do the best they can. We are stuck with the cognitive
229
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equipment that we have.231
This leads F&S to recognize a problem that overarches what they have heretofore
focused upon in Plantinga’s argument, and that problem is that there is no non-circular
argument available to us that will enable us to confirm the reliability of our cognitive
equipment without first presupposing its substantial reliability.

We have seen this

problem earlier, and it will come up again, especially in Chapter 5. F&S’s last word on
the subject is:
… Plantinga suggests that evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating, but that
traditional theism is not. However, what is true is that neither position has an
answer to hyperbolic doubt. The theist, like the evolutionary naturalist, is unable
to construct a non-question-begging argument that refutes global skepticism.232

Plantinga’s Response to Fitelson & Sober
To begin with, Plantinga thinks that when F&S say that he believes P(R/E&N) is
low or its value is inscrutable233 that they have mistakenly interpreted him as saying that
P(R/N&E) under only one scenario regarding the link between beliefs and behavior is
low and that that makes P(R/N&E) in general also low. F&S seem to only consider the
argument under the option where beliefs and behavior are causally connected in an
adaptive manner.234
This revisits a response that Plantinga gave to Fodor on a similar point.235
Plantinga maintained that it doesn’t really matter what value is given to only that one
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option, because the formulation of the argument involves many different scenarios
examining the link between behavior and belief. The four236 options are: (1)
epiphenomenalism (no causal link between belief and behavior), (2) semantic
epiphenomenalism (also no causal link), (3) belief/behavior are causally linked but
maladaptive, and (4) “the common sense possibility … according to which belief is both
adaptive and also causally efficacious by way of content as well as neurophysiological
properties.”237 Plantinga notices that F&S really only considered the last scenario:
… F&S consider only … [option four]. But given the structure of the argument, it
might be that P(R/N&E) … [in general238] is low or inscrutable even if P(R/N&E)
… [under only option four239] is very high – indeed, as high as you please. So
even if their animadversions of my argument for at best a moderately high value
for … [option four] were on target, the overall argument wouldn’t suffer.240
Next, Plantinga responds to F&S’s assertion that adherents of E&N might have
other reasons for believing R (e.g, R is basic, or R derives support from something than
E&N). He responds:
They might indeed argue for both those theses [R is basic, or R derives support
from reasons other than E&N] … and if they did, I think they’d be right. But that
fact does not insulate R from defeat for the naturalist. My belief that I see a sheep
is a basic proposition that does not require theoretical support; nevertheless, it is
possible to get a defeater for it (as when you, the local authority on sheep, point
236
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out that what I see is only a sheep dog that looks like a sheep from this distance).
So it is entirely possible to acquire a defeater for a belief you hold in the basic
way. In the same way, R (we may suppose) is a basic proposition … nevertheless
the naturalist’s belief (N&E) & P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable can perfectly well
provide him with a defeater for it.241
Regarding R deriving support from something other that E&N, Plantinga
reiterates the XX drug story:

… [Say] I believe I’ve taken XX, a substance I believe sometimes induces
massive unreliability; I also believe that P(R/I’ve taken XX) is low or inscrutable.
I then have a defeater for R with respect to myself; but of course R does not
derive its epistemic credentials from my belief that I’ve taken XX. So it is
entirely possible to acquire a defeater D for a belief, even if the belief does not
derive its epistemic credentials from D … [In the same way, although R is not
derived from N&E] nevertheless (N&E) & P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable
provides the naturalist with a Humean defeater for R.242

About the suggestion of F&S that inscrutability is not a reason to reject R (e.g.,
the special relativity/birds fly example), Plantinga notes that F&S seem to be relying on
the falsity of a certain proposition, namely: For any propositions A and B, if P(B/A) is
inscrutable, then A is a defeater for B.
F&S think this principle is false. Plantinga agrees that it is false, but does not
think that his argument presupposes it. Instead, he claims that there are some cases like
this that do result in a defeater, and some cases that do not, depending upon the particular
situation. EAAN is one of the former cases (where there is a defeater). Plantinga thinks
this is shown by way of his analogies.243
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Along the same lines, Plantinga notes that F&S “seem also to think that ignorance
of probabilities is never a guide to belief …”.244 But surely, Plantinga says, sometimes it
is:
… I assume, as usual, that the thermometer T I’ve just bought is reliable. You tell
me that this thermometer was made in a factory F whose … owner aims to do his
best to frustrate modern industrial society by fabricating instruments many of
which are unreliable, but you don’t know the ratio of reliable to unreliable
instruments … P(T is reliable/T was fabricated in F) is then inscrutable for you, as
it will be for me if I believe you. This constitutes a defeater, for me, of my initial
assumption that T is reliable, and it is a defeater, in part, because of ignorance of a
probability.245

What about F&S’s criticism that “… Plantinga assumes that evolutionary
naturalists have no basis for deciding what to think about R, other than the proposition
E&N itself”? He responds that he thinks R has intrinsic warrant (as a basic belief) partly
because of human beings’ sharing in the imago Dei.246 Therefore, he says, “… of course I
don’t think that the naturalist’s only basis for what to think about R is N&E. (But I do
think that neither the naturalist nor anyone else can give a cogent argument for R.)”247
Plantinga feels that F&S are bringing up the conditionalization problem:
“… what, in this context, can the naturalist properly conditionalize upon? Just N&E
itself? Presumably not: but then what further? This is indeed a tough problem, but not,
so far as I can see, in such a way as to give the naturalist an escape route.”248 (Since this
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is a matter that has been brought up in various ways by numerous authors, I consider it in
Chapter 4.)
Plantinga then responds to the charge of F&S that he must show that E&N not
only defeats R, but also defeats the claim that “at least a non-negligible minority of our
beliefs are true.”249 He states:
But why must I show that? I agree that (E&N) & P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable
does not offer a direct defeater for the belief that at least 50% of our beliefs are
true. But how does that help the naturalist? F&S seems to make the mistake …
of thinking that if you don’t have a defeater for the proposition that 50% of your
beliefs are true, then 50% of your beliefs are such that you don’t have a defeater
for them. But that doesn’t follow at all. I still have a defeater for each of my
beliefs, even if I also believe that 50% of them are true, and even if 50% of them
are true.250
For example, take the thermometer T mentioned earlier. If you tell me that the
factory owner designed T to read correctly 50% of the time, then (if I believe you and
have no other information) I have a defeater for each of my readings of T (because I
don’t know which of them are in the set of the true readings).251
Concerning F&S’s remarks about the impossibility of constructing a nonquestion-begging argument for R, that is something with which Plantinga agrees. I take
that question up in Chapter 5.
So then, what have we learned from the analysis of F&S and Plantinga’s
responses? F&S think that one could see the truth of the Probability Thesis and still not
have a defeater for R. This is because they think that one could have other evidence for
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R other than N&E. (This is a version of the Total Evidence charge that we have seen
before.)
Plantinga agrees that one could initially have other evidence than N&E for R (like
R being a basic belief, etc.) but he thinks that such evidence will be threatened with the
same defeater that attaches to N&E. Plantinga’s XX drug analogy is one that he will lean
on especially heavily in this regard. I will look more in depth at it in later chapters. At
this point, I’d like to turn to the conditionalization problem alluded to in Plantinga’s
response to F&S.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Some Concerns about Probability

The conditionalization problem is one that Plantinga feels is deep and hard to
precisely define.252 Having said that, Plantinga tries to set it out as follows:
… According to EAAN, (a) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, and (b) the naturalist
who sees the truth of (a) has a (Humean) defeater for R. But why think (b)?
There are plenty of other propositions the naturalist N believes, and on some of
them, the probability of R is high … Which beliefs of his are such that if R is
improbable on them, then he has a defeater for R?253

We saw earlier that Fitelson and Sober brought up a similar point when they
wrote:
… Notice that Plantinga assumes that evolutionary naturalists have no basis for
deciding what to think about R, other than the proposition E&N itself. This
crucial assumption is never defended in either Warrant and Proper Function or
“Naturalism Defeated”.254

Richard Otte describes Plantinga’s conditionalization problem in this manner:
One of the most basic objections to … [arguments like Plantinga’s] is that they
make use of the wrong probabilities. It is well know that probability is very
sensitive to the information conditionalized on. Plantinga’s arguments look at the
probability of R conditional on N&E, but this ignores other information we have
that would make R likely. In effect this objection claims that Plantinga’s
argument ignores relevant evidence we have for R, and thus it is no surprise that
P(R/N&E) is low. But when we take into consideration this additional evidence,
we find that the probability of R conditional on it is high.255
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Otte notices that the strategy of bringing up additional evidence might not be very
helpful for the naturalist under Plantinga’s Preliminary Argument for EAAN, because the
other evidence might also strengthen the argument for T, theism. But, the Main
Argument of EAAN does not compare N with T, but rather argues that if P(R/N&E) is
low or inscrutable then “the naturalist has a defeater for all his beliefs, including N, and
thus the naturalist is self-referentially incoherent.”256
In trying to get a handle on the conditionalization problem, Otte thinks it is
helpful to think in terms of possible worlds, or “narrowing down the worlds that we are
interested in.”257 The narrowing down could begin by first imagining a wide set of
possible worlds, and then slimming the set of worlds -- each subsequent level
representing a further restriction of possible worlds:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

begin by looking at how likely R is, given any possible world;
restrict to worlds in which N&E is true;
restrict to worlds in which there are beings;
restrict to worlds in which the beings have beliefs;
restrict to worlds in which the beliefs cause behavior;
restrict to worlds where the beings are communicative and live in societies;
restrict to worlds in which advanced science has been developed by the beings;
restrict to worlds “in which massive mistakes are not made”;258
restrict to worlds in which “these beings have mostly true beliefs”.259

The problem is in determining at which level to stop, since the level at the bottom
is clearly inappropriate as it begs the question. Although there is no answer to solve “the
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general problem of what to conditionalize on in cases like this … we can discern some
principles to guide us …”, Otte thinks.260 What might these principles be?
For the issue at hand, we know that we must conditionalize on N&E, and we
know that we cannot conditionalize on anything that already presupposes R. But, we
must conditionalize on relevant information that is “independent or not epistemically
based on the source in question [which is R].”261 He continues:
… If we were to ignore any of this evidence, then the probability would be
useless, since the ignored evidence might affect the probability … Since Plantinga
claims that naturalism and evolutionary theory is an unreliable source of our
cognitive faculties, all of our beliefs are called into question … What then is left
to conditionalize on?262

Otte then asks if it might be appropriate to conditionalize on our experience. By
experience, Otte means that we should conditionalize on propositions about our external
and internal experience.263 The list of these propositions includes:
• we experience that we believe that our beliefs causally affect our actions;
• we experience that we believe that we live in society;
• we experience that we believe that we can communicate with each other;
• we experience that we believe that we do not make massive mistakes;
• we experience that we believe that we tend to correct the mistaken beliefs that
we do form;
• we experience that we believe that our science is quite good;
• we experience that we believe that our cognitive faculties are reliable.264
However, notice that we cannot assume that the experiences of our beliefs are
veridical without begging the question. We do know that we experience that we believe
that they are veridical, but Plantinga is not questioning that. Otte concludes, because of
260
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this, that conditionalizing on our experience is not a fruitful way to defeat Plantinga’s
argument.
So, what kinds of propositions are such that can we add them to N&E (other than
propositions about our experiences of our beliefs) to yield R?
Carl Ginet has proposed adding that it is entailed by naturalism that our cognitive
faculties are reliable:
… Now how is it that the theist is allowed to build into her metaphysical
hypothesis something that entails R or a high probability of R but the naturalist
isn’t? Why isn’t it just as reasonable for the naturalist to take it as one of the
tenets of naturalism that our cognitive systems are on the whole reliable
(especially since it seems to be in our nature to have it as a basic belief)?265
So, the other evidence to add to P(R/N&E) is a proposition to the effect that it is
entailed by naturalism that our cognitive faculties are on the whole reliable. In a similar
vein John Perry suggests adding the proposition “we have won the evolutionary
lottery”.266 Yes, R is improbable under N&E, but sometimes improbable things happen.
Fitelson & Sober use a card-dealing illustration that is similar to Perry’s point.
F&S say:
If you draw a card at random from a standard deck of cards, the probability is
only 1 in 52 that you will draw the seven of diamonds. If you do draw this card,
that doesn’t mean that you should conclude that the deck isn’t standard or that the
card wasn’t drawn at random. If you have independent evidence that the deck is
standard and that the draw was random, you simply accept the fact that some of
the things that happen don’t have high probabilities.267
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Yet another author, Timothy O’Connor, proposes adding a general proposition
(O): “the initial conditions of the development of organic life and the sum total of
evolutionary processes (including ones as yet unknown or only dimly understood) were
and are such as to render … [P(R/N&E&O)] rather high … .”268
Plantinga responds that, generally, all these responses can’t be appropriately
lodged against EAAN, or really against any argument. If they could, then “every defeater
could automatically be defeated.”269 Plantinga presents the following example as an
appropriate rejoinder to Ginet’s point: say a Christian theist comes to believe proposition
U, that the Bible is unreliable and full of egregious errors. U seems to be a defeater for
any belief that the theist holds on the sole basis of its being in the Bible:
… now consider some belief B I do hold just on the basis of Biblical teaching …
U looks to be a defeater for B. Could I defend B from defeat just by adding a little
something to U? Ginet suggests that the naturalist add R itself to naturalism;
could I analogously add B to U, thus moving to U*, pointing out that the
probability of B on U* (i.e. U&B) is neither low nor inscrutable? Or better, since
this adding something isn't really relevant, could I point out that I believe not
merely U but B&U, adding that this conjunction entails B, and claiming
triumphantly that I now no longer have a defeater for B? As Quine says in another
connection, that is not the method of true philosophy.270
Plantinga then considers Perry’s slightly different suggestion, that although R is
unlikely given N&E, sometimes unlikely things happen … we have won the evolutionary
lottery, and thus R. Plantinga writes:
… But this can't be right either. Consider the probabilistic argument from evil
against theism and consider the analogue of Perry's response: "Well, I concede
that the existence of God is unlikely given all the suffering the world displays, but
I have a defeater for this defeater. I believe that we have won the divinity lottery,
268
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and, despite its improbability, that there is indeed such a person as God." Again,
not the method of true philosophy. If you discover that you have a defeater D for
one of your beliefs B, you can't in general deliver B from defeat just by noting that
you believe the conjunction of D with some other proposition D* such that D&D*
entails B. In particular, if you believe naturalism and the Probability Thesis and
see that this threatens a defeater for R, you can't preserve the latter from defeat
just by noting that you also believe N&E&L,[271] with respect to which the
probability of R is 1.272

Moving then to O’Connor’s idea, Plantinga notes:
O'Connor's suggestion is a bit different again; it is that the naturalist should add
There is some true proposition P such that P(R/N&E&P) is high273 to his noetic
structure. But clearly this is no better than the two preceding suggestions. It would
be like conceding that the existence of evil is a defeater for theistic belief, but
suggesting that this defeater can be defeated by adding that you think there is
some other true proposition P (theism itself perhaps?) such that the probability of
theism with respect to P together with that evil is high. Once more, not the
method of true philosophy.274
So, what propositions Q might there be such that if (1) the naturalist believes Q,
and (2) if P(R/Q&N&E) is high, then R is not defeated for the naturalist by the
combination of N&E and the Probability Thesis [P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable]?275 In
other words, which beliefs function as defeater-deflectors in this case?276
One option would be that any proposition that satisfies (1) and (2) would be a
defeater-deflector. But then it would be possible to defeat any probabilistic argument
(i.e., there would be no probabilistic defeaters). For instance, in considering P(R/N&E),
there might be some naturalists who would take R itself to be Q (i.e., satisfy conditions
271
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(1) and (2)). Therefore, P(R/N&E&R) = 1. In this way, any belief could be insulated
from defeat. So, this option in general seems wrong because surely, Plantinga says, there
are probabilistic defeaters:
I believe on the usual grounds that the sphygmomanometer I have just purchased
is at least reasonably reliable; I then learn that it was made in a factory owned by
a wealthy eccentric whose aim it is to discredit the medical establishment and that
90 percent of the sphygmomanometers made in his factory are unreliable. Then I
have a defeater, and a probabilistic defeater, for my initial belief that the
instrument in question is reliable.277
Applying this to arguments surrounding EAAN, he then says:
… And can’t I also acquire a probabilistic defeater for R in my own case? I come
to believe that I am a brain in a vat, or a victim of a Cartesian evil genius, or have
ingested XX, that anti-reliability drug, and also that 90 percent of those thus
afflicted are no longer cognitively reliable. Then don’t I have a defeater – a
Humean rationality defeater – for R?278
So, if not just any believed propositions satisfying (1) and (2) count as defeaterdeflectors, which ones do? Plantinga admits that he has no complete and rigorous
answer to this, but thinks a complete account is not necessary to see that one has a
probabilistic defeater at times in specific cases. His analogies are supposed to be
instructive in this regard.279 Additionally, there do seem to be some general guidelines
involved in the case regarding EAAN:
• neither R itself, nor any proposition equivalent to R280 … is a defeater-deflector
here;
• conjunctions of R with other propositions P the naturalist believes … will
not be defeater-deflectors unless P itself is.
• no proposition P that is evidentially dependent upon R for S – i.e., such that S
believes P on the evidential basis of R – is a defeater-deflector for R.281
277
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What all this is supposed to have shown is that Plantinga does not think there is
any “independent” or additional evidence that could be brought forth by the naturalist
that would not have the same defeater attached to it. It is hard to see how considering
Total Evidence could make any difference. This is because the weighing of any other
evidence will necessarily involve R, and R is in dispute. Any such evidence will be
flowing from the suspected faculties, and have the same taint.
Once someone sees this, then she is in a position to recognize how Plantinga’s
argument highlights a long-recognized epistemological puzzle: we can’t seem to provide
a reasoned argument for the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties without using those
very same faculties. Although other issues concerning probabilities will come up later282
(e.g., concerning objective and subjective probability), it is to the epistemic circularity
issue that I now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EAAN and Some Issues Concerning Skepticism and Epistemic
Circularity
Some commentators on EAAN have noticed similarities between this argument
and some of Descartes’ reasoning, principally in Meditations on First Philosophy and
Objections and Replies.283 In struggling to arrive at certain knowledge, Descartes saw
the need to bring in God (and a God who is not a deceiver at that) to underwrite this level
of knowledge. Arriving at such knowledge of God, however, seemed to involve
problems that set up what is now sometimes called the Cartesian Circle. In this chapter, I
will look into some of the similarities between Plantinga’s argument and some of these
problems. This comparison will highlight some interesting and important aspects of
EAAN.
James van Cleve helpfully summarizes the issues of the Cartesian Circle in this
manner:
The problem of the Cartesian Circle arose for Descartes because he appeared
to commit himself to each of the following two propositions:
(1) I can know (be certain) that (CD) whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is
true only if I first know (am certain) that (G) God exists and is not a deceiver.
(2) I can know (be certain) that (G) God exists and is not a deceiver only if I first
know (am certain) that (CD) whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is
true.284
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There is a vast body of literature concerning the Cartesian Circle. Some
philosophers see a way out of the Circle, others think it is impossible to get out of the
Circle, and still others think the Circle might not be so vicious in the first place (e.g., due
to co-implication).285 At this point I just want to note a few ways that Plantinga and
Descartes seem to resemble one another regarding how God might be related to our
ability to trust our cognitive faculties.
Both Descartes and Plantinga run arguments that seriously call into question our
ability to trust our cognitive faculties in the absence of a Divine cognitive faculty maker.
Descartes wrote:
I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and
if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for
without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of
anything.286

Additionally:
Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so
powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us not
argue with them, but grant them that everything said about God is a fiction.
According to their supposition, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or
chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since
deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my
original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the
time.287
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To Descartes (and, as we have seen, to Plantinga), agnosticism about the origins
of our cognitive faculties (especially absent a creator God) seems to corrode some types
of knowledge. Nietzsche also commented upon this:
… It is unfair to Descartes to call his appeal to God’s credibility frivolous.
Indeed, only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the
search for truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success. This
God left aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is not one of the
conditions of life.288

For Descartes, without a particular type of knowledge about God, one can be
subject to all kinds of skeptical doubts, in particular the Malevolent Demon hypothesis
and/or the Deceiving God hypothesis. This, however, is not to say that Descartes thought
someone (e.g., an atheist) who lacks knowledge of God knows nothing:
That an atheist can know clearly that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right angles, I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on the other hand, such
knowledge on his part cannot constitute true science,289 because no knowledge290
that can be rendered doubtful should be called science.291 Since he is, as
supposed, an Atheist, he cannot be sure that he is not deceived in the things that
seem most evident to him, as has been sufficiently shown; and though perchance
the doubt does not occur to him, nevertheless it may come up, if he examines the
matter, or if another suggests it; he can never be safe from it unless he first
recognized the existence of God.292
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So it seems that Descartes is willing to grant one level of knowledge to an atheist,
but not allow the highest level of knowledge to her. The higher level of knowledge here
for Descartes is scientia, and the lower level of knowledge is cognitio.293
Do we see something similar happen when the question of the extent of an
atheist’s knowledge is put to Plantinga? Like Descartes, Plantinga seems to grant
knowledge on the level of cognitio to a naturalist; at least, at first. But, later on in
EAAN, Plantinga seems to say that the reflective atheist (caught in a Humean dialectical
loop)294 can lose that even that.
James Van Cleve writes:
My interest in this argument [EAAN] is not in its final step, the allegedly selfdefeating character of naturalism, but in the penultimate step, in which Plantinga
asserts that the naturalist has a defeater for everything he believes. If so, then on
the assumption that no defeated belief can amount to knowledge, it follows that
the naturalist has no knowledge whatsoever. It appears that Plantinga renders a
more severe verdict on the atheist’s epistemic position than Descartes ever did:
Descartes allowed that the atheist geometer might know (for a while, or in a way)
a simple theorem or two, but Plantinga’s naturalist must evidently be a complete
ignoramus.295
Plantinga, in response, restates that “the conclusion of EAAN is not just that the
naturalist doesn’t know R or N&E (either by way of cognitio or scientia) but that he has a
rationality defeater for it – a Humean rationality defeater.”296 This reminds us that
Plantinga isn’t saying that the naturalist has a proper function defeater, but an alethic
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defeater and a Humean defeater. It is only a reflective naturalist (concerning EAAN)
whom Plantinga thinks to have a Humean defeater, not a non-reflective naturalist.
The distinctions drawn among these defeaters were not made in Plantinga’s
original argument, but they have become important in responses that Plantinga has
given.297 At the end of this chapter, I go into more detail on proper function defeaters,
alethic defeaters, and Humean defeaters. For now, the quick idea is that “Humean
defeaters” come about when one is in the particular vicious dialectical loop Plantinga has
described.298 Alethic defeaters have to do with, for lack of a better way of putting it, the
objective fact-of-the-matter.

Someone has an alethic defeater when she believes

something that puts her in a situation that she should, if she were being rational, see that
she has a defeater for her belief. (However, in fact, she may not be aware of this).
A “proper function defeater” has to do with whether or not one’s cognitive
faculties are aimed at truth. Maybe the design plan of a person allows her to function
well in certain situations while believing something that a rational person should not
believe. For example, say she believes that she will recover from a sickness (when the
chance of recovery is only .01), and her optimism initiates actions in her body that help
her to indeed recover.299 Although she has an alethic defeater, she doesn’t have a proper
function defeater. She would have a proper function defeater in this particular case if the
belief in question did not allow her to function well.
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These defeater distinctions will be explained in more detail, below.300
Van Cleve lodges several objections at this point. In order for Plantinga to think
that his argument degrades knowledge of R for a naturalist, Van Cleve surmises that
Plantinga must be implicitly relying upon a general principle like this:
For any propositions A and B that I believe, if B is improbable or inscrutable with
respect to A, then A is a defeater for B unless A derives its warrant from B.301
Van Cleve’s point is that such a principle would make trouble for everyone, not just a
naturalist. “I believe that it is raining now; I also believe that the Broncos won Super
Bowl XXXII; and I have no idea what the probability of the first is given the second.
Does my Super Bowl belief therefore defeat my belief about the rain?”302
Plantinga agrees that would be a troublesome principle:
Most contingent propositions I believe – for example, that at the moment there is
robin in my backyard – are, I should think, such that their probabilities with
respect to, say, the Fundamental Theory of Calculus, are either low or inscrutable;
furthermore, their warrant, for me, does not derive from the warrant, for me, of
this theorem. Yet surely that low or inscrutable probability doesn’t constitute
even a ghost of a defeater for them.303
However, Plantinga says that he is not relying on a general principle such as the
one above, but is rather arguing by way of analogy:304
… N&E (if true) gives us crucial information about the origin, provenance, and
development of the cognitive faculties in question: the process by which they
arose, whether they were designed (and if so, by whom), what their purpose is if
they have a purpose, and the like. Now analogous cases where the relevant
probabilities are low do offer a defeater. Thus if I learn that my new
sphygmomanometer was manufactured in a factory such that the probability of its
being reliable given that it was manufactured there is low or inscrutable, and have
300
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no other relevant evidence, then I have a defeater for my initial assumption that
the instrument is reliable. If I come to think that Sam has ingested that reliabilitydestroying substance XX, or that he is a victim of a Cartesian demon, or that he
has mad cow disease, and if I know nothing else relevant about him, I will have a
defeater for my initial belief that R holds with respect to Sam. The same goes, I
say, if I come to think I myself am in one of these conditions – or rather,
something similar does: I acquire a Humean rationality defeater for R.305

Well then, so what if one does acquire a Humean rationality defeater for R? Van
Cleve thinks that this fact alone shouldn’t give one a defeater for everything else one
believes.306 Van Cleve and Ernest Sosa307 think that Plantinga might be leaning on
something like an implicit premise thesis: “… the thesis that whenever we accept any
deliverance of a faculty, our doing so rests on the implicit premise that that faculty is
reliable.”308
No, Plantinga says, he does not argue EAAN on the basis on the implicit premise
thesis, because one might accept, say, many sensory perceptions without raising the
question of whether or not the relevant faculties are reliable.309 He continues:
In order for your acceptance of memory beliefs to be warranted, it is not
necessary that you actually believe that your memory is in fact reliable. Notice,
however, that if you come to think it is not reliable (in a certain range, say) then
you have a defeater for any memory belief (in that range), provided there is no
other source of warrant, for you, for the belief in question … In general, if you
have considered the question whether a given source of information or belief is
reliable, and have an undefeated defeater for the belief that it is, then you have a
defeater for any belief such that you think it originates (solely) from that source.
But then the same applies in the present context; in acquiring an undefeated
defeater for R, I get a defeater for all of my beliefs.310
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Van Cleve then wonders that, if circularity is the worry, are all circular arguments
equally damaging? Van Cleve maintains that some circular arguments are damaging and
some are not. “The really damaging kind of circularity … is the kind in which not merely
the truth of an argument’s conclusion, but knowledge of it, is a necessary precondition of
obtaining knowledge of the argument’s premises.”311
In response, Plantinga thinks that Van Cleve means to suggest that a naturalist
might agree that P(R/N&E) is low and see the circularity problem that ensues, but claim
that the circularity is not vicious.312
Plantinga agrees that it might be possible “… in some cases that one can base an
argument for the reliability of a certain faculty on premises (beliefs) that themselves are a
product of that faculty.”313 An example of this might again be the trust of one’s
perceptual faculties before one has reflected upon them. Once the question is brought up,
one might think that, as far as one could remember, one’s perceptual faculties produced
beliefs that were for the most part true. “This is a plausibly sensible procedure”,
Plantinga writes.314 Let us classify this example as a Type 1 scenario.
However, in other matters, such a procedure seems out of place. Here Plantinga
quotes Thomas Reid:
If a man’s honesty were called into question, it would be ridiculous to refer to the
man’s own word, whether he be honest or not. The same absurdity there is in
attempting to prove, by any kind of reasoning, probable or demonstrative, that our
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reason is not fallacious, since the very point in question is, whether reasoning may
be trusted.315

Plantinga then wonders:
Suppose I am worried about whether R is true with respect to me: I seem to
remember ingesting XX a couple [of] hours ago, and believe that nine out of ten
people who have done so suffer from serious cognitive disability within the next
couple of hours, so that R no longer holds with respect to them. Now suppose I
try to reassure myself by … [a kind of ] epistemically circular argument … [like
this one:]
I believe p1 and it’s true,
I believe p2 and it’s true,
.
.
.
I believe pn and it’s true;
so most of my beliefs are indeed true; so my faculties are reliable. Is this a
reasonable procedure? Surely not; here Reid’s point holds.316
Let us term Reid’s Honesty example and Plantinga’s XX example as illustrations
of Type 2 cases. What is the distinguishing mark, then, between Type 1 cases and Type 2
cases? Isn’t it just that in Type 1 cases the questioning of R has not come up … there is
no reason to question R? However, in Type 2 cases, for various reasons R is suspected of
being possibly untrue, and in such a situation:
… you can’t properly assuage that doubt by giving yourself an argument; for you
will, or will if you are proceeding rationally, have the same doubt about the truth
of the premises of the argument, as well as your belief that if the premises are
true, so is the conclusion.
In the EAAN case then: if you accept naturalism and the Probability Thesis
and as a result come to doubt or wonder whether R is true, you cannot sensibly
lay that doubt to rest by way of an epistemically circular argument.317
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This seems to highlight once again that, for Plantinga, R is first held in a basic
way but, once doubted, needs a story to make sense of its basicality in order to preserve
rationality. Plantinga agrees that theists and naturalists alike tell stories which they think
might enable them to trust that R. However, Plantinga thinks that the person holding N is
incapable of telling an adequate story which can defeat the defeater that comes with the
acceptance of the Probability Thesis. (Part of the reason for this has to do with
Plantinga’s overall account of warrant; specifically, the relation of proper function to
warrant. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine, below.)
This becomes clear in Plantinga’s response to an objection lodged by Ernest Sosa.
Sosa wrote that the theist and the naturalist were both in the same sort of epistemic boat
as far as telling a comforting story that yields R. Sosa asks:
Why can’t you as a naturalist develop a view of yourself and your surroundings
that shows your situation to be epistemically propitious. You would need to be
able to self-attribute ways of acquiring and retaining beliefs that put you so in
touch with your surroundings, relative to the relevant fields of interest to you, that
you would tend to believe correctly in virtue of using those ways. What precludes
your doing so, by means of science, as a naturalist, if the supernaturalist can do so
by means of theology?318
Plantinga, however, counters that the problem is that it’s hard to see how any
story that is told given N can possibly defeat or deflect the Humean defeater that attaches
to an adherent of N once she has seen the Probability Thesis. He writes:
… [Suppose] I believe I have ingested XX and I also believe R is unlikely with
respect to this. Could I nonetheless achieve reflective knowledge, scientia, that R
is in fact true, with respect to me, by elaborating a story according to which R
holds for me even though I’ve taken XX? Could such a story be either a defeater318
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defeater or a defeater-deflector in such a way that I wind up with scientia or R? I
can’t see how.
(Notice that Plantinga is starting to lean on the XX Drug Example fairly often.
We will see that it is indeed one of the most crucial of his analogies. When presented
along with the Case of the Curiously-Produced Sphygmomanometer and the Case of the
Irradiated Widgets, the Case of the Mysterious Radio Device, and the Case of the
Questionable Thermometer, Plantinga seems to have a decent overall analogical case. I
look at some of these in more detail in Chapter Nine.)
Continuing his response to Sosa, Plantinga goes on to say:
… Perhaps I believe, for example, that while it is certainly unlikely that we
human beings should be reliable, given our origins, natural selection has
nevertheless inexplicably brought it about that we are … The problem would be
with the status of those beliefs constituting the story. Presumably they would be
the sort of beliefs for which evidence is required, if they are to be accepted
rationally: but where would we find the evidence? On the other hand, suppose the
naturalist just assumes that R is true … and then looks for and embraces the best
explanation of its being true. Then his belief in that explanation is evidentially
dependent on his belief that R, and thus cannot function as a defeater-deflector
with respect to R … The truth is, so it seems to me, that reflection doesn’t give
the naturalist scientia or reflective knowledge of R; what it does is give him a
reflective (Humean) defeater of R, and hence deprives him even of his animal
knowledge of that proposition. How does telling the story that Sosa proposes
differ from just whistling in the dark?319

Sosa, in his second article on EAAN, admits that things do look bleak:
What seems bad for the naturalist is not just that, given our brutish etiology, it is
monumental luck that we exist at all. That would seem acceptable … What seems
bad for the naturalist is that however accidental our existence, it is a further
accident that our faculties are reliable, if indeed they are. Suppose we have no
basis for supposing that things have turned out well enough for our faculties,
despite how little reason we have to suppose they would turn out that way, given
their evolutionary origins. This would be bad. It would put us in an epistemic
situation about as bad as if we knew that we had taken a pill that nearly always
319
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disables one’s faculties terminally, except for those in some miniscule subset. If
one believes that one did take such a pill, it seems incoherent to think that one is
still cognitively reliable. This would require believing that one falls in the
favored miniscule subset. But how could one rationally believe that one was so
lucky, unless one had some special reason for so believing? And how could one
gain such a reason, given how likely it is that one’s cognition is disabled?320
Sosa now thinks that Plantinga’s argument has turned the tables on the naturalist
opposition, and “a fully adequate response remains to be formulated.”321 He does,
however, point in two directions where naturalists might look to respond to this situation.
Sosa’s first idea is the thought that perhaps it is not possible that human beings
can come into existence while being “deprived of our successful cognitive faculties.”322
For instance, maybe it is not possible to be the beings we are, with beliefs having content,
without those beliefs corresponding to a “… substantial amount of built-in truths … For it
is only through adequate sensitivity to the presence or absence of perceptible properties
that we acquire corresponding concepts of those properties.”323
Here is another line that Sosa thinks a naturalist might use to develop a story that
can save R: make us of the fact that, although our evolutionary origins do not entail R,
they also do not preclude R – we may be reliable nonetheless. That we get into some sort
of circularity in trying to establish R is not totally incapacitating; no story can avoid some
type of circularity, so this cannot be a “disabling objection in the end.”324
In testing these thoughts, Sosa looks in detail at the example of the cognitively
disabling pill (Sosa calls it DISABLEX … it seems to work substantially the same as
320
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Plantinga’s XX). This pill permanently disables one’s cognitive faculties such that these
faculties are no longer reliable, but the person taking the pill still believes the faculties to
be reliable. Thinking about such a scenario, I might wonder how I could know that I
have never taken such a pill.325
Well, I think right now that my faculties are indeed reliable … by default, I
manifest my commitment that R, Sosa says. What else can I do? Sosa writes:
… the claim that you have taken any such pill is a self-defeating claim. Both
believing that you have taken the pill and even suspending judgment on that
question are epistemically self-defeating. The contrary claim, that you have taken
no such pill, follows logically from what is epistemically obligatory and selfsustaining, namely, the [default] commitment to the reliability of your faculties.
Therefore, it is hard to see how you could possibly go wrong epistemically not
only in affirming the reliability of your faculties but also in affirming anything
you can see to follow logically from that, including the consequence that you have
never taken any such pill.
So, Sosa holds that, once you get into the muddle of wondering if you have ever
taken DISABLEX, you are stuck either way. Therefore, the only reasonable thing to do
is to believe that you have never taken such a pill. It’s hard to see how anyone could
epistemically fault you for that. If this is indeed true, then Plantinga’s argument should
not trouble the naturalist. Sosa applies this to EAAN as follows:
… the same goes for Plantinga’s evolutionary argument. Again, believing that
our faculties are unreliable is self-defeating, as is even suspending judgment on
that question. On the question whether your faculties are reliable, you have no
rational choice but to assent, therefore, and so you would be within your rights to
draw the further conclusion that if your origins are evolutionary, then such origins
cannot make your faculties unreliable. Would that necessarily preclude a
naturalist from believing in evolution? Only if evolutionary origins entailed the
unreliability of our faculties. But nothing like this is shown by any of the
considerations adduced in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument. At most, what
those considerations show is that the probability that our faculties are reliable is
low or inscrutable. And this is compatible with our faculties being reliable.
325
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Indeed, from those considerations it cannot even be inferred that it is unlikely that
our origins are evolutionary, for inscrutability would permit no such inference.326
Notice in his argument that Sosa (here, at least) seems to be arguing in large part
for something that Plantinga has already granted, namely, that our cognitive faculties
have evolutionary origins. Plantinga just will not grant that N is the metaphysic that
frames the evolutionary process. In addition, Plantinga is not saying that our faculties
aren’t cognitively reliable, or that we shouldn’t rely upon them. For the most part, he
thinks they are reliable and that we are right to rely upon them.
He claims that N does not have the resources to explain why our cognitive
faculties are reliable. Additionally, he claims that there is something curious about the
conjunction of E with N that puts one in an irrational situation (once one reflects upon the
Probability Thesis). Sosa’s critiques, however, do make me think about a certain
intuitional issue. Plantinga might be relying here on a very widespread intuition about
brute forces, to which I will turn in the next chapter.

Excursus: Concerning Various Types of Defeaters
Near the beginning of his “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts”, Plantinga makes some
important comments about different kinds of defeaters.327 He begins by saying that
EAAN holds that an adherent of naturalism who sees the truth of the Probability Thesis
has a rationality defeater for R:
… the reflective naturalist … will be in some sense irrational if he continues to
believe R. In what sense? At the fundamental level, I explain rationality in terms
of proper function: the rational thing to believe, in circumstances C, is what a
326
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properly functioning human being – more exactly, one whose cognitive or rational
faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects – would believe in those
circumstances.328

But even if someone had such a defeater, wouldn’t that person still continue to
believe R? Here Plantinga brings up the case of the XX drug, that, within one hour of its
being taken, causes such cognitive disorder that R is no longer true. The drug also does
not allow the victim to detect it. Suppose that someone believes that 90% of those taking
the drug are cognitively unreliable (although they cannot tell that they are unreliable).
Also suppose that this person takes XX. Plantinga writes:
… The first thing to see here is that a person in this condition will continue to
form perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and the like; and she will also continue,
in some sense, to assume that her cognitive faculties are reliable. Furthermore (at
least so one thinks), in so doing she is conforming to our design plan; this is
precisely what proper function requires [i.e., in a way, it is the right thing to do to
continue to believe R]. In this sense, then, her cognitive behavior is entirely
rational.
Still, one wants to say that is some way she really does have a defeater for
R specified to her case. She believes that R no longer holds for the vast majority
of those who take this drug; she knows of nothing that distinguishes her case from
theirs; someone who was thinking straight would certainly no longer (without
additional evidence) believe R for someone else she thought had ingested XX; so
doesn’t rationality dictate that she cease believing R in her own case?329
So, in one sense (the proper function rationality sense), the victim is believing properly to
continue to hold R. In another sense (the alethic rationality sense), though, she ought to
not hold R any longer. To further explicate a “proper function defeater”, Plantinga says:
… our cognitive establishment contains (or at any rate could contain) processes,
modules, whose purpose it is not to produce true belief, but belief with some other
property. If you fall victim to a usually fatal disease, you may somehow think
your chances are much better than is indicated by the statistics you know (“the
328

Plantinga, in Beilby, 205. Of course, “C” here denotes something different than it does in other sections
of EAAN responses.
329
Plantinga, in Beilby, 206-207.

103

optimistic overrider”) … [such beliefs] therefore, do not issue from cognitive
processes whose purpose it is to produce true beliefs … but [in this case to
increase] the likelihood of recovery … [So] being produced by properly
functioning cognitive capacities is not sufficient for warrant; in addition, to have
warrant, a belief must be such that it is produced by a module that is successfully
aimed at truth … [the beliefs in the optimistic overrider do] not meet this
condition. They display proper-function rationality (they are produced by
properly functioning rational or cognitive faculties) but they do not have
warrant.330

Plantinga is ready to grant that the naturalist who sees the truth of the Probability
Thesis does not necessarily have a proper-function defeater. However, he wants to insist
that the naturalist in this situation has an alethic defeater:
[I have already agreed that] … proper function requires that the naturalist
continue in assuming R, despite her seeing that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable.
Proper function would require the same of someone who believes that she has
ingested that reliability-destroying drug XX and that P(R/I’ve ingested XX) is
very low, indeed even zero. But it doesn’t follow either that R has warrant for her
under those conditions, or that she doesn’t have a defeater for it. True, she
doesn’t have a proper-function rationality defeater for it; but she does have (so I
claim) a purely alethic rationality defeater for it, and consequently, if she is
reflective, also a Humean defeater.331

In order to spell out more clearly the nature of this alethic defeater, Plantinga says:
… Say that a cognitive process aimed directly at the production of true beliefs is
an alethic process.332

… I do have a defeater of some sort for R, if I believe that I display some
condition c such the R is false with respect to all who display that condition – or if
I believe that I display a condition c such that R is false with respect to most of
those who display that condition, and I know of nothing relevant that
distinguishes my condition from theirs.333
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In cases like the XX case, the person who believes she has taken the drug will still
believe R, but “only because of the presence and power of processes not aimed directly at
the production of true belief [but which instead are aimed at survival or carrying on].” 334
Alethically speaking, though, she has a defeater for R. A rather detailed definition of an
alethic defeater goes like this:
D is a purely epistemic [i.e., purely alethic] defeater of B for S at t iff (1) S’s
noetic structure N at t includes B and S comes to believe D at t, and (2) any person
S* (a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects,
(b) who is such that the bit of the design plan governing the sustaining of B in her
noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth (i.e., at the maximization of true
belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing more, (c) whose noetic
structure is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to believe D but nothing else
independent of or stronger that D, would withhold B (or believe it less
strongly).335
Now, if someone has such an alethic defeater, and additionally is reflective about
her situation, then Plantinga maintains she additionally has what he calls a Humean
defeater:
My situation will be like that of Hume, who concludes that while, to be sure, he
can’t stop believing what nature prompts him to believe, these beliefs are at best
doubtful. When he follows out what seem to be the promptings and leading of
reason, he winds up time after time in a black coalpit, not knowing which way to
turn … [T]he enlightened person, Hume thinks, hold the consolations of Nature at
arm’s length. She knows she can’t help acquiescing in the common illusion, but
she maintains her skepticism of “the general maxims of the world” and adopts a
certain ironic distance … .336
… That’s the situation the naturalist will be in: he won’t be able to help believing
or at least assuming R; but (if he reflects on the matter) he will also think, sadly
enough, that what he can’t help believing is unlikely to be true. He will have a
purely alethic rationality defeater for R, but at those reflective moments when he
thinks about his cognitive situation he will also have a … Humean rationality
defeater. Of course when he isn’t thinking about his epistemic condition he will
334
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naturally assume that R is true – nature permits nothing else. But when he
reflectively considers his condition he will, if functioning properly [re: faculties
aimed at truth, etc.] adopt that Humean posture, or something similar.337

So go the distinctions involving proper function defeaters, alethic defeaters, and
Humean defeaters. Although these defeater distinctions were not originally part of the
argument (but trotted out later in responses to critiques), they have become an
indispensible part of a thorough understanding of the current form of EAAN.
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CHAPTER SIX
Some Remarks on Intuitions Regarding EAAN and Similarities with
Related Arguments
Sosa (in his second article on EAAN) distinguishes between (1) Plantinga’s
argument gutted of its evolutionary trappings [i.e., merely P(R/N) is low or inscrutable]
and (2) Plantinga’s argument given E [i.e., P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable].338 Just what
work is the E portion of the argument doing for EAAN?
In order to answer this question, I believe it is helpful to think more generally
about the intuition undergirding Plantinga’s overall argument: that brute, blind, uncaring,
unintentional forces are sources of dubious trustworthiness when it comes to having
confidence that R. Regarding this, it does not seem to matter whether E is involved in
this blindness or not. Such untrustworthiness of a source results in a defeater for a belief
in R given N, similar to the kind of defeater we would get if we came to believe
Descartes’ malevolent demon hypothesis. Sosa writes: “… [such a] belief is a defeater
for one’s trust that R is true, and is also thereby a defeater in turn for the ostensible
deliverances of these faculties.”339
With regard to this intuition about brute forces, Plantinga’s EAAN is reminiscent
of some arguments made previously by others. In a footnote of a relevant chapter of
WPF, Plantinga writes:
“Victor Reppert reminds me that the argument of this chapter bears a good bit of
similarity to arguments to be found in chapters III and XIII of C. S. Lewis'
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Miracles; the argument also resembles Richard Taylor's argument in Chapter X
of his Metaphysics.”340
I believe that a look at these other arguments helps to clarify crucial aspects of
Plantinga’s argument, and also helps in discerning just what it is he is doing that is novel.
What were the arguments of Lewis and Taylor, and how is Plantinga’s argument similar
and dissimilar to them?
An Argument by C. S. Lewis
On February 2, 1948, G. E. M. Anscombe and C. S. Lewis engaged in a debate at
a meeting of the Oxford Socratic Club. The topic of the debate was Lewis’s argument
against naturalism as expressed in Chapter Three of the first edition of his book Miracles
(1947).341 (This chapter was called “The Self-Contradiction of the Rationalist.”) At the
Oxford Socratic Club meeting, Elizabeth Anscombe read a paper entitled “A Reply to
Mr. C. S. Lewis’s Argument That ‘Naturalism’ is Self-Refuting.”342 She began her
presentation by briefly summarizing what she took to be Lewis’s argument: that a
naturalist was in an irrational position because naturalism is “inconsistent with the
validity of reason.”343 Since naturalism (roughly defined) usually carries with it the idea
that all things (including thought) are the result of irrational (natural) causes, this
“impugns the validity of reason, and therefore any thinking by which it itself is
340
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reached.”344 Lewis had set forth a rule: “no thought is valid if it can be fully explained
as the result of irrational causes.”345
Anscombe’s primary irritation with this seems to be that she felt Lewis’s
argument contained many crucial terms that had not been sufficiently defined. The set of
key terms for her included irrational, valid, invalid, reason, cause, explanation, and
because.346
What did Lewis mean by the validity of reason? What is the distinction between
valid and invalid reasoning? What, precisely, is an irrational cause? If a naturalist
maintains that she believes X because of Y, what exactly is the relation between X and Y?
Does she mean it to be a scientific cause-and-effect relation, or a relation between
propositions?
Anscombe’s aim was not to defend naturalism as the correct metaphysical stance,
but to contend that, because of his imprecise usage of key terms, Lewis’s argument did
not go through. She said in conclusion:
… I do not think that there is sufficiently good reason for maintaining the
“naturalist” hypothesis about human behaviour and thought. But someone who
does maintain it cannot be refuted as you [Lewis] try to refute him, by saying that
it is inconsistent to maintain it and to believe that human reasoning is valid and
that human reasoning sometimes produces human opinion.347
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Lewis responded that his wide and varied uses of the word valid were unfortunate
in communicating what he meant: “veridical (or verific or veriferous) would have been
better.”348 Concerning the term because he added:
… I also admit that the cause and effect relation between events and the ground
and consequent relation between propositions are distinct. Since English uses the
word because of both, let us here use Because CE for the cause and effect relation
(“This doll always falls on its feet because CE its feet are weighted”) and Because
GC for the ground and consequent relation (“A equals C because GC they both
equal B”).349
Around ten years after this meeting of the Socratic Club, Lewis revised the
chapter of his book Miracles in order to meet some of Anscombe’s criticisms. The new
title of the chapter was “The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism.”350 Anscombe read the
revisions, and although she still found some reasons for criticism, thought that the second
version was “… much less slick and avoids some of the mistakes of the earlier one; it is
much more of a serious investigation … it certainly does correspond more to the actual
depth and difficulty of the questions being discussed.”351
Lewis’s revised argument is now mostly contained in Chapter Three of the second
edition of Miracles.352 The argument there, in nutshell, is that “no account of the
universe can be true unless that account leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real
insight.”353 Naturalism, Lewis held, seems to have a difficulty at this point. It appears to
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result in a situation that discredits our processes of reasoning “or at least reduces their
credit to such a humble level that it can no longer support Naturalism itself.”354
One way to begin to see this, Lewis now asserted, was to notice the difference in
the following two sentences of the use of the word because (one here sees the influence
of Anscombe’s criticism):
(1) Grandfather is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday.
(2) Grandfather must be ill today because he hasn’t got up yet (and we know that
he is an invariably early riser when he is well).355

Sentence (1) above illustrates Because CE (because regarding cause and effect),
while sentence (2) illustrates Because GC (because regarding the relation of ground and
consequent). The one “indicates a dynamic connection between events or ‘states of
affairs’; the other, a logical relation between beliefs or assertions.”356
Now, for the most part, reasoning has no value (with regard to finding truth)
unless inferences are connected via a Ground-Consequent relation. “If what we think at
the end of our reasoning is to be true, the correct answer to the question, ‘Why do you
think this?’ must begin with the Ground-Consequent because.”357
But, concerning events in the physical world under Naturalism, “every event in
Nature must be connected with previous events in the Cause and Effect relation[;] … the

354

Lewis (1960) 22.
Lewis (1960) 22. Italics mine, and bold mine where Lewis had italicized the word.
356
Lewis (1960) 23.
357
Lewis (1960) 23.
355

111

true answer to ‘Why do you think this?’ in this regard must begin with the Cause-Effect
because.”358
Note that Lewis is assuming here that Naturalism entails determinism. About an
alternative based on, say, quantum physics, he says:
The older scientists believed that the smallest particles of matter moved
according to strict laws; in other words, that the movements of each particle were
‘interlocked’ with the total system of Nature. Some modern scientists seem to
think – if I understand them – that this is not so. They seem to think that the
individual unit of matter (it would be rash to call it any longer a ‘particle’) moves
in an indeterminate or random fashion; moves, in fact, ‘on its own’ or ‘of its own
accord’. The regularity which we observe in the movements of the smallest
visible bodies is explained by the fact that each of these contains millions of units
and that the law of averages therefore levels out the idiosyncrasies of the
individual unit’s behaviour … Now it will be noticed that if this theory is true we
really have admitted something other than Nature. If the movements of the
individual units are events ‘on their own’, events which do not interlock with all
other events, then these movements are no part of Nature. It would be, indeed,
too great a shock to our habits to describe them as super-natural. I think we
should have to call them sub-natural. But all our confidence that Nature has no
doors, and no reality outside herself for doors to open on, would have
disappeared. There is apparently something outside her, the Subnatural; it is
indeed from this Subnatural that all events and all ‘bodies’ are, as it were, fed into
her.359

It doesn’t really matter for Lewis whether one is a naturalistic determinist or
naturalistic indeterminist, because either way he would say that it is hard to see how
propositions could be related in the necessary Ground-Consequent relation for us to be
able to trust our cognitive faculties. In a train of reasoning, unless the conclusion “is the
logical consequent from a ground it will be worthless [re: gaining the truth] and could be
true only by a fluke.”360 But, at the same time, unless the thinking is the effect of some
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cause, “it cannot occur at all.”361 Therefore, regarding a train of thought and its purchase
on the truth, it seems as if the two different systems of connection (i.e., GroundConsequent & Cause-Effect) “must apply simultaneously to the same series of mental
acts.”362
However, the two systems seem vastly distinct: “[t]o be caused is not to be
proved.”363 If natural causes fully account for a belief, it seems as though “the belief
would have had to arise whether it had grounds or not.”364 How is one thought seen to be
a ground for another?365 And how is that seeing to be worked into a naturalistic
framework of all reality? (Here we are reminded of Plantinga’s comments about
epiphenomenalism.)
Acts of thinking can have intentionality, and the associated beliefs and assertions
regarding these acts can many times be true or false. But, “events in general are not
‘about’ anything and cannot be true or false.”366 How is this truth and falsity, the
Ground-Consequent relation, and the phenomena of knowing (beyond being taken in just
a subjective sense) to be worked into the naturalistic Cause-Effect relation?367 If Nature
is the whole show, and all events are linked in some kind of cause-effect relation, then
“this account, on inspection, leaves no room for the acts of knowing or insight on which
the whole value of our thinking, as a means to truth, depends.”368
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Lewis agreed that both he and his hypothetical naturalistic opponent both believe
that we do make real inferences, and that we know things. Lewis’s account is not a
global skeptical account about knowledge anymore than is Plantinga’s account. Like
Plantinga, Lewis just thinks that the naturalistic framework cannot account for how we
have this knowledge.369
If the naturalist responds that our thinking is useful, and so it is reasonable to
believe that it must have been preserved over the years for its utility, Lewis thinks that
the here the question is being begged, for:
“[i]f the value of reasoning is in doubt, you cannot try to establish it by
reasoning. If … a proof that there are no proofs is nonsensical, so is a proof that
there are proofs. Reason is our starting point. There can be no question whether
of attacking it or defending it. If by treating it as a mere phenomenon you put
yourself outside it, there is then no way, except by begging the question, of
getting inside again.”370

One could, Lewis notes, retreat to pragmatism, and not make reference to truth in
the traditional (roughly) correspondence sense about our real metaphysical situation, but
then one could not posit naturalism as the “true” worldview. Nature (such as is involved
in the concept of naturalism) “… is not an object that can be presented either to the
senses or the imagination. It can be reached only by the most remote inferences.”371 The
positing of a correspondence of the truths of the conclusions of our inferences to our
“true metaphysical position” is way beyond our pragmatic phenomenological experience.
So, for reasons such as these Lewis did not see his argument as one that could be
defeated by a pragmatic line of reasoning. A pragmatist would not be asserting
369
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metaphysical naturalism as a true belief; Lewis’s argument (like Plantinga’s) is against
those who do.
Lewis realized that he needed a working definition of naturalism and
supernaturalism to get the discussion off the ground. But he also realized that it is
practically impossible to fully define the terms. Lewis thought the best way to get a
handle on what we usually mean by naturalism would be via the ordinary language route.
Lewis brings this out by examining how the words nature or natural are used in
sentences like the following:
 Are those his natural teeth or a set?
 The dog in his natural state is covered with fleas.
 I love to get away from tilled lands and metalled roads and be alone with
Nature.
 Do be natural. Why are you so affected?
 It may have been wrong to kiss her but it was very natural.372
Lewis thought that the common idea portrayed in these sentences is that a thing
that is “natural” is characterized by whatever springs up (or comes forth, arrives, goes on,
etc.) on its own (i.e., “of its own accord: the given, what is there already: the
spontaneous, the unintended, the unsolicited.”)373 He goes on to say:
… What the Naturalist believes is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can’t go
behind, is a vast process in space and time which is going on of its own accord.
Inside that total system every particular event (such as your sitting here reading
this …) happens because some other event has happened; in the long run, because
the Total Event is happening.374
372
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Could a conscious God have sprung up from the universe this way? Could there
be a God who has emerged from the forces and operations of Nature? Lewis said:
… It is, of course, possible to suppose that when all the atoms of the universe got
into a certain relation … they would give rise to a universal consciousness. And it
might have thoughts. And it might cause those thoughts to pass through our
minds. But unfortunately its own thoughts, on this supposition, would be the
product of non-rational causes and therefore, by the rule that we use daily, they
would have no validity. This cosmic mind would be, just as much as our own
minds, the product of a mindless Nature. The cosmic mind will help us only if we
put it at the beginning, if we suppose it to be, not the product of the total system,
but the basic, original, self-existent Fact which exists in its own right. But to
admit that sort of cosmic mind is to admit a God outside Nature, a transcendent
and supernatural God.375
The “rule that we use daily” is the rule that whenever we trace beliefs back to
non-rational causes (non-rational in that they are Cause-Effect related instead of GroundConsequent related), we tend to take that as a basis to disbelieve the assertions (e.g., He
believes he can fly because he has taken a drug, or She believes she is a child again
because of a tumor in her brain.)376
So we see that Lewis’s main argument is that rationality cannot come from nonrationality, and even if it does, that in itself is no reason to believe that the deliverances of
the cognitive faculties so formed are actually veridical. This reminds us of the stages of
Plantinga’s argument that emphasize the difficulties of naturalism to account for the
linkages between beliefs, propositions, truth and behavior. Additionally, it is reminiscent
of Plantinga’s contention that the trustworthiness of a cognitive source is important in
determining the trustworthiness of beliefs downstream from the source.

375
376

Lewis (1960) 46-47.
See Lewis (1960) 27. The examples are mine.

116

Interestingly, most of Lewis’s argument is given (or could be given) without
reference to evolution. When he does treat matters involving evolution, he does so
mainly as a response to some perceived lines of rebuttal. About evolutionary
considerations, Lewis said:
… It is agreed on all hands that reason, and even sentience, and life itself are late
comers in Nature. If there is nothing but Nature, therefore, reason must have
come into existence by a historical process. And of course, for the Naturalist, this
process was not designed to produce a mental behavior that can find truth. There
was no Designer; and indeed, until there were thinkers, there was no truth or
falsehood. The type of mental behaviour we now call rational thinking or
inference must therefore have been ‘evolved’ by natural selection, by the gradual
weeding out of types less fitted to survive.
Once then, our thoughts were not rational. That is, all our thoughts once
were … merely subjective events, not apprehensions of objective truth. Those
which had a cause external to ourselves were (like our pains) responses to stimuli.
Now natural selection […works by] eliminating responses that were biologically
hurtful and multiplying those which tended to survival. But it is not conceivable
that any improvement of responses could ever turn them into acts of insight, or
even remotely to do so. The relation between response and stimuli is utterly
different from that between knowledge and the truth known. Our physical vision
is a far more useful response to light than that of the cruder organisms which have
only a photo-sensitive spot. But neither this improvement nor any possible
improvements we can suppose could bring it an inch nearer to being a knowledge
of light. It is admittedly something without which we could not have had that
knowledge. But the knowledge is achieved by experiments and inferences from
them, not by refinement of the response …
Besides natural selection there is, however, experience – experience
originally individual but handed on by tradition and instruction. It might be held
that this, in the course of millennia, could conjure the mental behavior we call
reason – in other words, the practice of inference – out of a mental behavior
which was originally not rational … [But my] belief that things which are equal to
the same thing are equal to one another is not at all based on the fact that I have
never caught them behaving otherwise. I see that it ‘must’ be so.377
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Here we see Lewis arguing that it is difficult to see how evolution could bring
about insight or knowledge through modification. Jerry Fodor seems to express a similar
idea when he says:
… Perhaps I should mention … that I’m not actually an adaptationist about the
mind; I doubt, that is, that Darwinism is true of the phylogeny of cognition. For
reasons I’ve set out elsewhere [378] I think our kinds of minds are quite likely
“hopeful monsters,” which is why there are so few of them.”379
This difficulty, of seeing how insight could historically arise under naturalism,
attends to relevant discussions involving either biological evolution and/or cultural
evolution. (Cultural evolution is also affected because the process of knowledge
acquisition could never get off the ground in the first place). The reason for this is that
the very nature of insight or knowledge is too different than the materials that evolution
originally had to work with. Plantinga, in effect, makes the same point when he
emphasizes the intractability (under naturalism) of ontologically accounting for
propositions, truths, and beliefs, and the relationships of these entities to behavior. We
will see, below, that a similar argument arises from Richard Taylor’s contentions.

An Argument by Richard Taylor
The relevant argument by Richard Taylor (from Chapter 11 of the 4th edition of
Metaphysics) follows below.380 Note that, although it may look at first glance like a case
for the existence of God by way of a standard design argument, there is a slight twist. As
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will be seen, there will be something made of the relationship between rationality and
natural forces that reminds one of Plantinga’s EAAN.381
Taylor’s argument begins by way of a couple of examples. Here is the first one.
Suppose you are riding on a train and, glancing out the window, you see white rocks on a
small hillside near the train that are seemingly arranged into letters that read THE
BRITISH RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES. You would probably not think
that nature had assembled these stones into such a pattern. Most likely you would not
even question the fact that the stones had been purposely arranged to convey information.
However, reflecting upon this, you note that you cannot prove that nature did not do it. It
is logically possible that, given enough time, the stones were rolled into precisely their
current positions by way of natural operations. You know from experience that
sometimes things that have seemed purposely arranged turn out to have not been
purposely arranged.382
Now we come to the most important point to notice:
… if, upon seeing from the train window a group of stones arranged as described,
you were to conclude that you were entering Wales, and if your sole reason for
thinking this, whether it was in fact good evidence or not, was that the stones
were so arranged, then you could not, consistently with that, suppose that the
arrangement of stones was accidental. You would, in fact, be presupposing that
they were arranged that way by an intelligent and purposeful being or beings for
the purpose of conveying a certain message having nothing to do with the stones
themselves. Another way of expressing the same point is that it would be
irrational for you to regard the arrangement of the stones as evidence that you
were entering Wales, and at the same time to suppose that they might have come
381
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to have that arrangement accidentally, that is, as the result of ordinary interactions
of natural and physical forces. If, for instance, they came to be so arranged over
the course of time simply by their rolling down the hill, one by one, and finally
just happening to end up that way, or if they were strewn upon the ground that
way by the forces of an earthquake or storm or whatnot, then their arrangement
would in no sense constitute evidence that you were entering Wales, or for
anything else whatever unconnected with themselves.383

The second example goes like this: say an archaeologist dug up a stone that had
various marks on it, and all the marks were roughly about the same size and were
arranged in rows. It is of course possible that these marks had been made as a result of
natural forces. Even on the further supposition that the marks were found to be similar to
a known ancient alphabet, that still would not necessarily destroy the hypothesis of a
natural origin. However, suppose a recognized scholar (having knowledge of the
resembled language) translates the marks to read: HERE KIMON FELL LEADING A
BAND OF ATHENIANS AGAINST THE FORCES OF XERXES. Now, of course, it is
still logically possible that nature has produced the marks.384 But, as Taylor continues:
The point to make again, however, is this: If anyone having a knowledge of this
stone concludes, solely on the basis of it, that there was someone named Kimon
who died near where this stone was found, then he cannot, rationally, suppose that
the marks on the stone are the result of the chance or purposeless operations of the
forces of nature. He must, on the contrary, assume that they were inscribed there
by someone whose purpose was to record an historical fact. If the marks had a
purposeless origin, as from volcanic activity or whatnot, then they cannot reveal
any fact whatever except, perhaps, certain facts about themselves or their origin.
It would, accordingly, be irrational for anyone to suppose both that what is
seemingly expressed by the marks is true, and also that they appeared as the result
of nonpurposeful forces, provided the marks are his sole evidence for believing
what they seem to say is true.385
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Now, our human bodies are exceedingly complex organisms (especially our
cognitive faculties), much more so than the complexity displayed in an arrangement of
rocks or marks as mentioned above. (This is one of the standard facets of a typical design
argument for the existence of God.) However, in the considered opinions of many
people, these complexities (and the seemingly purposeful composition of human beings)
do not necessitate a non-natural explanation.386
However, there is an additional consideration that Taylor wants us to ponder:
The important point, however, and one that is rarely considered is that we do not
simply marvel at these [complex cognitive] structures, and wonder how they came
to be that way … We, in fact, whether justifiably or not, rely upon them for the
discovery of things that we suppose to be true and that we suppose to exist quite
independently of those organs themselves. We suppose, without even thinking
about it, that they reveal to us things that have nothing to do with themselves,
their structures, or their origins. Just as we supposed that the stones on the hill
told us that we were entering Wales – a fact having nothing to do with the stones
themselves – so also we suppose that our senses in some manner “tell us” what is
true, at least sometimes. The stones on the hill could, to be sure, have been an
accident, in which case we cannot suppose that they really tell us anything at all.
So also, our senses and our faculties could be accidental in their origins, and in
that case they do not tell us anything either. But the fact remains that we do trust
them, without the slightest reflection on the matter.387

The argument at this stage is depending upon the assumption that accidental and
truth-displaying are not descriptions that go together to any great extent. This does not
seem to be an unreasonable assumption.

Someone might respond that naturalistic

evolution does not produce accidental characteristics in organisms, because over a long
period of time it produces traits well-suited for survival and reproduction. But Taylor
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means accidental in the sense of having nothing to do with intentional direction – and
this, of course, naturalistic evolution does not have.
Now, not only does the fact that we trust our cognitive faculties in the way the we
do inspire wonder, but additionally the basicality of many of our beliefs stemming from
these faculties inspires curiosity:
Our seeing something is often thought to be, quite by itself, a good reason for
believing that the thing exists, and it would be absurd to suggest that we infer this
from the structure of our eyes as speculations upon their evolutionary origins.
And so it is with our other faculties. Our remembering something is often
considered to be, quite by itself, a good reason for believing that the thing
remembered did happen. Our hearing a sound is often considered, quite by itself,
a good reason for believing that a sound exists; and so on.
We are not here suggesting that our senses are infallible, nor even that we
ought to rely upon their testimony. The point is that … [w]e assume, rightly or
wrongly, that they are trustworthy guides with respect to what is true, and what
exists independently of our senses and their origins; and we still assume this, even
when they are our only guides.388
Once we have seen this, the last step of the argument is to assert the irrationality
of depending upon cognitive faculties that have accidental, non-purposeful origins to
deliver truths to us (the way that we do). This is the most crucial part of the argument
and it will remind us of both Lewis and Plantinga:
We saw that it would be irrational for anyone to say both that the marks … on
the stone had a natural, nonpurposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth
with respect to something other than themselves, something that is not merely
inferred from them … So also, it is now suggested, it would be irrational for one
to say both that his sensory and cognitive faculties had a natural, nonpurposeful
origin and also that they reveal some truth with respect to something other than
themselves, something that is not merely inferred from them. If their origin can
be entirely accounted for in terms of chance variations, natural selection, and so
on, without supposing that they somehow embody and express the purposes of
some creative being, then the most we can say of them is that they exist, that they
are complex and wondrous in their construction, and are perhaps in other respects
interesting and remarkable. We cannot say that they are, entirely by themselves,
388
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reliable guides to any truth whatever, save only what can be inferred from their
own structure and arrangement. If, on the other hand, we do assume that they are
guides to some truths having nothing to do with themselves, then it is difficult to
see how we can, consistently with that supposition, believe them to have arisen by
accident, or by the ordinary working of purposeless forces, even over ages of
time.389
After laying out the argument in such a fashion, Taylor tries to field the main
objections to his argument. He writes:
At this point persons who have a deep suspicion of all such arguments as this,
and particularly persons who are hostile to any of the claims of religion, are likely
to seize upon innumerable objections of a sort that it would hardly occur to
anyone to apply to our first two examples ... Thus, it is apt to be said that our
cognitive faculties are not so reliable as some would suppose, which is irrelevant
… Or it is claimed that we rely on our cognitive faculties only because we have
found them reliable in the past, and thus have a sound inductive basis for our
trust, which is absurd, if not question-begging.390

The first criticism is deemed irrelevant because Taylor’s argument is about why
we trust our cognitive faculties to point to truth when we think that they are indeed doing
so. It doesn’t matter that they aren’t always reliable as long as they are sometimes
reliable. The only way this objection would work is if they were never reliable, but then,
how would one successfully lodge the objection (or any objection)?
Regarding the claim that we only trust our cognitive faculties because of past
inductive evidence, Taylor further underscores the basicality of many of our beliefs:
… The reason I believe there is a world around me is, quite simply, that I see it,
feel it, hear it, and am in fact perpetually in cognitive contact with it, or at least
assume myself to be, without even considering the matter. To suggest that I infer
its existence from the effects that it has within me, and that I find the inference
justified on the ground that such inner effects have, in the past, been accompanied
by external causes, is not only a ridiculous caricature but begs the question of
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how, without relying upon my faculties, I could ever confirm such an idea in the
first place.391
This seems to make it all the more unlikely that we came to value and trust the
primary deliverances of our cognitive faculties in any inductive way, which would take
away the threat of this objection.
Once again, like in the case with Lewis, we see that most of these arguments take
place in a context where there is no reference to evolution. Taylor does elsewhere very
briefly address evolutionary concerns, but he also mainly does so in response to
perceived objections (i.e., E is not part of the main argument). Here is Taylor’s brief
comment on an evolutionary concern regarding this argument:
Again, it is sometimes said that the capacity to grasp truths has a decided value
to the survival of the organism, and that our cognitive faculties have evolved,
quite naturally, through the operation of this principle. This appears farfetched,
however, even if for no other reason than that our capacity to understand what is
true, through reliance upon our senses and cognitive faculties, far exceeds what is
needed for survival. One might as well say that the sign on the hill welcoming
tourists to Wales originated over the course of ages purely by accident, and has
been preserved by the utility it was then found to possess. This is of course
possible, but also immensely implausible.392
One might say, though, that Taylor has missed an important point here: our
capacity to grasp such truths (those beyond what mere survival would require) is a
product of cultural evolution, not biological evolution. However, such a retort seems still
vulnerable to Lewis’s point, above: that it is hard to see how cultural evolution could
produce something of the nature of “insight” and “knowledge” in the first instance, given
the materials of biological evolution.393
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Comparing the Arguments of Lewis and Taylor to Plantinga’s EAAN
To many observers, it might seem that Plantinga’s argument is simply a
reworking of those of Lewis and Taylor. It does seem that Plantinga’s argument depends
upon some of the same crucial intuitions working in the other arguments; whether that is
helpful or hurtful to Plantinga depends upon what one thinks of those intuitions.
However, it should be noticed that Plantinga’s argument is the only one that, using
evolution as a given, tries to reveal an inherent defeater that flows from E when
combined with N. Looking into the nature of such a supposed defeater is the subject of
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Some Thoughts on Defeaters Given the Probability Thesis
Ernest Sosa points out that, in EAAN, it is E itself that, under N, yields a problem
and highlights the difficulties surrounding the link between behavior and beliefs. E,
being so well-confirmed and currently the main game in town for those who hold N,
leads to the surprising conclusion from its own premises. Without E in the argument, you
have an intuitional case about brute forces. With E in the argument, you have the
intuition about brute forces plus the purported indifference that natural selection has to
truth (in that it is concerned with mere adaptability – see Chapter Three), the difficulty of
naturalistically correlating brain states to truths, the mystery of the naturalistic
evolutionary development of (and ontological status of) propositions, and so on. Sosa
writes:
After all, evolution cares fundamentally about adaptation and fitness. If it cares at
all about the truth of our beliefs, this will have to be because of how our true
beliefs contribute to our adaptation and fitness. But the probability that our true
beliefs make any such contribution is low or at best inscrutable. According to
naturalist cognitive science, beliefs are brain states with cognitive content. Their
place in the causal order is thus at the juncture between afferent and efferent
nerves. But how then can the content or truth of a belief gain any purchase in the
causal order? It is presumably the physical, electrochemical properties of the
brain and nervous system that link up with our sensory receptors on one side and
with our muscles on the other, serving thus as causal intermediaries between
perceptual stimulus and behavioral response. It is those electrochemical
properties that matter causally. The propositional content of a belief thus seems
epiphenomenal, its causal efficacy preempted by the physical properties of the
constitutive brain state.394
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Say then, for argument’s sake, that because of these types of considerations
mentioned by Sosa, above, that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable. But, asks Sosa, would
this necessarily defeat many ordinary beliefs that we have? Is a child irrational for
forming ordinary beliefs about food and shelter? Is someone walking down a lane who
sees a stone and thinks this stone is smooth and would reliably roll down inclines
irrational in thinking this?395 What about my belief that I now have an ache in my knee,
or that I have hands? Are those irrational beliefs given that P(R/N&E) is low or
inscrutable?396
Plantinga would again bring up the differences between proper function defeaters,
alethic defeaters, and Humean defeaters.397 Plantinga is not saying that just any adherent
of N has a defeater for these ordinary beliefs. Plantinga acknowledges that, even after
seeing the truth of the Probability Thesis, a person is still probably going to believe
propositions about stones and hands, etc., because this is to go along with what proper
function dictates. However, according to Plantinga, the reflective naturalist would have
an alethic defeater, and then a Humean defeater, because that person has been saddled
with an undefeated defeater (which, however, she could be relieved of if she abandoned
N). If someone S does indeed have an undefeated defeater for a belief, Plantinga holds
that B would not be warranted for S, and so B would not be an instance of knowledge.
And, if the particular belief that is involved is R, then one would not have warrant for R,
and so one would not have knowledge that R.
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Michael Bergmann wonders if one might argue that, although a reflective
adherent of N might seem to be in trouble because of certain propositions she believes,
she might still have enough nonpropositional knowledge about R to keep her from being
in an irrational position. (This will basically echo Sosa’s points about the reliably-rolling
stone and the ache in the knee).
What Bergmann is doing is granting that one can see that the Probability Thesis398
is true, but still not have a defeater for R. In formulating this argument, Bergmann
depends heavily upon portions of Thomas Reid’s epistemology, which Bergmann
summarizes like this:
… (i) a belief can be noninferentially justified or warranted – that is, justified or
warranted even if formed on the basis of an experience rather than on the basis of
another belief … – and that (ii) among our noninferentially justified beliefs are a
good number of our commonsense beliefs.399

To begin to explicate his line of thinking, Bergmann uses an example from one of
Plantinga’s own Reidian-style defenses which Plantinga uses elsewhere (i.e., outside of
EAAN) regarding the Problem of Evil. Plantinga thinks that even if a theist believed
P(G/HE) is low (where G is God exists and HE is there are horrendous evils), this does
not necessarily give the theist a defeater for G. This is because even if G is unlikely on
the total propositional evidence the theist has, she may have enough nonpropositional
evidence (e.g., by way of the sensus divinitatis) to keep her belief in HE from rendering
her belief in G irrational.400
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Here is a Plantingian example to illustrate how nonpropositional evidence might
keep propositional evidence from defeating various beliefs: suppose you are accused of
stealing a letter, and that there is a very impressive amount of evidence amassed against
you (in the form of an inductive argument to the conclusion that you stole the letter).
This evidence includes: (1) you had a motive to steal it, (2) you have done similar things
in the past, (3)eyewitnesses testify that you were in the area, and so on. But you claim to
have been on a walk in the woods (W) when the letter was stolen. Now, everyone
involved very reasonably believes that P(W/k) – where k is the total propositional
evidence – is very low. But you have a clear memory belief that you really were on a
walk in the woods when the letter was stolen. You know you did not steal the letter …
don’t you? So, here the nonpropositional evidence (by which you know W) keeps the
relevant propositional evidence from rendering your belief in W (and your belief that
you’re innocent) irrational or unjustified. Likewise, Plantinga held, a theist might not
have a defeater regarding the problem of evil if she had enough of the right kind of
nonpropositional evidence.
Now what Bergmann wants to know is whether or not the same sort of defense is
available to an adherent of N in the face of EAAN: she has strong nonpropositional
evidence for R, and so the Probability Thesis need not threaten her with a defeater. What
is this nonpropositional evidence for R?
Here Bergmann builds upon Thomas Reid’s idea that we know R in a basic way
(i.e., we do not know R based on other beliefs). R is a first principle, and all first
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principles are non-inferentially justified.401 We obtain knowledge of first principles
through a part of our faculty of reason that Reid calls “common sense”.402 By “common
sense” Reid does not mean beliefs that are formed by education, but because of our
constitution. Common sense beliefs can be necessary truths (e.g., logical axioms) or
contingent truths (e.g., other humans have minds).403
Here is something important about how Reid says these kinds of beliefs are
recognized:
… We may observe, that opinions which contradict first principles are
distinguished from other errors by this; that they are not only false, but absurd:
and to discountenance absurdity, nature has given us a particular emotion, to wit,
that of ridicule, which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of
countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or practice.404
So, beliefs in first principles, although they are not shored up by other beliefs or
evidences, are supported by the fact that the denial of a first principle strikes one as
absurd or ridiculous.405 With this groundwork being laid, Bergmann applies such Reidian
thinking to the case of the naturalist who has accepted the truth of the Probability Thesis.
This “commonsense naturalist” could reply to Plantinga as follows:
… Even if a naturalist believed that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, this needn’t
give her a defeater for R. For she could have nonpropositional evidence for R that
is sufficiently strong to make belief in R rational, reasonable, and warranted –
even for someone whose total relevant propositional evidence, k, was such that
P(R/k) is low or inscrutable. The nonpropositional evidence she has could be of
the sort Reid describes.406
401
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Now, this does not mean that Bergmann is proposing that R is altogether
undefeatable. One could still gain a defeater by, say, coming to believe that one is a
victim of a Cartesian demon. Or, in the Case of the Purloined Letter, you could come to
believe that there was something wrong with your memory. Similarly, a theist faced with
the problem of evil might at first hold belief in God as a basic belief, but later become
convinced that such a belief is really the result of wish fulfillment.407
Bergmann then considers the possibility that the examples in his Reidian
response to EAAN are disanalogous to Plantinga’s response to the problem of evil. This
might be because of the differences between rebutting defeaters and undercutting
defeaters. Rebutting defeaters provide evidence for the falsity of some belief.
Undercutting defeaters work by casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the source of
some belief, and thereby defeat the belief by pointing to the tainted spring from which it
comes.408
Unlike the case with undercutting defeaters, nonpropositional evidence can still
be valuable in the face of a rebutting defeater – someone could still hold onto her belief
B; she has merely become aware that something she believes (because of
nonpropositional evidence) is unlikely on the basis of the propositional evidence that she
has. However, in the case of an undercutting defeater that casts doubt on B’s source, it is
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hard to see how the nonpropositional evidence can rescue B. The nonpropositional
evidence also flows from the possibly infected source.409
In order to make these distinctions more clear, Bergmann analyzes in more detail
the structure of arguments involving what he calls the Wish Fulfillment Defeater, the
Memory Implant Defeater, and Plantinga’s N&E Defeater. Then he contrasts these with
the structure of the Problem of Evil Defeater in order to see if his cases are properly
analogous.
Freudian Defeater (Wish Fulfillment Defeater) for Theism

Because of the following beliefs:
X: The source of my belief that G (i.e., that God exists) is wish fulfillment
Y: P(a belief source is reliable/it is a sort of wish fulfillment) is low or
inscrutable
it is reasonable to then doubt:
Z: The source of my belief that G is reliable.410
Artificial-Memory-Implant Defeater for W
Because of the following beliefs:
X: The source of my belief that W (i.e., that I was out for a walk in the
woods at the time the letter was stolen) is artificial input by scientists who,
as far as I know, have no particular interest in the beliefs so produced
being true
Y: P(a belief source is reliable/it consists of input by scientists who, as far
as I know, have no particular interest in the beliefs so produced being true)
is low or inscrutable
it is reasonable to then doubt:
409
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Z: The source of my belief that W is reliable.411
Plantinga’s N&E Defeater for Naturalism
Because of the following beliefs:
X: The sources of our beliefs (including my belief in naturalism) came
about by way of N&E
Y: P(a belief source is reliable/it came about by way of N&E) is low or
inscrutable
it is reasonable to then doubt:
Z: Our belief sources are reliable.412
In these arguments, belief in X and Y are supposed to usher in doubts about Z.
Actually, in the Freudian case and the Memory Implant case, it is probably safe to say
that most people would agree that one does indeed have a defeater because of the
unreliable nature of the sources. But does the next argument work in the same way?
Defeater for Theism from Evil
Because of the following beliefs:
X: HE (i.e., there exists horrendous evil)
Y: P(G/HE) is low or inscrutable
it is reasonable to doubt:
B: G.413
Here, says Bergmann, is a rebutting defeater, one that directly casts doubt on a
belief. In the other three cases, an undercutting defeater indirectly defeats a belief by
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casting doubt on the source of the belief. Bergmann agrees that the Freudian
undercutting defeater and the Memory Implant defeater would be successful even if one
had nonpropositional evidence to support the belief in question. However, he says that
the nonpropositional evidence could come to one’s aid in the rebutting defeater case
(involving the problem of evil). So, if Plantinga’s EAAN argument is more like the
Freudian and Memory Implant cases than it is like the Defeater for Theism from Evil,
then it seems that Bergmann’s (Reidian) nonpropositional evidence strategy could not
help.414
To try to strengthen a Reidian defense, Bergmann maintains:
… it’s important to recognize that there is no reason to think that such
defeaters [undercutting ones] will be successful if the person holding the
threatened belief does not come to have doubts about the trustworthiness of its
source. So the question we need to ask ourselves is whether belief in X and Y in
cases that are like the first three always requires the person holding the threatened
belief to have doubts about Z? I say it doesn’t.415
Bergmann thinks that there are cases where believing X and Y don’t cause you to
doubt Z. As an example, he uses the Straw-Drawing Case:
X: The straw is drawn from the lottery straws.
Y: P(straw is about three inches long/it is drawn from the lottery straws)
is low or inscrutable.
Z: The straw that is drawn is about three inches long.416
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Here the reason for your belief in Z is nonpropositional sensory evidence. You
have a proposition (Y) that casts doubt upon your belief, but you don’t have to let that
lead you to question your sensory evidence or your source… you just learn that what you
believe happens to be unlikely given your propositional evidence. So, Bergmann says,
this shows that even when you are faced with an argument with the same structure as the
Freudian argument and the Memory Implant argument, you don’t necessarily need to
have doubts about your belief.417
At this point, one might well ask whether Bergmann’s line of thinking is really
appropriate; the straw case involves a rebutting defeater, and the Freudian and Memory
cases involve undercutting defeaters. Remember, Bergmann said that an argument (like
the Freudian Wish Fulfillment case or like Memory Implant Case), involving an
undercutting defeater for a belief in the reliability of some source S, could not be
overturned by nonpropositional evidence. Therefore, if Plantinga’s case against N is
appropriately analogous to the undercutting defeaters in those cases, then Bergmann’s
nonpropositional evidence approach would not succeed.
To this, Bergmann says: “… [notice that] the three undercutting defeaters (for G,
for W, and for N)418 [still] involve rebutting defeaters for the belief that the source of the
belief that G or W or N is reliable.”419 To explain further, he says:
… the cases involving undercutting defeat work by way of a rebutting defeater for
Z – the claim (in the Freudian and memory implant cases) that the source of the
belief threatened with undercutting defeat is reliable. And my point is that if this
rebutting defeater doesn’t work, then the undercutting defeater that depends upon
its success won’t work either. So it is relevant to focus on rebutting defeaters
417
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(like the straw-drawing case) that parallel the sort of rebutting defeater that plays
a role in the undercutting defeat in the Freudian and memory implant cases.420

So, is Plantinga’s EAAN more like the straw case than it is like the Freudian or
memory implant cases? Bergmann says yes, because almost anyone who sees the truth of
X and Y in the Freudian or memory implant cases will think Z to be extremely
improbable. But Plantinga doesn’t give an improbability argument, says Bergmann – he
only gives an inscrutability argument: “[t]he only persuasive reason Plantinga gives for
thinking that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable is that P(R/N&E) is inscrutable.”421
(Recall, though, that Plantinga thinks he has provided a disjunctive argument, based upon
either inscrutability or low probability (the low probability disjunct stemming from the
analysis of the five options of correlating beliefs and behavior.))422
In the straw case, Bergmann holds that the nonpropositional evidence (of memory
and sense perception) trumps the probabilistic propositional case against Z. This
nonpropositional evidence keeps the propositional evidence against Z from being a
possible defeater in the first place. Similarly, says Bergmann, goes Plantinga’s argument.
The strong nonpropositional evidence which a naturalist has for Z (which in this case is
R) prevents the probabilistic evidence from even being considered. Bergmann writes:
… the evidence for Z in the Plantingian N&E case is as strong or stronger than it
is in the Freudian and memory implant cases. For it is natural and sensible to
place much more confidence in R than in the reliability of the source of one’s
belief that G or the trustworthiness (on that particular occasion) of the source of
one’s belief that W. As a result, less counterevidence is required to make it
rational to mistrust the source of G or of W than is required to make it rational to
doubt R.
420
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So, the evidence against Z is much weaker in the Plantingian N&E case than it
is in either the Freudian or memory implant cases … [so it] is reasonable for the
naturalist to believe R. And all that her acceptance of X and Y does in that case is
make it reasonable for her to think that something she knows to be true – namely,
that her cognitive faculties are reliable – is unlikely to be true given other things
she believes.423
Yes, but in Plantinga’s case Z is about all of your cognitive faculties, which
crucially distinguishes it from the straw case. The rescue in the straw case comes from
only two faculties, sense perception and short-term memory. Regarding EAAN, the way
out of the dilemma (Bergmann style) is supposed to come from a Reidian type of
common sense. But you can’t use that if your common sense is in doubt. Is one’s
common sense in doubt because of the Probability Thesis?424
Bergmann has granted (for argument’s sake) the truth of the Probability Thesis.
This means that there is strong propositional evidence to doubt the reliability of your
cognitive faculties. “Cognitive faculties” includes the faculty of common sense. But
common sense is supposed to be the faculty that protects belief in R via nonpropositional
evidence. How can one trust the nonpropositional evidence if it, too, comes from the
denigrated source? There seems to be a kind of epistemic loop involved here.
This brings up again the circularity question that we have seen before, and, of
course, Bergmann is well aware of it. He begins to attempt to tackle this circularity issue
by distinguishing between three different types of circularity:
(1) logical circularity,
(2) epistemic circularity involving source confidence, and
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(3) Bergmann’s brand of Reidian circularity.425
An argument is logically circular ((1), above) when its conclusion is already
contained in one of the essential premises. An epistemically circular argument of type
(2), above, is one in which a belief source produces beliefs which are used to restore lost
confidence in that source. Bergmann agrees that both of these types of circularity will
make arguments infected with them vicious and argumentatively unimpressive.426
However, he thinks his Reidian response ((3), above) displays a type of circularity which
is not vicious because it involves basic justification:
The reason belief in R can be maintained is that it is justifiably believed quite
firmly in the basic way. By employing her faculty of common sense, the person
holding R comes to have very powerful nonpropositional evidence for R, which
justifies her belief in it. So R isn’t believed on the basis of a logically circular
argument. It isn’t held on the basis of an argument at all, since it is based on
nonpropositional evidence. For the same reason, it isn’t based on an epistemically
circular argument.427
But isn’t it true that in this case the Reidian move (type (3)) is really the same
thing as type (2), since you have common sense vouching for itself? No, says Bergmann:
in type (3) common sense justifies belief in R, while in type (2) common sense is
restoring lost confidence in R. Bergmann writes:
… although this is a case of a belief source vouching for its own trustworthiness
… it is not a case of a belief source being depended upon to restore lost
confidence in its own trustworthiness. For the person in question does not have
any doubts about the trustworthiness of common sense. It’s true that if she did,
then common sense would be of no help to her.428
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Bergmann buttresses this point with the fact that, if this kind of type (3) response
isn’t available, then R cannot be justified for any position: naturalist, theist, or otherwise.
“Not even God could form the belief that his ways of forming beliefs are trustworthy
without relying on those ways of forming beliefs.”429 If this is so, then Bergmann says
the really important question to ask is:
… Should the believer in N&E, initially at least, doubt R once she learns that
P(R/N&E) is inscrutable? Or should her natural and sensible confidence in R
remain high? If the latter, then the epistemic circularity is of the third kind
[Reidian circularity] and is not problematic; if the former, she is in real trouble.430
Bergmann notes that another way of putting the question is to ask whether the
response to EAAN involves a defeater-defeater (i.e., a defeater to defeat Plantinga’s
defeater for R), or whether the response invokes something that keeps Plantinga’s
defeater from working in the first place.431 Bergmann agrees that, once doubt in R has
been thus engendered, nothing can work as a defeater-defeater. However, he argues that
recognition of the Probability Thesis needn’t (for someone who believes N&E) prompt
doubts about R.432
One of Bergmann’s last shots at EAAN is to try to paint Plantinga’s argument as
just another global skeptical argument. He notes that a typical structure of these types of
arguments goes like this:
Typical Skeptical Argument to R
429
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Because of the following beliefs:
X: I currently have these experiences and beliefs
Y: P(R/I currently have these experiences and beliefs) is inscrutable
it is reasonable to doubt:
Z: R433

Bergmann’s point is that such an argument need not lead one to doubt R in his
Reidian framework, because R is not believed because of an inference of the likelihood
of R given such experiences. R is believed in the basic way; one can have confidence in
R.434 That is the main gist of Bergmann’s Reidian strategy regarding EAAN.
Plantinga, in response, leans heavily upon something already referred to: the
difference between proper-function defeaters and alethic defeaters.435 Notice that, in
order for a belief B to have warrant, two of the necessary conditions involved include: (a)
that the belief is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, and (b) that the
belief be produced by a module that is successfully aimed at truth. Plantinga is ready to
grant that the naturalist who sees the truth of the Probability Thesis may still be operating
under proper function in believing R, and so does not have a proper function defeater.
However, since such a naturalist cannot know that her basic belief in R is produced by a
module successfully aimed at truth, Plantinga wants to insist that the reflective naturalist
has an alethic defeater. (He again refers to the case of the XX drug to buttress the point.)

In cases like the XX case, the person who believes she has taken the drug will still
believe R, but “only because of the presence and power of processes not aimed directly at
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the production of true belief [but which instead are aimed at survival or carrying on].”436
Likewise, if a person has, because of seeing the truth of the Probability Thesis, come to
have doubts about R, she has the same difficulty trying to rescue R as does the person
who has taken XX. If someone has an alethic defeater because of the Probability Thesis,
and additionally is reflective about her situation, then Plantinga maintains she also has a
Humean defeater.
Remember, in the case involving the hypothetical creatures we would withhold
believing R with respect to them.437 Bergmann concedes this, but thinks that our
nonpropositional evidence (of continuing to believe R) makes the conclusion involving
us different from the conclusion that we would draw of the other creatures. But Plantinga
wants to know why would the fact that we continue to believe R give us any warrant for
believing R? Bergmann would say that we have warrant for R in the basic way, Reidian
style, and very, very strong confidence in R.
Now Plantinga has great affinity with Reid, and would agree that we can have
(and do have) much confidence in R because of its basicality, but thinks that the
reflective naturalist should have the right to that confidence stripped from him once he
come to believe the Probability Thesis. Again, this happens also, analogously, to the
person who comes to believe that she has taken XX – confidence in R, or at least warrant
for R based on its basicality, is now eroded. Plantinga writes:
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Plantinga, in Beilby, 232.
See my p. 17ff. for the Plantingian thought experiment involving creatures, of whom all we know is that
these “creatures have cognitive faculties, hold beliefs, change beliefs, make inferences, and so on;
and suppose these creatures have arisen by way of the selection processes endorsed by
contemporary evolutionary thought. What is the probability that their faculties are reliable? What is
P(R/(N&E&C)), specified not to us, but to them?” Plantinga, WPF, 223.
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True … he [the naturalist in question] also has this strong impulse to continue to
believe or assume R. But (as in the above case of the person who believes she’s
ingested XX) he can’t take that as evidence for his reliability; no doubt he would
have that inclination to believe R whether or not it is true … but can he, in this
circumstance, take the strength of that inclination as measuring the degree of
warrant R has for him? I think not. That is because R has warrant for him only if
it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly and successfully aimed
at the production of true belief. But of course he can’t sensibly suppose that his
cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at the production of true belief. For he
realizes that they are successfully aimed at the production of true belief only if
they are in fact reliable; and of course that is precisely the question at issue. So he
can’t sensibly take it that his cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at truth.
Further, he also realizes that if N&E is true, there is no reason to think his
cognitive faculties are aimed at the production of true belief at all, whether
successfully or not. (For example, if his beliefs supervene on neurophysiological
processes plus environmental condition, they are presumably not aimed at
anything at all; they are more like what Stephen Jay Gould calls a spandrel.)
Therefore he can’t suppose that his beliefs have warrant. And hence he can’t
sensibly follow Bergmann in thinking that he has nonpropositional evidence for R
– evidence strong enough to overwhelm the defeating tendencies of his belief in
the truth of N&E and the Probability Thesis.438
Note that when Plantinga says “he can’t sensibly suppose that his cognitive
faculties are successfully aimed at the production of true belief”, Plantinga doesn’t mean
to say that the issue at hand is mainly about the adherent of N’s justification of his belief
in R; the issue is whether or not R has warrant now for that person. A person might be
justified in a belief (in the sense of the person’s faculties and volitions are good) and that
person still not have warrant for a belief (because that belief is, in fact, false). Warrant,
as defined by Plantinga, is the factor which makes a true belief count as knowledge; so, in
order for a person to have warrant for a belief, that belief must first be true. Now this
might seem to be in conflict with something Plantinga has said earlier about proper
function. But really, it’s not, because in effect Plantinga is saying that sometimes our
proper function beliefs, although understandable, are not warranted. And his classic case
438
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for this is illustrated in the story about the XX drug. The person still believes R, but no
longer has warrant for R. And we can see that she doesn’t have warrant for R. How can
we see this? We can see this because we can see that, because of the drug’s effect, it is
probable for her that she will have a false belief about something even as basic as R.
Here is perhaps the crucial element to look at in the exchange between Plantinga
and Bergmann. Bergmann would probably agree that we can all see that the person
taking the XX drug might still believe R but not have warrant for R. But, Bergmann
might ask, what exactly is it that makes Plantinga’s XX case supposedly analogous to the
kind of maneuvers involved in the Probability Thesis?
Plantinga might reply that what makes the two cases analogous is that in both
cases we notice that a person has been put in a scenario that a rational outside observer
could see that the person has lost warrant for the basic belief in R. In the XX case, it is
the usual effect of the drug that erodes warrant. In the case of the Probability Thesis, it is
in noticing the circular nature of the propositions that are associated with N when coupled
with E.
To unpack this a bit, let’s think more deeply about just what it is that makes one
lose warrant in the XX case. Plantinga agrees that the person might be behaving
according to proper function in believing R even though she has taken XX. So, in one
sense of the word, she is still “justified” in believing R. But, according to Plantinga,
something about her belief in R, since taking the drug, is now changed. And that is: her
right to believe in R alethically. In other words, she can still believe R pragmatically, but
has now lost the right to believe that R “really is the case”.
143

Now, in one version of the XX case, there is still a 10% chance that R, even after
taking XX. Therefore, her belief in R, even after taking the drug, might be justified
regarding proper-function and might be justified alethically, too (if she is in the 10%
group that is still reliable). So, in this case, whether she has warrant depends upon
whether or not she is in the 10% group. But Plantinga wants to say that even if she is in
the 10% group, her right to believe in R alethically has been taken away. So, she is in a
position where she only has pragmatic confidence in R. Plantinga thinks this is a bad
position to be in regarding R. What can she, the victim, do to recover more than
pragmatic confidence in R? Well, it is hard to think of any evidence she might be able to
use, because that evidence will have to be sifted through the source in question that, in all
probability, has been tainted. The moral of this story … don’t take XX, because, until it
wears off (if it wears off, and if it hasn’t done any permanent damage), you have lost
something precious … you have lost the ability to have knowledge of R. Now, it may be
true that R; but, even if that is the case, if you have taken XX, you have lost the
knowledge of R (unless possibly you are in the 10% group … but then, how could you be
objectively sure that you were?). And Plantinga thinks that’s bad.
Now, how should this be analogous with the Probability Thesis (PT)? Plantinga
thinks that, like taking the XX drug, combining N with E and seeing PT results in a
similar dissolution of knowledge of R. Before combining N with E (and even afterwards
if one hasn’t reflected on PT) one possibly could have warrant to believe R as a basic
belief. However, upon reflection and seeing PT, one loses warrant to believe R as a basic
belief and therefore loses knowledge of R.
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What is it that causes one to lose knowledge? In the XX case, it was the probable
effect of the drug that made it so that a rational outside observer could see that knowledge
of R has been lost. In the case of EAAN and the Probability Thesis, it is the circular
nature of the resulting string of propositions … one comes to see that there is simply no
evidence that one could present to get out of the muddle. (This is because, again, this
evidence would have to be sifted through the source under suspicion; propositional
evidence or nonpropositional evidence.)
Question: can one have knowledge without having warrant for a belief? Under
Plantinga’s definition of warrant, the answer is no. The reason is because warrant is the
entity that transforms mere true belief into knowledge.
Moving to Bermann’s charge that EAAN is just another version of some global
skeptical argument, let’s look again at the supposed general structure of such an
argument:
Typical Skeptical Argument to R
Because of the following beliefs:
X: I currently have these experiences and beliefs
Y: P(R/I currently have these experiences and beliefs) is inscrutable
it is reasonable to doubt:
Z: R439
Plantinga agrees that just believing X and Y doesn’t give one a defeater. He
writes:

If, for R to be warranted for me, I had to infer it from my present experiences,
then R will have warrant for me only if it is probable with respect to those
experiences. But clearly that is not how warrant [in the case of the types of basic
439
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beliefs at issue] works. My memory beliefs (let’s assume) have warrant for me;
but not by way of those beliefs’ being probable with respect just to my current
experiences and belief.440

But EAAN isn’t an argument based along those lines anyway. Plantinga is not
arguing that R is in trouble because it is not probable based upon one’s current beliefs
and experiences. Plantinga has granted all along that we can have the knowledge of R.441
EAAN is, however, an argument that the knowledge of R comes to be in jeopardy when it
is put in the framework of N and conjoined with belief in E. The belief in N&E (when
seen through the Probability Thesis) is itself supposed to generate the Humean dialectical
loop for the reflective naturalist, who then cannot use argumentation to solve the muddle
now present. Nor can the reflective naturalist use Bergmann’s Reidian method to appeal
to nonpropositional evidence to allay the fears about R, since one cannot be at all sure
that this method is aimed at truth; perhaps it is only part of a proper function mechanism
to enable one to carry on when presented with an argument threatening noetic disaster.
So, EAAN is no global skeptical argument … it is a very particular argument working
within a certain metaphysical worldview, (N), when combined with a certain other
theory, (E). Perhaps an extended summary of EAAN would make it more clear that it is
not a global skeptical argument, and also will aid in helping readers to see where their
exact points of contention are with Plantinga’s argument.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
An Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form, with
Discussion of Premises (1) through (6)
In this chapter I summarize EAAN, putting it in logical form. I will discuss, in
some detail, matters that lead to and affect the first contentious premise, which is
SUMMARY Premise (3).

Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form (SUMMARY)
Here is Plantinga’s EAAN, summarized by me into an argument with 23 premises.442
(1) Given N&E,443 there are four relevant scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive,
regarding how our beliefs might be connected with our behavior:
(a) epiphenomenalism (no links between beliefs and behaviors);
(b) semantic epiphenomenalism (links between beliefs and
behaviors, but no causal links);
(c) a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked but
have maladaptive results;
(d) a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked in an
adaptive way [premise].
(2) P(R/((a) v (b) v (c)) & N&E) is low [obvious].444
(3) P(R/(d) & N&E) is inscrutable [premise].445
(4) So P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) & N&E) is low or inscrutable [1, 2, 3].
(5) P(R/N&E) = P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) & N&E) [1, 4].
(6) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable [4, 5].
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I am especially indebted here to John Nolt for significant help with this part of my project.
N is “metaphysical naturalism”, E is “current evolutionary theory.”
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R is “our cognitive faculties are basically reliable.”
445
Remember, the argument for this was that there are an infinite number of possible scenarios that could
be constructed in which the organism in question has false beliefs, but to an onlooker the behavior resulting
from those false beliefs looks like it has come from true beliefs. This is Plantinga’s point about Paul, the
hominid; see my pp. 20ff.
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(7) If P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, then P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be
high [premise].
(8) A “reflective adherent of N&E” (RA) believes N&E and knows anything that
is soundly deduced in this argument [definition].
(9) RA knows P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be high [6, 7, 8].
(10) If (9), then (epistemically speaking) RA should have doubts about the source
of R, and thereby lacks warrant for believing R [argued via analogy].446
(11) RA lacks warrant for believing R [9, 10].
(12) RA’s holding of the proposition RA lacks warrant for believing R is
epistemically inconsistent with RA’s simultaneously holding the proposition
R [obvious].
(13) For any person S, when some proposition p known by S is epistemically
inconsistent with simultaneously holding q, then S has a defeater d for q
[definition].
(14) RA has a defeater d for R [12, 13].447
(15) If RA knows that she has a defeater d for R because of doubts about the
source of R, then RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional
evidence, since any such evidence would have to come from the cognitive
faculties which are in question [vicious epistemic circularity].448
446

We can see this, Plantinga maintains, by looking at analogous situations involving our cognitive
faculties (e.g., the XX drug, the sphygmomanometer).
447
There are different kinds of defeaters (e.g., rationality defeaters, rebutting defeaters, undercutting
defeaters, warrant defeaters, alethic rationality defeaters, proper function rationality defeaters, etc.).
Premise (14) is about an undercutting alethic rationality defeater . See Plantinga, WCB, 359-361. For more
details, see my pages 101 and 140-142, and also see WCB, 363. An extended definition of an alethic
rationality defeater goes like this: “D is a purely epistemic [i.e., purely alethic] defeater of B for S at t iff
(1) S’s noetic structure N at t includes B and S comes to believe D at t, and (2) any person S* (a) whose
cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, (b) who is such that the bit of the
design plan governing the sustaining of B in her noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth (i.e., at the
maximization of true belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing more, (c) whose noetic structure
is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to believe D but nothing else independent of or stronger that D,
would withhold B (or believe it less strongly).” Plantinga, in Beilby, 209.
448
“… you can’t properly assuage that doubt by giving yourself an argument; for you will, or will if you
are proceeding rationally, have the same doubt about the truth of the premises of the argument, as well as
your belief that if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. In the EAAN case then: if you accept
naturalism and the Probability Thesis and as a result come to doubt or wonder whether R is true, you
cannot sensibly lay that doubt to rest by way of an epistemically circular argument.” Plantinga, in Beilby,
242.
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(16) RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional evidence [10, 11, 14,
15].449
(17) RA cannot defeat d by way of non-propositional evidence [argued for in
Chapter 7].450
(18) d can be defeated only by evidence [premise].
(19) d is an undefeated defeater of R for RA [16, 17, 18].
(20) One cannot rationally451 believe a proposition for which one has an
undefeated defeater [premise].
(21) RA cannot rationally believe R [19, 20].
(22) If one cannot rationally believe R, then one cannot rationally believe
anything [premise].
(23) RA cannot rationally believe N [21, 22].

Commentary on the Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form (SUMMARY)

EAAN touches on so many areas that it is often difficult to pinpoint the real
area(s) of contention. One of the most helpful aspects of the Extended Summary of
EAAN in Logical Form (hereafter SUMMARY) is that it helps someone to see precisely

449

Again, important analogies here for Plantinga include the thought experiments regarding the
sphygmomanometer and the XX drug.
450
“But of course he can’t sensibly suppose that his cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at the
production of true belief. For he realizes that they are successfully aimed at the production of true belief
only if they are in fact reliable; and of course that is precisely the question at issue.” Plantinga, in Beilby,
232-233.
451
Concerning “irrationality” and thus, “rationality”, note that Plantinga explains “… rationality in terms of
proper function: the rational thing to believe, in circumstances C, is what a properly functioning human
being – more exactly, one whose cognitive or rational faculties are functioning properly in the relevant
respects – would believe in those circumstances.” Plantinga, in Beilby, 205. Omar Mirza summarizes
Plantinga’s thought in this respect as follows: “The basic idea here is that if S has a defeater for B, and S
continues to hold onto B, then S is being irrational.” Omar Mirza, “A user’s guide to the evolutionary
argument against naturalism,” Philosophical Studies (2008) 141:125-146. See esp. 128. See also
Plantinga’s comments on my p. 151.
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where she might have problems with EAAN. Now that the argument is in the form of the
SUMMARY, I would like to make some detailed comments.
The SUMMARY452 is a blend of some different versions of EAAN, culminating
in Plantinga’s presentation in the book Naturalism Defeated? 453 However, Plantinga
later put out a more streamlined version of EAAN in Knowledge of God (KOG).454 The
Probability Thesis (Premise (6) of the SUMMARY) is arrived at differently in KOG than
in the other versions reflected in the SUMMARY. However, after SUMMARY Premise
(6), the argument in KOG runs similarly to the other versions of EAAN.

Premises (1) and (2) of the SUMMARY
(1) Given N&E, there are four relevant scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive,
regarding how our beliefs might be connected with our behavior:
(a) epiphenomenalism (no links between beliefs and behaviors);
(b) semantic epiphenomenalism (links between beliefs and
behaviors, but no causal links);
(c) a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked but
have maladaptive results;
(d) a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked in an
adaptive way.

(2) P(R/((a) v (b) v (c)) & N&E) is low.
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Plantinga looked at my Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form and said he thought that it
accurately reflected his argument as it stood before his version of EAAN in Knowledge of God. Personal
correspondence, 10/01/2009.
453
Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James
Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002).
454
Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley. Knowledge of God. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008. Hereafter
KOG.
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Premise (1)455 says that, given N&E, there are four main alternatives concerning
how our beliefs are connected with our behavior. Maybe it ought to say that these are the
alternatives given N&E&K, where K represents a set of relevant background beliefs.
(This seems necessary in order to take into account all of the relevant total evidence. It
would be hard to estimate any of the probabilities without this other evidence, because no
one believes merely N&E.)
Whose background evidence would be at issue? Not just anyone’s, presumably
(e.g., not a child’s background evidence); maybe it’s the background evidence of a
rational adult person. But what kind of person is a “rational” adult person? Plantinga
states in WPF that “… [w]hile we may not be thinking of a veritable Mozart of
probabilities, we are not thinking of your average probability duffer, either … When it
comes to the deliverances of reason, what counts is the best, or nearly the best, that
human beings can do.”456
Or maybe it’s not the just the background evidence of a rational adult person that
we need, but some proposition stating that K is the collective background evidence of
humanity with respect to the current state of human knowledge (i.e., K at tx). This would
appear to be consistent with Plantinga’s argument, as E is a proposition about
contemporary evolutionary theory.
Background beliefs are, of course, based upon evidence. In the first of two full
chapters of WPF where Plantinga discusses conditional probability,457 he makes a
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Any premises referenced in this chapter refer to premises in the Extended Summary of EAAN in
Logical Form (SUMMARY).
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Plantinga, WPF, 165.
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Plantinga, WPF, Chapters 8 and 9.
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distinction between first-level evidence and second-level evidence. First-level evidence
involves things like memory, perception, etc..458 “Propositional evidence is second-level
evidence”, he says.459 Your belief that you are watching a bird fly near your window is
based upon first-level, non-propositional evidence. Your belief that the bird that you saw
was probably a grackle (since it looks like the grackles you learned about in school)
involves second-level, propositional evidence.
The probabilities in EAAN are conditional probabilities involving the relations
between certain propositions that are informed by numerous background beliefs, which
themselves contain beliefs based upon a myriad of first-level and second-level evidences.
Plantinga knows that these first-level and second-level evidences are intimately involved
with the beliefs N and E. I think that the reason that something like K does not appear in
Plantinga’s argument is because Plantinga is assuming that competent readers of EAAN
know that the needed background evidences (non-propositional and propositional) are
built-in already into N&E.
For instance, it should be assumed that whatever background beliefs one must
have in order to believe N (e.g., I (the reader) exist, naturalism is a philosophical theory,
etc.), then those beliefs are already crucial parts of N. Therefore, you don’t need an
additional component (i.e., K) in proposition N. Likewise, whatever background beliefs
one must have to believe E, it should be assumed that those beliefs are already contained
in E as crucial parts of E.

458
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So, given N&E (with K built-in), Premise (1)(a) says that there are four relevant
scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive, regarding how our beliefs might be connected with
our behavior. Premise (2) makes a probability assessment given certain features of
Premise (1). What kind of probability is at issue here? Since it involves relations
between propositions, it will be one of the types of epistemic probability. However, there
are a number of different epistemic probability theories on offer.
In WPF, Plantinga writes:
… The term ‘epistemic probability’ is used variously by various authors. I shall
use it to refer to the relationship between a pair of propositions A and B when A is
evidence, propositional evidence, for B. More precisely, in those cases I shall say
that the epistemic conditional probability of B on A is high … Our question is:
what is the relation between a pair of propositions A and B when the epistemic
conditional probability of A on B is high? What kind of account or analysis can
we give of that relation? What makes it the case that P(A/B) is high?460

Plantinga divides theories of epistemic probability into basically three categories:
(1) personalist (Bayesian),461 (2) logical (à la Keynes, Carnap, and Swinburne), and (3)
what he calls the “statistical account”, which seeks to “derive epistemic probability from
the statistical syllogism” (e.g., Kyburg).462 The problem, for his purposes, with the first
of these (the Bayesian understanding) is that under this view probabilities are relative to
persons (i.e., the probability figures change according to the belief sets of different
people). But Plantinga is looking for a conditional probability that is not relative to
persons.
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That fact in itself may not seem to be a good reason for Plantinga to abandon a
Bayesian take on EAAN. A Bayesian approach, under the most competent, rational
judges, may end up (for all practical purposes) with the same conclusion to EAAN as
Plantinga’s desired logical approach. There are, however, other reasons that Plantinga
steers away from the Bayesian approach that have to do with his overall account of
“warrant”.463 He feels that Bayesianism generally cannot provide the necessary and
sufficient conditions for warrant.464
The third category, which he deems “Kyburgian”, is an effort to “derive epistemic
probability from known statistics”, and it, too, turns out (for various reasons) to not be fit
for Plantinga’s purposes in EAAN.465
Plantinga then considers at length the issues surrounding the middle category of
epistemic conditional probability, which is logical probability (hereafter LP). This is the
category in which Plantinga’s EAAN attempts to work, in spite of the problems of LP
which are well-known among probability theorists.
Plantinga says of LP:
the heart and soul of the theory would be that for any pair of propositions, there is
a definite and logically necessary relationship of probability between them, a
relationship that conforms to the probability calculus … [o]n the logical
interpretation, a probability statement of the form P(A/B) = n is not first of all an
epistemic statement about what is or is not sensible or rational or acceptable or
warranted; it simply records a necessary, objective, quasi-logical fact about A and
B. Probability thus construed has nothing to do with partial belief, or uncertainty,
or lack of knowledge, or observed frequencies. The truth of a probability
statement in no way depends upon what anyone knows or believes, or upon any
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other contingent state of affairs. God may not need probability; nevertheless, he
knows[466] the value of P(A/B) for any propositions A and B.467

LP theory is attractive because, for a great many pairs of propositions, it seems to
be “the sober truth”. He writes:
… [in many cases] there does seem to be a relationship of probability between the
propositions in question, and it also seems to be necessary that there is the
relation in question … It seems intuitively obvious that the proposition Feike can
swim is probable with respect to the proposition 9 out of 10 Frisians can swim
and Feike is a Frisian. Furthermore, that this relation obtains between them does
indeed seem necessarily true; it is at best extremely hard to see how it could be
that the first should fail to be probable with respect to the second.468
Some very important issues concerning logical probabilities include questions
like:
(1) are there really, ontologically speaking, these kinds of relations between
propositions?
(2) if there are, precisely how are the objective and normative components of
epistemic probability related?
(3) since it is unlikely that there are “only finitely many possible worlds”, if
logical probability is thought of in terms of the proportion of A worlds among
B worlds (i.e., divide “worlds in which both A and B are true by worlds in
which B holds”), it seems as though the infinities will wreck your probability
figures.469
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That is, assuming that there is a probability to know.
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There is a lengthy discussion of these matters in WPF, and going into too much
detail here will take me too far afield from my purposes. 470 But, summarily, Plantinga
ends up concluding the following, below.
First of all, concerning the ontological status of the relations proposed by LP,
Plantinga says:
According to this idea … for any pair of propositions A and B, 471 there is the
probability of A on B[472] … This relationship is a necessary, objective, quasi
logical fact about A and B … if we think in terms of possible worlds [and
entailment], A entails B just if B is true in every world in which A is true. We can
also think of P(A/B) as something like the proportion of worlds in which both A
and B are true among B worlds. If there were only finitely many possible worlds,
we could think of P(A/B) as the quotient of the number of A&B worlds [divided]
by the number of B worlds. But of course it seems unlikely that there are only
finitely many possible worlds … .473
Some people have denied that such probability relations exist, given various
problems associated with the idea of logical probability.474 Plantinga thinks, however,
that that would overestimate the state of things: “There is such a thing as logical
probability, even if we run into difficulties involving infinite sets of propositions, and
even if our grasp of this relation among propositions is tenuous in the extreme.”475 And
there are a good number of intuitively clear cases of LP that give it respectability in the
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midst of the difficulties (e.g., Feike can swim is obviously probable on 9 out of 10
Frisians can swim and Feike is a Frisian).476
The logical theorist need not insist that “all pairs of propositions fall within the
field of logical probability” (e.g., the logical probability theorist need not insist that there
is a probability figure associated with the pair of propositions Feike can swim on China is
a large country, although there might be one).477
About the second concern regarding the normativity issue, Plantinga states that
there does typically478 seem to be a relation between the objective component of logical
probability and the normative component (i.e., what is the rational, appropriate, right
thing to think given the objective probability figure), although it is very difficult to say
exactly what this relation is.479 Take the propositions concerning Feike, above. If it is
objectively likely that Feike can swim given that Feike is a Frisian and 9 out of 10
Frisians can swim, then the right thing (the rational thing, the proper thing, the
appropriate epistemic stance to take) is to believe that it is highly likely that Feike can
swim. In situations like these, if we know the objective probability to be high, then the
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right propositional attitude one should have in the matter should be one of great
confidence.480
What is the connecting principle that forms the bridge between the objective and
normative aspects? Plantinga knows that this is a difficult question, but says that this
connection comes by way of something “in the neighborhood of Miller’s Principle”.481
(Plantinga also realizes that judgments of epistemic probability don’t always have tight
connections between objective and normative aspects.)482
About the third category concerning infinities, Plantinga thinks that problems
with infinities need not necessarily scrap the whole theory:
… The probability calculus applies neatly and easily to the finite case, the case of
proportions in finite classes. It is harder to see how things go in the case of
infinite magnitudes, and the greater the cardinality, the harder it is to see how
things go. But perhaps this is just a reflection of the more general truth that
infinite magnitudes present real problems of understanding. Cantor’s Paradise is
indeed seductive; but that paradise, like others, is not well understood. If so, the
fact that infinite magnitudes present problems against the logical theory of
probability isn’t much of an argument against it.483

So, the probability figures that Plantinga aims to attain for EAAN are epistemic,
in the area of logical probability (qualified), have objective components and normative
components, and are thought by him to be useful in spite of various problems.
How precise do the probability figures need to be in EAAN, especially in these
first six premises of the SUMMARY? As I see it, Plantinga basically has four options in
480

Plantinga, WPF, 165ff.
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conditional probability of a proposition A on the supposition that the objective probability of A is x, is x.”
See Plantinga, WPF, 39, note 7.
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which to present the probabilities associated with the scenarios in Premise (1). The
probabilities can be taken to be numerical, non-numerical, or inscrutable to us (but
possibly known by other cognizers),484 or it may be that there are no probabilities
associated with the relevant propositions.
Since Plantinga revises somewhat (in Knowledge of God) the way that he argues
for the numerical option, I have divided the first option into two sub-options. The first
sub-option will consider the numerical argument before KOG, and the second sub-option
will discuss the numerical argument in KOG.

Numerical Probabilities, Part 1: the Earlier Versions of EAAN485
If someone (i.e., a person who is reflectively considering EAAN) wanted to put a
number on the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given Premise (1)(a), I
would think that most people would give it an extremely low number. If
epiphenomenalism is the case, the likelihood that our cognitive faculties are reliably
pointed at truth (given that we have been selected on account of adaptive behaviors that
are not linked in any way to beliefs) would seem extremely low. Since our beliefs are not
correlated with our behaviors, the relationship between our beliefs and our behaviors is
more or less at random. Given this, we know that there are vastly more ways for beliefs
to be unreliable486 than there are for beliefs to be reliable. Therefore, under Premise
(1)(a), it is more likely than not that our beliefs are unreliable.
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E.g., angels, or God, traditionally defined.
See footnote 482.
486
I.e., they do not correspond (point to, relate to, link to) most of the time to true states of affairs.
485
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Concerning Premise (1)(b), we have links between beliefs and behaviors, but no
causal links. Once again, most people would agree that the probability that our cognitive
faculties are reliable, given that we have been selected for behavior which is not even
causally connected to our beliefs, would be a miniscule number (for the same reason as
(1)(a)).
Premise 1(c) describes a situation where there are links between our beliefs and
our behavior, but with maladaptive results. Once again, any number that we are seeking
to put on the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable on this scenario would be
still very small. (Remember that Plantinga had, in an early version of EAAN, put a
figure of .2 to the P(R/N&E) under the scenarios of 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) combined.)487
This leaves SUMMARY Premise 1(d) to be the only hope for Plantinga’s
opponent to be able to defend some significantly large number for the relevant
probability. Here beliefs and behaviors are causally related, so it would seem (since the
associations are no longer more or less at random) that one could get a promising figure
for reliability. It might even be very high.
However, regarding this point, Plantinga gave an argument that there are an
infinite number of belief/behavior pairings where the behaviors are based upon false
beliefs but are nonetheless adaptive.488 If this argument holds, then we seem to be in a
similar situation as in premises (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c) … there are vastly more possible
ways for belief/behavior pairings to be based upon false beliefs and still be adaptive than
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to be based upon true beliefs. Looked at this way, if you wanted to put a number on this,
it should be very low.
Two paragraphs ago, the figure we were looking for regarding (1)(d) looked like
it could be high. If one buys the Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairing Argument, though, it
looks like it would be low. If one does not accept Plantinga’s Indefinite Belief/Behavior
Pairing Argument, then one probably would say it would be high. Since it could be high,
or it could be low, or it could be anywhere in-between, it looks like the appropriate stance
then would be inscrutability.
This leaves one with very low figures for 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) [which is Premise
(2)] along with an inscrutable number for 1(d) [which is Premise (3)]. Combining all of
these gives you Premise (4), from which it follows after an identity thesis in (5) that you
get the Probability Thesis [Premise (6)].
That was the manner in which Plantinga argued “numerically” for the first part of
EAAN in the earlier versions before his book Knowledge of God was published.
However, in KOG, he offers a simpler, more streamlined numerical case, to which I now
turn.

Numerical Probabilities, Part 2: the Version of EAAN in KOG
Here is the way in KOG that Plantinga argues for the terrain of the argument that
is reflected in the first six premises of the SUMMARY. He has two arguments: one
argument that P(R/N) is low via the Principle of Indifference, and another argument that
P(R/N) is inscrutable. These two separate arguments are then combined, and then we
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have P(R/N is low or inscrutable), the familiar Probability Thesis. In terms of my
SUMMARY, in KOG Plantinga has streamlined things to get quickly to Premise (6), and
then the rest of the argument runs practically the same way.489
To begin the numerical part of the argument in KOG, Plantinga does not offer the
four scenarios contained in Premise (1). Instead, he begins with the thought experiment
(that we have seen before) about a hypothetical species, cognitively similar to ourselves:
… [These creatures] exist in a world in which there is no such person as God or
anything like God [i.e., naturalism holds for them]. Our question, then, is this:
what is the probability that their cognitive faculties are reliable? Consider any
particular belief … [of the creatures.] That belief, of course, is a neural structure
of a given sort, and one sufficiently complex to generate content. We may add, if
we like, that this structure occurs or takes place in response to something in the
environment; perhaps it is a certain pattern of firing of neurons in the optical
portion of the brain, and perhaps this pattern arises in response to the appearance
of a predator in the middle distance. And a certain proposition has somehow
come to be associated with this structure, so that the structure acquires belief
content and is a belief.
Now what is the probability (given naturalism) that this proposition is
true?490
Plantinga thinks that in order to come up with a probability figure here, we first
need to ask: what is a belief? A belief (given naturalism) is (at least) a neuronal event.491
What is the content of the belief? Where does the content come from, and why is it that
that content is associated with that particular belief, and that that particular belief is
associated with that specific neurophysiological state?492
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There is a minor adjustment in the defeater wording. In KOG, it now runs like this (adapting a form by
Michael Rea and adjusted for the inscrutability example): “B is a defeater for A, for S, if (but not only if)
(1) S sees that P(A/B) is low [or inscrutable], and (2) there is no experience E [that] S has or proposition P
(distinct from A) S believes such that the epistemic probability of A on B&E or B&P is high.” Plantinga,
KOG, 46, 48, note 63.
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In KOG, Plantinga says that the current two main materialistic options493
regarding this content are that either (1) “content supervenes upon NP
[neurophysiological] properties”, or that (2) “content is reducible to NP properties.”494
After a discussion of various considerations, including some differences between
weaker and stronger forms of supervenience, Plantinga concludes (as in earlier versions
of EAAN) that there is no necessary correlation between content and NP structures.
Now, Plantinga says:
… [s]houldn’t we suppose that the proposition in question [about the
hypothetical creatures495] is as likely to be false as true? Shouldn’t we suppose
that the proposition in question has a probability of roughly one/half of being
true? Shouldn’t we estimate its probability, on the condition in question, as in the
neighborhood of .5? That would be the sensible course. Neither seems more
probable than the other; hence we estimate the probability of its being true as
.5.496
This is invoking the Principle of Indifference (PI), which admittedly has fallen
upon hard times. The Principle of Indifference (also known as the Principle of
Insufficient Reason) basically states that “… evidence which gives us no reason to think
that any one of a number of mutually exclusive possibilities … is more probable than any
other will give those possibilities equal epistemic probabilities.”497
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Actually, what he says is: “Materialists offer two (or possibly three) main theories here.” Plantinga,
KOG, 35. The first two are obvious enough, but I am at a loss in ascertaining the third one.
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One of the main criticisms about the Principle of Indifference is that it yields a
uniform distribution of probabilities without any real reason to accept a uniform
distribution rather than a non-uniform distribution. D. H. Mellor writes:
… The moral of … [examples] that have been used to discredit the indifference
principle in the last two centuries … is that epistemic probabilities, equal or
unequal, cannot be derived from mere ignorance. The general recognition of this
fact has profoundly affected the way in which probability is used to measure how
far evidence supports propositions …”.498
Plantinga anticipated possible criticisms concerning the Principle of
Indifference.499 He concluded that, although the Principle of Indifference has some wellknown problems, it still makes good sense to use it in some circumstances:
… [some examples] show that certain incautious statements of PI come to grief –
[j]ust as Goodman’s grue/bleen paradoxes show that incautious statements of a
principle governing the projection of predicates or properties comes to grief. But,
of course, the fact is we project properties all the time, and do so perfectly
sensibly. In the same way, I think, we often employ a principle of indifference in
ordinary reasoning, and do so quite properly. We also use it in science – for
example, in statistical mechanics.500

In spite of the fact that the Principle of Indifference has been severely criticized,
Plantinga approvingly quotes Roy Weatherford concerning its occasional use:
… An astonishing number of extremely complex problems in probability theory
have been solved, and usefully so, by calculations based entirely on the
assumption of equiprobable alternatives.501
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Roy Weatherford, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan
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If we want a numerical probability here,502 it looks like we’re going to have to use
PI. If that is allowed, Plantinga then asks: what is the probability that our hypothetical
creatures have cognitive faculties that are reliable (meaning that, roughly, at least ¾ of
the beliefs that the creatures have are true)?503 Very small, says Plantinga:
If I have 1000 independent beliefs, for example, the probability (under these
conditions) that three quarters or more of these beliefs are true (certainly a modest
enough requirement for reliability) will be less that 10-58. And even if I am
running a modest epistemic establishment of only 100 beliefs, the probability that
¾ of them are true, given the probability of any one’s being true is ½, is very
low, something like .000001 … The conclusion to be drawn is that it is very
unlikely that the cognitive faculties of those creatures are reliable.504
This is how things run if content somehow supervenes upon NP properties. Does
the situation change if content is reducible to NP properties? No, and for the same
reason:
The content doesn’t have to be true, of course, for the neuronal structure to cause
the appropriate kind of behavior. It just happens that this particular arrangement
of adaptive NP properties also constitutes having content. But again: it would be
a piece of enormous serendipity if this content, this proposition, were true; it
could just as well be false. So the probability that this content is true would have
to be rated at about ½, just as in the case of supervenience.505
Someone might object that, in both of the above cases, Plantinga is implicitly
assuming that truth/falsity is randomly distributed among all (adaptive and non-adaptive)
beliefs. However, given N plus E and background beliefs (K), this assumption seems
this picture of Smith standing there with an equal chance of throwing a Five [on a die with six faces].”
Weatherford, p. 35.
502
Concerning the proposition at my footnote 496.
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Plantinga, KOG, 41.
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content were such that if either occurred, so would the other; then the beliefs in question would not be
independent. Similarly when the content of one neural structure entails the content of another: there, too,
the beliefs in question won’t be independent.” Plantinga, KOG, p. 41, note 53.
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unjustified. Under E we have strong reasons to believe that our beliefs are adaptive (so
the argument goes). Hence to run the kinds of arguments he gives above, Plantinga must
be assuming that, given N&E, truth/falsity is more-or-less randomly distributed among
adaptive beliefs. But among adaptive beliefs, it seems that it would be simpler and hence
more likely for true beliefs to be involved rather than false ones. False beliefs can be
adaptive, to be sure, but they have to be counterbalanced by very specific beliefs in very
specific situations to make them workable toward survival.506
In reply, the Plantingian might point again to the argument that there is an
indefinite number of belief/behavior pairings that are adaptive and false. Sure, some of
the counterbalancing beliefs which result in the adaptivity of false beliefs seem unlikely
to us, as would an interconnected web of such beliefs. But given an infinite amount of
belief/behavior pairings, there is no way to calculate the appropriate ratio of worlds in
which adaptive behaviors are based upon false (or true) beliefs to worlds in which
adaptive behaviors are based upon beliefs.
This brings up a matter that we briefly looked at in Chapter Four.507 (Here it is
important to revisit Plantinga’s responses to Richard Otte, et al..508) How far out into
various sets of possible worlds do we go when considering Plantinga’s indefinite
belief/behavior pairings? Obviously we are not looking at all logically possible worlds;
we’ve already restricted to worlds in which N&E hold. But what further restrictions
should be are drawn? Perhaps Plantinga is restricting to worlds in which N&E hold and
there are creatures that have beliefs. If that is the proper set of possible worlds, then
506
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perhaps it does seem proper to assume that truth/falsity is more-or-less randomly
distributed among adaptive beliefs, because we have no basis to say whether or not
adaptive behaviors are associated with true or false beliefs without begging the
question.509
A critic might maintain that we do, however, have a basis to say whether or not
adaptive beliefs are associated with true beliefs by appealing to the actual world. Why
can’t the actual world can’t be one in which adaptive behaviors are based on true beliefs?
Another way to put it is to ask: “What specific propositions from our background
evidence from the actual world are we allowed to add to N&E to support R?”
The answer for Plantinga is that it might well be the situation that the actual world
is one in which adaptive behaviors are mostly based upon true beliefs. But we don’t
know this to be the case, because what the actual world is is in question, because of the
Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairings Problem.
Someone might respond that they still don’t see why Plantinga would say that we
don’t know the situation of the actual world. It can’t be because we have a defeater for
R, because we don’t have a defeater until we get to Premise (10). Ordinary evidence
suggests very strongly that many of our beliefs are adaptive because they are true, even
given N&E. We know, for example, that our belief that apples are good to eat is both
true and adaptive because it is true.
509

There might be a type of objection along the lines of Donald Davidson’s work that might suggest that, in
order for translatability to be possible, we must assume that most of the organism’s beliefs are true.
Plantinga might not be worried concerning an objection like this, though, because a Davidsonian is not,
presumably, making an ontological case for N&E (i.e., proposing that it is the objective fact-of-the-matter
that metaphysical naturalism is true), and Plantinga’s argument is only aimed at metaphysical naturalists
who are asserting N to be the case. Thanks to John Nolt for bringing this possible objection to my
attention.
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Plantinga might respond that, yes, we can know that it is true that apples are good
to eat, and that that situation is adaptive because it is true that apples are good to eat. But
the evidence for this is E&K. So, it is not quite right to say that we know this even given
N&E&K, because the introduction of N might take away the right that the adherent of
N&E had to hold the apple belief in the same way that the introduction of D to E&K (that
there is a Cartesian evil demon) might take away the right to know the apple belief.
Plantinga would agree that, given E in the actual world, many adaptive behaviors
are based upon true beliefs. And almost everyone would agree that, given E in the actual
world, some adaptive behaviors are based upon false beliefs. But once someone has
admitted that there is an indefinite number of possible adaptive behaviors based upon
false beliefs, we can’t assume that there is a preponderance of adaptive behaviors based
upon true beliefs without begging the question.510
Consider a time when the best ancient science held that it is the sun’s movement,
not that of the earth, that causes the phenomenon of the sun’s rising and setting. If
(anachronistically) we assume that the scientists of those days could use Possible Worlds
concepts and terminology, we can imagine the following scenario, below.
Say that one of these scientists says, “I think that there is an indefinite number of
possible worlds in which the appearance of the rising and setting of the sun is not caused
by the sun’s movement, but in which the sun is relatively fixed in space.” We can
510

Remember also, earlier (my p. 87, and Plantinga, in Beilby, 225) that Plantinga wondered which
propositions Q might be possibly added to N&E to underwrite R, and thus acting as defeater-deflectors to
the Probability Thesis. He said that:
• neither R itself, nor any proposition equivalent to R … is a defeater-deflector here;
• conjunctions of R with other propositions P the naturalist believes … will
not be defeater-deflectors unless P itself is.
• no proposition P that is evidentially dependent upon R for S – i.e., such that S
believes P on the evidential basis of R – is a defeater-deflector for R.
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imagine that his friend, who is also an ancient scientist, might respond, “Yes, but if we
look at the evidence in the actual world, we can see that it is the case that it is the sun that
moves, and almost no one in his/her right mind would entertain your wildly speculative
possible worlds. Our evidence from the actual world is just too strong.”
The first scientist would possibly respond, “Don’t you see? You are assuming
that you know what the actual world is in order to say what you have said. But, I am
maintaining that, because of my alternative scenarios, it is possible that the actual world
is one of my “wildly speculative (to you)” possible worlds, and that you are begging the
question.”
For Plantinga, we might be in a similar situation. If, because of the above
reasoning, someone grants Plantinga the Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairings Problem, his
next step is to apply the conclusions of the earlier-mentioned hypothetical creatures to us;
if naturalism is true and there is no God (or similar being), then it seems that we are in an
analogous situation. Plantinga, in KOG, abbreviates this situation as P(R/N) is low.
(Here is another slight change from many earlier versions of EAAN: he now includes in
N the proposition “… that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the
processes proposed in current evolutionary theory.”511 He feels justified in so
simplifying because he thinks current evolutionary theory is the only real game in town
for most naturalists with regard to our development as organisms. Since that would
probably be undisputed by most of his critics, this seems a fair-enough simplification.)
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Summing up the KOG changes, so far, which affect Premise (1) through Premise
(6): In KOG, Plantinga shortens his argument by maintaining that, since naturalists are
usually materialists about the mind, then on either of the two main ways of thinking about
how content is related to NP properties (i.e., supervenience or reduction), P(R/N) turns
out to be low. The numerical assignments here involve the Principle of Indifference, but
that does not necessarily count against it. Without using the Principle of Indifference, it
is difficult to see how one could arrive at any reputable numerical figures. So, if you
want numbers, you’re going to have to use the Principle of Indifference. If you don’t like
that, you are going to have run the argument without numbers somehow. So, the avenues
that remain will be narrowed down to two options: non-numerical probabilities, or
inscrutability.512
(One additional important consideration that Plantinga addresses in KOG is that
he anticipates the idea that his argument can be avoided by certain naturalists who are not
materialists, in the style of, say, Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, etc.. This, Plantinga
maintains, would not damage his argument, because there isn’t any God in such a picture
to create the design plan in such a way that our cognitive faculties would be appropriately
aimed at truth. We therefore have to proceed as before, figuring the probability that any
one belief is true to be .5, or considering it to be inscrutable).513
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This inscrutability can mean either (1) that there is a probability out of our epistemic reach, or (2) that
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Non-numerical Probabilities for EAAN
Maybe the “probability premises” of EAAN, as formulated in the SUMMARY,
look so obviously low that it is not necessary to assign any numbers. One could just say
that, intuitively speaking, on each scenario, P(R/N&E) looks very low (in the same way
that one might say that the probability the Chicago Cubs will win the World Series each
year of the second decade of the 21st century given the proposition 1908 was the last time
that the Chicago Cubs won the World Series is low.)514
Looking again at Premises 1(a) through 1(c), it seems obvious that on all three of
these scenarios that P(R/N&E) would be intuitively very low. Indeed, I haven’t seen
anywhere in the literature concerning EAAN a place where someone criticizes Plantinga
for holding these scenarios to result in a low probability. Then you only have remaining
Premise 1(d). If Plantinga’s argument about an indefinite number of possible
belief/behavior pairings (involving false beliefs but adaptive behavior) holds, then
Premise (1)(d) turns out to be inscrutable. The Probability Thesis has been reached
without any numerical values.

Taking All the Probabilities to be Inscrutable
I don’t know of anywhere in the literature where Plantinga defines inscrutability,
but from remembering the places where he tends to use the term, “inscrutability” comes
up when (for various reasons) we just don’t know what to think about a probability in
question. We have no real reason to consider the probability to be either low or high.
514

For the relevant information, see the Official Website of the Chicago Cubs,
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Now, this could be because of our limits as cognizers. For instance, say there is an
objective probability, but it is out of our epistemic reach (e.g., presumably God would
know the probability even if we do not).515 Or, a probability we are considering might be
inscrutable because there really is no probability associated with the proposition under
consideration (e.g., there may not be a probability associated with Feike can swim on
China is a large country.)516 Either way, the probability is unavailable to us, and
unavailability is a central thought whenever Plantinga invokes “inscrutability”.
If inscrutability is the case because there are no probabilities associated with the
relevant propositions, that would cause a problem for Plantinga as far as the logical form
of the SUMMARY goes. That is because Premise (5), the identity statement, does
involve probability. Also, in Premise (6), the crucial Probability Thesis, it says that there
is a probability. If in fact the situation is that inscrutability holds (because there is no
probability associated with the various propositions involved), then Premise (5) is either
false or does not have a truth value, and the argument stops right there. The argument
would then have to begin at Premise (9).
Some critics might say that Plantinga owes us an argument that there even is a
probability associated with the relevant propositions before he can start talking about
whether it is low, high, or inscrutable.
Consider the following two sets of proposition relations:
Case 1: P(F/L&S), where F is Feike can swim, L is Feike is a Frisian lifeguard,
and S is 9 out of 10 Frisian lifeguards can swim.
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Case 2: P(F/H), where F is Feike can swim and H is China is a large country.
Is P(R/N&E) more like Case 1 or Case 2? Obviously, it had better be more like
the first case. In Case 2 it is reasonable to suspect that there isn’t any probability
regarding the relation of the propositions involved. The propositions in Case 2 don’t
seem at all relevant to one another such that a probability could be obtained, numerical or
non-numerical.
Relevance issues can get deep and murky fairly quickly. Not only that, the
concept of inductive probability generally is admittedly controversial. Various problems
and paradoxes (e.g., Bertrand’s paradox) vex the concept. But, even in light of the
difficulties and complexities, it does not seem to be the case that the whole concept of
inductive probability in incoherent. John Nolt writes:
Even if … [various arguments] have no precise inductive probability, this does
not show that the idea of inductive probability is completely incoherent. It shows
only that, strictly speaking, this idea is not applicable to certain arguments … at
worst we must concede that the applicability of the concept of inductive
probability is limited.517
Some propositions do seem relevant to one another (and seem to be in a
probability relation) even though we can’t explicate exactly how they are so related. The
propositions involved in the Probability Thesis, although not statistical as in Case 1, do
seem to be relevant to one another. Therefore, they are closer to Case 1 than Case 2. I
have not seen any of Plantinga’s critics maintain that the propositions involved in EAAN
were not at all relevant to one another. Granted, we did see James Van Cleve ask about
the probability of it is raining given the Broncos won Super Bowl XXXII;518 but he was

517
518

John Nolt, Informal Logic: Possible Worlds and Imagination (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984) 357.
See my p. 94.

173

attacking a general defeater principle that he thought Plantinga was using, not
maintaining that the propositions in the Probability Thesis were unrelated.519
I think, in fact, that Plantinga thinks that there is a probability associated with
these propositions, and that if the probability is inscrutable to us it is due to our short
epistemic reach; it is not inscrutable to God. However, if he did want to allow that “nonprobability inscrutability” can enter into the argument (i.e., there isn’t any probability for
anyone to know), then the premises in the SUMMARY before Premise (9) would be
worthless. (That is, all except Premise (1), which might still be of some value in
prompting reflection on the difficulty of stating the relationship between our beliefs and
our behaviors in light of the many differing naturalistic philosophies of mind.)
For those probability theorists who doubt that there are probabilities associated
with propositions of the types as those in the Probability Thesis, the premises before
Premise (9) will obviously not be persuasive to these critics; they will need to pick up the
argument in the latter premises.
If a critic of EAAN held, for various reasons, all of the relevant probabilities to
exist but to be inscrutable, then that would bring to center stage the thought experiments
that Plantinga presents as being analogous to the situation (of the reflective adherent of
N&E who has considered the Probability Thesis). These analogies will be, primarily, the
cases of the XX drug, the questionable sphygmomanometer, the mysterious radio device,
and the irradiated widgets. The main premise of contention of EAAN now becomes
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Premise (10), and the whole argument then hinges upon the appropriateness of
Plantinga’s analogies.
Plantinga thinks, of course, that inscrutability520 doesn’t change the ultimate
results of the argument. For Plantinga, the reflective naturalist is still saddled with a
defeater. Plantinga’s main weapon here appears to be the now-familiar XX drug analogy:
the drug that, within two hours, destroys the cognitive reliability of those who take it (i.e.,
they believe mostly false propositions).521 In KOG the scenario is changed a bit from
previous versions; this time Plantinga presents the story in such a way that we have no
idea what percentage of those who take the drug are unreliable:
You learn that your cousin Sam, whose cognitive faculties you have always
assumed to be reliable, has ingested XX … You know that some proportion of
those who ingest XX become wholly unreliable; but you don’t know what that
proportion is; as far as you are concerned, P (Sam’s faculties are reliable/Sam has
ingested XX) is inscrutable. It could be as low as zero; it could be as high as 1;
and it could be anything in between. Under these conditions you have a defeater
for your assumption that Sam’s cognitive faculties are reliable. You would also
have a defeater for R if you believed you had ingested XX and that P(R/I’ve
ingested XX) is inscrutable.522
The XX drug thought experiment is supposed to be analogous to the situation of a
reflective adherent of N&E who has a Humean defeater. I will look more into how this is
supposed to be the case, below. As a side note, it should be noticed that, in KOG, a
Humean defeater is given a more precise definition, described as follows:
… You have a Humean defeater for a belief B in a given situation if (1) the
production of B is governed by a bit of the design plan that is aimed not at the
production of true belief, but at some other state of affairs (such as recovery from
520
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disease or the avoidance of cognitive disaster), and (2) if only truth aimed
processes were at work in this situation, you would have an ordinary rationality
defeater for B. One who believes she’s taken XX has a Humean defeater for R, as
does someone who thinks she has mad cow disease.523
If the RA does indeed have a Humean defeater, then the RA has been put into a place
where she has an undefeated defeater concerning R, and this will eventuate in a corrosion
of the basis for all of her beliefs.
Assessing the Changes to the Argument in KOG
In KOG, things move much more swiftly as the beginning phases of the argument
are vastly simplified. If someone doesn’t object to Plantinga’s use of the Principle of
Indifference, this may be a better form of the early part of EAAN. However, the KOG
version may move too swiftly for some; they might feel that many points have been
passed over without sufficient detailed argumentation.
In the pre-KOG formulations, Plantinga was looking very closely at the
relationship between our beliefs and our behavior. He grouped the possibilities into four
scenarios which exhausted the possibilities. It then turned out that P(R/N&E) was
obviously low on all but the fourth scenario. I don’t know of any substantial criticisms of
EAAN that disputed a low probability for R in each of the first three scenarios (i.e.,
premises 1(a) -1(c) of the SUMMARY). On that last scenario (i.e., 1(d)), at first it
seemed that P(R/N&E) would be high. But, concerning this, we remember, Plantinga
said that there were an indefinite amount of belief/behavior pairings, where the beliefs
were false, that could result in adaptive behavior. That resulted in the claim in Premise
(3) that the probability associated with (1)(d) is inscrutable. Has Plantinga indeed
established Premise (3)?
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SUMMARY Premise (3)
A good bit of the criticism that EAAN received (especially early on) arose related
to Premise (3). About this, Plantinga maintained that, although at first glance it seems
like P(R/N&E) would be high under 1(d), it actually is inscrutable. The reason for this
inscrutability, once again, is because there are an infinite number of belief/behavior
pairings that could cause an organism to display adaptive behavior, and on many of these
pairings the relevant beliefs are false. Support for this came, in part, from Plantinga’s
examples of (a) Paul the hominid and (b) of the beings who referred to everything (other
than God) as a creature.524
These examples are missing from Plantinga’s formulation of EAAN in KOG. The
non-inclusion of these examples might make the overall argument less persuasive. This
is because, upon first hearing of EAAN, a lot of people are tempted to reject it outright.
They assume that natural selection would weed out organisms that had significantly false
beliefs. (We saw this earlier, typified in the remarks of Popper and Quine.)525 My
Chapter Three was mainly concerned with an analysis of Premise 1(d) and Premise (3).
Ramsey, Sober, Fitelson, and Fodor were all, in various ways, punching away at Premise
(3). However, remember that, toward the end of their critiques, there were these
important caveats offered by Fodor, Fitelson, and Sober:
[Fodor] … Since, for all we know, evolution would have chosen false believers if
it had been given the chance, the fact that evolution chose us isn’t, in and of itself,
a reason for thinking that we’re true believers. There is, as far as I can tell, no
Darwinian reason for thinking that we’re true believers. Or that we aren’t …
524
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Darwin isn’t in the epistemology business, and evolution doesn’t care whether
most of our beliefs are true.526
[Fitelson & Sober]:
Anyhow, if evolutionary theory does say that our ability to theorize about the
world is apt to be rather unreliable, how are evolutionists to apply this point to
their own theoretical beliefs, including their belief in evolution? One lesson that
should be extracted is a certain humility— an admission of fallibility. This will
not be news to evolutionists who have absorbed the fact that science in general
is a fallible enterprise. Evolutionary theory just provides an important part of
the explanation of why our reasoning about theoretical matters is fallible.
Far from showing that evolutionary theory is self-defeating, this consideration
should lead those who believe the theory to admit that the best they can
do in theorizing is to do the best they can. We are stuck with the cognitive
equipment that we have.527 [Fitelson and Sober]
Can Plantinga combine ideas like these (expressed in the above quotations) with
his argument concerning indefinite belief/behavior pairings to establish Premise (3)?
Remember, in Premise (3) Plantinga is not arguing that in the scenario of Premise (1)(d)
that P(R/N&E) is low; here it is inscrutable. If he were arguing that is was low, he would
need an argument to show that the proportion of possible worlds in which R is true
among the possible worlds in which N&E is true (and our beliefs are adaptively
connected to our behavior) is low. Since we have the Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairings
Problem there doesn’t seem to be any way to do that, except for perhaps using the
Principle of Indifference.
Maybe one helpful way to approach this matter is to think about what happens if
we do not, at first, include N. If N is dropped out, what should we think about P(R/E)? 528
The argument would look, in summary form, like this:
526
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(1) Given E, there are four relevant scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive,
regarding how our beliefs might be connected with our behavior:
(a) epiphenomenalism (no links between beliefs and behaviors);
(b) semantic epiphenomenalism (links between beliefs and
behaviors, but no causal links);
(c) a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked but
have maladaptive results;
(d) a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked in an
adaptive way.

(2) P(R/((a) v (b) v (c)) & E) is low [obvious].
(3) P(R/(d) & E) is inscrutable [premise].
(4) So P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) &E) is low or inscrutable [1, 2, 3].
(5) P(R/N&E) = P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) & E) [1, 4].
(6) P(R/E) is low or inscrutable [4, 5].
(7) If P(R/E) is low or inscrutable, then P(R/E) cannot be known to be
high [premise].
(8) A “reflective adherent of E” (RA) believes E and knows anything that
is soundly deduced in this argument [definition].
(9) RA knows P(R/E) cannot be known to be high [6, 7, 8].
(10) If (9), then (epistemically speaking) RA should have doubts about the source
of R, and thereby lacks warrant for believing R [argued via analogy].
(11) RA lacks warrant for believing R [9, 10].
(12) RA’s holding of the proposition RA lacks warrant for believing R is
epistemically inconsistent with RA’s simultaneously holding the proposition
R [obvious].
(13) For any person S, when some proposition p known by S is epistemically
inconsistent with simultaneously holding q, then S has a defeater d for q
[definition].
528
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(14) RA has a defeater d for R [12, 13].
(15) If RA knows that she has a defeater d for R because of doubts about the
source of R, then RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional
evidence, since any such evidence would have to come from the cognitive
faculties which are in question [vicious epistemic circularity].
(16) RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional evidence [10, 11, 14,
15].
(17) RA cannot defeat d by way of non-propositional evidence [argued in Ch. 7].
(18) d can be defeated only by evidence [premise].
(19) d is an undefeated defeater of R for RA [16, 17, 18].
(20) One cannot rationally believe a proposition for which one has an
undefeated defeater [premise].
(21) RA cannot rationally believe R [19, 20].
(22) If one cannot rationally believe R, then one cannot rationally believe
anything [premise].
(23) RA cannot rationally believe E [21, 22].
It appears that the argument runs the same way, with N or without N. But it
doesn’t. The latter premises of the argument are the same; but the difference shows up
upon reflection on the first premise, especially in the four scenarios (a) through (d). The
first thing to notice is that, if N is not in the argument, there may be more or less options
in (1) than there were previously.
Without N in the argument, we only have E simpliciter, without any supporting
metaphysical framework. Let’s now separate the background beliefs K from E, in order
to highlight the fact that it is due to K that we think that our cognitive faculties are
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reliable, not because of E. Ordinarily, people assume R, and that is not because of E;
many people believe R and do not believe E.
So, pre-reflection, it is neither any metaphysical framework (e.g., N or T) nor a
theory of development like E that we are using to underwrite our ordinary belief that R.
(It is important to note something like R given K was never in doubt in EAAN. It is only
when K is conjoined with certain specific metaphysical commitments that some troubles
ensue.)
A critic of EAAN might ask: “why would a proponent of EAAN think that ~R, or
that P(R/E&K) is low?” The answer is that the proponent of EAAN does not think that
~R, nor that P(R/E&K) is low. The proponent of EAAN could hold P(R/E&K) as high;
she also could think that P(R/T&E&K) is high.529 But, once N is introduced as a
conjunct with E, she thinks something happens that takes away the right for an adherent
of N&E&K to still hold R. Why is this?
There are many conjuncts that could be added to E&K which would result in such
a low probability that it would take away one’s right to hold R. For instance,
P(R/D&E&K), where D represents a proposition to the effect that there exists a Cartesian
malevolent demon, would seem to be low or inscrutable for an RA who came to believe
that she was created by such a being. So also would P(R/L&E&K) be low or inscrutable
for an RA who believed she had taken XX (where L stand for a proposition maintaining
that RA is an adherent of a group that frequently takes XX).
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Other conjuncts might not yield an extremely low probability figure, but still
bring in enough complications to make it difficult to know what to think about R given
that specific scenario. So, there are many scenarios that could compromise the right one
has to hold R. For example, our confidence about the right to hold R could be somewhat
undermined by the hypothesis that B&E&K (where B represents a Theravada Buddhist
situation; ultimately, “selves” and “beliefs of individual selves” are illusory), or a host of
other metaphysical possibilities. The scenarios in Premise (1) will change depending
upon the various metaphysical framings, because the options will vary regarding how to
understand the links between our beliefs and our behavior (if there even are selves who
can even have beliefs, and if beliefs even are ontologically what we normally take them
to be given the specific metaphysical framework being asserted).
Now think about introducing N as the metaphysical framework being posited to
be conjoined with E&K, and ask about P(R/N&E&K); at first glance, this probability
would seem high. Many people would point to our inductive successes in science, our
ability to predict states of affairs, our abilities to create new technologies, etc.. (Granted,
philosophical problems abound concerning induction generally, but still, we get around
fine, at least with matters that have to do with survival. Of course, we are probably less
likely to be right concerning higher level theoretical matters, like theories about quantum
mechanics, or theories of matter, or philosophies of space, or philosophies of mind, or
positions like metaphysical naturalism.)
This inductive evidence for R is coming from K, not N. So, adding N&E to K
isn’t presenting any additional evidence for R. But, might adding N to E&K take
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something away from the evidence for R (as could the assertion of B&E&K)?530 If the
universe, under a given metaphysical position, is not (at its core, so to speak) a reputably
rational place, what might that do to P(R/__&E&K)?531
This is mainly the reason that the conjunction of N to E&K results in some
epistemic trouble in EAAN. We saw earlier how C. S. Lewis remarked that, even if God
somehow was produced by Nature, then God would be in the same epistemic muddle that
the naturalist is now supposedly in (i.e., not knowing whether to ultimately trust
beliefs).532 The reason is because then God would have been produced by non-rational
causes, and we have a strong intuition that beliefs which trace back to non-rational causes
are not to be trusted. Whenever we trace beliefs back to non-rational causes (in the
Cause-Effect sense instead of Ground-Consequent sense), we tend to take that as a basis
to disbelieve the assertions (e.g., He believes he can fly because he has taken a drug, or
She believes she is a child again because of a tumor in her brain.)533
Richard Taylor’s argument that mentioned the rocks seemingly arranged to say
THE BRITISH RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES was driving toward the
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same conclusion.534 If you decide to believe that the rocks were arranged by only natural
forces (storms, wind, erosion, gravity, etc.), you lose your right to believe the
“information” the arrangement portrayed. It may in fact be true that the British Railways
has a welcoming attitude toward you and your visit to Wales, and so if you believe that
you will (in one sense) be correct. But, if your belief is based solely upon the rock
arrangement (that you take to have been produced by the blind forces of nature), you
cannot rationally believe it. Your belief in the British Railways’ disposition toward you,
although (via a stroke of luck?) true, has a negative epistemic status. It is not warranted,
and therefore cannot count as knowledge.
Someone might protest that the rock arrangement case is disanalogous, because
N&E&K involves living beings (not rocks) that are selected over long periods of time,
and it is the truths of the beliefs of these beings that is under scrutiny. However, the
purpose of the Case of the Arranged(?) Rocks was simply to awaken the intuition that
“information” which traces back to non-rational causes, or blind forces, cannot ultimately
be trusted as rationally warranted. Given N&E&K, living beings, as well as rocks, are
ultimately the products of these blind forces; one need only look far enough back down
the causal path.
Given N we ultimately come about by way of non-rational causes, not under any
design plan such that our cognitive faculties need traffic in propositions that are pointed
to truth. Plantinga is not the only one who is worried that that might create a problem.
We saw, for example, that Darwin himself worried about this near the very end of his
534
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life. We also saw Nietzsche highlighting the difficulties concerning truths absent a God,
as did Descartes, among many others.535
Nor is Plantinga the first one to point out that we have trouble giving a noncircular argument for R. How to account for R without presupposing R has long been a
philosophical problem. Given K we trust R, but once we try to give a rational basis for it,
we run into problems. Plantinga thinks that, given T, a reasonable story can be told that
makes sense of why we can’t give a non-circular argument for R: because we are made
under a design plan such that that kind of evidence isn’t needed to trust R, nor is that kind
of evidence needed to trust our basic memory beliefs and basic sensory beliefs. But, he
wonders, can someone tell a story under N that makes sense of this?536
I propose what might be a more helpful beginning for the proponent of EAAN: to
first present an argument for R under E&K, so that readers can be assured that R is not
being questioned. The next move is to talk about different metaphysical scenarios which
might be attached to E&K and assess how these scenarios might affect one’s right to
believe that R. Then, specify that EAAN will look at how R might be affected on the
introduction to E&K of one particular metaphysical view, namely N. Present the
Intuition about Non-rational Origins of Beliefs, and then run the argument as before.
If the argument is presented in this way, it has many advantages. First, it tells the
reader that the proponent of EAAN is not a global skeptic about R. Second, it helps the
reader to think of E&K, initially at least, divorced of various metaphysical commitments.
535
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This is important, because it is likely that some readers will think that N is necessarily
wedded to E&K, but it isn’t. Those who hold T and those who hold N could both
conceivably study and use the regularities presented to us in nature and arrive at E&K, as
could some of those who hold other metaphysical commitments. As Bas van Fraassen
has written:
… Suppose some scientist wishes to write something to the effect that there is no
God on the first page of his notebook. This may of course simply express some
anti-religious sentiment. He could however intend it to be a metaphysical thesis
with which all his scientific theories are to be compatible. Then he may write
something like “Matter is all there is; God does not exist” … When the scientist
comes to the end of that notebook, he’ll find that the thesis made no difference at
all. At least, its content – as opposed to its emotive force – played no role. The
same thing would have happened if he had written down its negation instead.537

Thirdly, presenting the argument in this manner focuses the readers’ minds on
how various scenarios, when conjoined with E, could result in greatly decreased
confidence in one’s right to hold R, or greatly decreased confidence that a coherent noncircular case can be made for R given the metaphysical view at issue. EAAN is not an
argument that anyone should have decreased confidence in R, but that a RA should give
up N because, when that specific metaphysical commitment is attached, one loses warrant
for the truths one thinks one knows538 (if there are even truths as we ordinarily think of
them under N). In other words (and this point bears continual repeating because it seems
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to be regularly missed by some of Plantinga’s critics), it is not R that is being questioned
for a RA, it is the right to rationally hold R that is being questioned.539
Here might be another way to approach the overall issue involved in EAAN. Say
that an adherent of N&E&K comes upon the following proposition:
Proposition M: There is a possible world w such that, in w, organisms are
sometimes selected for adaptive behaviors which issue from false beliefs.
That in itself is not controversial.540 Almost everyone seems willing to admit that
M is true. Now, take a person who accepts M and believes N&E&K and ask her if she’s
willing to reflect on Proposition M. After a little reflection she might well wonder how
many of her own beliefs could be false but somehow adaptive (especially beliefs that are
not directly correlated with survival, like higher level theoretical beliefs). That doesn’t
seem too controversial, either.
How many of her beliefs might be false? Why can she trust the ones that she
does? She knows that the support she is really depending upon for this has to do with K,
and she knows that N&E isn’t a crucial component of K.
If she thinks about that for a while, it might not be surprising if it led her to
wonder in general about the right to trust her cognitive faculties (not to wonder about her
cognitive faculties). She has been apprised of the Intuition about Non-rational Origins,
539
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and she realizes that it’s hard to see how she can give any non-circular argument for R.
The Intuition about Non-rational Origins seems to present a problem about her right to
rationally believe R. She begins to suspect that it was the introduction of N into her web
of beliefs that caused the problem.
Another way (other than reflection about Proposition M) to enter the muddle is to
be a RA who is reflecting upon SUMMARY premises (1) – (3). Some critics, however,
think that merely reflecting upon those premises is not enough. For instance, we saw that
Fitelson and Sober thought that Plantinga needed to show (in order to cause trouble for a
RA) “… that E&N not only defeats R, but also defeats the claim that ‘at least a nonnegligible minority of our beliefs are true.”541 Jerry Fodor seemed to think that
Plantinga’s argument needed to have independent evidence that most of our behavior is
linked to false belief.542 I think that many people might think that Plantinga initially
needs to show that given N&E we have good reasons to believe that we are organisms
that have been adapted most of the time by way of false beliefs before they will allow him
SUMMARY Premise (3).
I can’t rehearse all that was said in response to these ideas in Chapter Three.
However, a brief summary might be in order. First of all, Plantinga doesn’t think that we
have been adapted most of the time by way of false beliefs. Plantinga believes R and
doesn’t think that there is necessarily any problem with a high probability for R/E. What
he does think is that, when E is conjoined to N, then you have problems.
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Secondly, Plantinga thinks someone should give him Premise (3) because of his
Indefinite Belief-Behavior Pairings argument. Plantinga thinks it’s fairly easy to form
conceptions of belief/behavior pairings where the relevant beliefs (upon which the
adaptive behavior was based) are false.

Thinking up enough of these examples will

point someone in the direction of a vast number of these pairings, and that leads to
inscrutability.
One of these belief/behavior pairings that he used to illustrate this point had to do
with a thought experiment about people who believed there was a God who was
uncreated, but that every other thing that existed was created, i.e., a “creature”. So, every
proposition about every entity in the universe (other than God) had creaturehood attached
as a property of every thing. But, if naturalism is true, then that would involve a massive
number of false beliefs that those people had, all the while still displaying possibly
adaptive behavior.
For some reason, though, that particular thought experiment (i.e., the
Creaturehood Predication Scenario) does not seem to satisfy people like Fodor and
company, nor does the scenario about Paul (the hominid),543 nor the one about the group
of beings, each of whom thinks that everything other than herself is a witch.544 Perhaps
these are too colorful, and their nature tends to make people disinclined to further
consider Plantinga’s argument. Are there more persuasive imaginable scenarios
involving false belief that would look more likely to the minds of those like Fodor,
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Fitelson, Sobor, and Ramsey? I will argue that there are, in the following scenarios,
below.
Scenario α, Being H
In Scenario α, Being H is a being that believes that any organism that she
perceives to be the color “dusty-white” (say, the color of sheep’s wool) is a predator.
Therefore, she believes it is good not to go near any dusty-white beings. Let us say, in
this scenario, that the belief all dusty-white beings are predators is a false belief. Let us
additionally stipulate that, actually, in her mini-environment, there is no organism that is
dusty-white that is a predator. In her mini-environment, it so happens that all of the
beings that are dusty-white are mountain goats that live on precarious rock formations.
All beings of H’s type which have wandered onto these rock formations have slipped and
died, never to return to the H-being habitat. So, this confirms the false Predator Belief in
the mind of H. H lives to pass on her characteristics to her descendants, but because of a
false belief.
Scenario β, H the Teacher
Keep the same story as above, but in Scenario β let us add that Being H teaches
her (living) descendants about the belief in dusty-white predators, and that these
descendants acquire (and pass on to their descendants) this same false belief about dustywhite predators. As long as they continue to live in the same mini-environment, they are
continually selected due to the false beliefs.
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Scenario γ, the New Home
Now, what if the descendants of Being H wander to another environment
(Scenario γ)? Will they now be disabused of the false belief?
Not necessarily. Perhaps all it would take for the false belief to be maintained is
that there be some other benefit(s) (and presumably there is a very large set of these) that
would give them some adaptive edge. For instance, say the dusty-white creatures in the
new area live near a hole that emits a gas poisonous to beings like H (but not poisonous
to the dusty-white creatures). Or, alternatively, say the dusty-white creatures in the new
micro-environment live near a lake where still other creatures (of some other color) grab
beings like H and eat them (but they don’t like to eat the off-white creatures). And so on.
Avoiding the dusty-white creatures still gives H and her so-taught descendants an
adaptive edge.
Those who lean toward positions epitomized in the Popper and Quine quotes
which appeared earlier might say that, sooner or later, beings of H’s species will
eventually die out because of the false belief in the dusty-white “predators”. But is that
obvious? Someone may think that H’s dusty-white belief is just one false belief that H
has. The large mass of other beliefs that H maintains could be mostly true beliefs about
the predators in her micro-environment, and it is these mostly true beliefs that account for
H’s adaptive behavior. (This was one of the ways that we saw Ramsey and Fodor
criticizing Plantinga, earlier.) Plantinga’s response was that, once the possibilities are
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brought up in this manner, there’s no way to know, under N&E, how many of one’s
behaviors are adaptive due to false belief or true belief.
Remember also what Plantinga had to say about Fodor’s charge that he was
reasoning from the mere possibility that our behavior could be adaptive while most of our
beliefs are false to the conclusion that most of our beliefs, then, are false. Plantinga
responded that he never said that, but instead maintained that there are indefinitely many
beliefs/desires that yield adaptive behavior, and among those are indefinitely many where
the beliefs involved are mostly false. Therefore, we couldn’t calculate probabilities here,
and we should consider the probabilities to be inscrutable.545
The upshot of all this is that it seems that Plantinga does not need to give an
argument that our cognitive faculties are, for the most part, unreliable, as Fodor, et al. say
that he does. And that’s not the argument anyway; it is rather that the basis for RA to
rationally believe R has been taken away.
So far, Premise (3) is the only one that has been contested in a significant way.
Given Plantinga’s argument about the indefinite number of possible belief/behavior
pairings, and combining that with my Prelude to the argument concerning the Intuition
about Non-rational Origins, perhaps Plantinga’s argument can move on past Premise (3).
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Since, after Premise (3), there is no significant opposition to Premises (4), (5), and (6),546
in the next chapter I will examine premises after Premise (6).

546

Assuming that there are probabilities … see my p. 171.
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CHAPTER NINE
An Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form: Discussion of
Some Premises after Premise (6), with Particular Attention to Premise
(10)

Assuming that Plantinga’s argument has established SUMMARY Premise (6),547
(or assuming that at least that his argument is still alive after Premise (6)), I now look into
the remaining premises of the SUMMARY. Premise (10) merits special attention. I will
conclude that Plantinga establishes Premise (10) for those who share a certain very
reasonable intuition with him.
Picking up now with Premises (7) through (9), we have:

(7) If P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, then P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be
high [premise].
(8) A “reflective adherent of N&E” (RA) believes N&E and knows anything that
is soundly deduced in this argument [definition].
(9) RA knows P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be high [6, 7, 8].
Premises (7) through (9) seem innocuous enough. Premise (7) is obvious,
Premise (8) is definitional, and Premise (9) follows tightly from (6), (7), and (8).
Therefore, Premise (10) looks to be our next contested proposition. It states:

(10) If (9), then (epistemically speaking) RA should have doubts about the source
of R, and thereby lacks warrant for believing R [argued via analogy].

547

I.e., the Probability Thesis.
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We have already seen some critics of EAAN protest that one does not necessarily
have a defeater here.548 Why should, if (9), RA have doubts about the source of R?
Because, Plantinga says, in analogous situations, we can just see that she should. He
agrees that one doesn’t always have a defeater for something like this, but in this case he
thinks one does have a defeater. This can be seen, he maintains, by looking at what we
would judge the right epistemic stance to be in similar situations. This means that these
analogies must be fairly tight.
Before we look again at these analogies, it might first be helpful to set them
before the backdrop of his overall epistemological project. Plantinga seemed to come
upon EAAN as almost an afterthought while working on the first two volumes of his
epistemology trilogy. In these books he was looking at various accounts of warrant. In
the first volume of his epistemology trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga
surveyed a number of (mainly) internalist accounts and commented upon why they were
insufficient with regard to warrant. In the second volume, Warrant and Proper Function,
Plantinga began to set out his own account of warrant (which was significantly, but not
exclusively, externalist). It looks like it is here that Plantinga apparently began to suspect
that all accounts of warrant which did not ultimately appeal to the notion of proper
function under a design plan aimed at truth (hereafter PF) would fail. So, as he was
developing his own account of warrant, he began to see the absolutely crucial role that
PF played in epistemic justification. Then, at the end of the book (WPF), he seemed to
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notice that, if his account of warrant was true, metaphysical naturalism might be in
trouble.
Plantinga maintains that there is no story that a metaphysical naturalist can tell
which would satisfactorily explain our basic ideas of proper function. He did note (in
WPF, WCB, his responses in Naturalism Defeated?, and KOG) that there were various
naturalistic attempts at accounts of proper function; the main ones he interacted with
were those of Karen Neander,549 Ruth Millikan,550 Larry Wright,551 and Michael Levin.552
But he maintained that they all failed (and that they all failed for basically the same
reason). The best place to see Plantinga’s reasoning for this is the entirety of Chapter 11
in WPF (entitled “Naturalism versus Proper Function?”), but there is a kind of summary
in KOG553 where he briefly looks at the four naturalistic attempts, above, and finds them
wanting. To delve into his support for this in detail is beyond the scope of what I’m
trying to do here, but at least a quick look at this matter is important.
First, an important caveat: Karen Neander uses the term “proper function” but
limits her account to an analysis of just a scientific concept of proper function, not the
ordinary-usage concept. Likewise, Ruth Millikan has made a similar disclaimer: “Proper
function is intended as a technical term … used to unravel certain problems, not because
it does or doesn’t accord with common notions such as ‘purpose’ or the ordinary notion
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of ‘function’.554 About Neander’s qualification (and by extension Millikan’s, too)
Plantinga says:
This is an important point, because it is the everyday ordinary concept of proper
function that is involved in the notions of warrant, sanity, health, and the like –
not some other concept in the neighborhood, no matter how scientifically
respectable that other concept may be. It is proper function (not some other
concept) that is entailed by the notion of warrant; and it is proper function, I say,
that can’t be given a naturalistically acceptable analysis. The fact that we can
construct other concepts out of naturalistically acceptable elements is perhaps of
interest in some contexts, but doesn’t cut any ice in this context.555

Still, he thinks that it is instructive to see just why Neander’s account and
Millikan’s account would fail if they were taken to be accounts of proper function. He
suspects that the reason such accounts are qualified the way that they are is because of the
foreseen difficulties in squaring the accounts with metaphysical naturalism:
…Often … when naturalists talk about proper function they give an account not
of proper function itself, but of some other notion in the neighborhood …
(Perhaps they do this partly because it is clear to them that one can’t give a
naturalistic account of proper function itself.)556

In order to explain proper function in the context of a naturalistic account of
warrant, Plantinga maintains that one would need to “give an analysis of proper function
in terms of properties that are naturalistically acceptable.”557 To do this would be to (at
least) give the necessary and sufficient conditions concerning proper function. Plantinga
doesn’t think that the accounts that Neander, Millikan, Wright, or Levin give the
554
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necessary and sufficient conditions for proper function (nor does he think that they could,
given naturalistic constraints; more on this will follow, below).
Millikan’s account goes like this:
… Putting things very roughly, for an item A to have function F as a “proper
function” it is necessary (and close to sufficient) that one of these two conditions
should hold. (1) A originated as a “reproduction” (to give one example, as a copy,
or a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of
the properties reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists
because (causally historically because) of this or these performances. (2) A
originated as the product of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had
performance of F as a proper function and that, given its circumstances, had
performance of F as a proper function and that, under these circumstances
normally causes F to be performed by means of producing an item like A. Items
that fall under condition (2) have “derived proper functions”, functions derived
from the devices that produce them.558
Neander’s account, similar but shorter, is that “… [i]t is the proper function of an
item X of an organism O to do that which items of X’s type did to contribute to the
inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the
phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.”559 Wright basically says that
“… an effect F of S is a function of S just in case S exists or persists because it F’s; i.e., a
thing’s functions are those of its effects that explain it.”560 And lastly, Levin states: “F is
a function of S if and only if ‘S is explained by its leading to F and the efficient cause of
S’ of S is explained by its leading to S.”561
A full rendering of Plantinga’s views on all of these accounts would take me too
far afield. It would also involve looking in detail at a long and complicated thought
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experiment that Plantinga offers. (The short version of it is this: a madman orders his
scientists to induce a genetic mutation into non-Aryans, but the mutation gets out of
control and affects Aryans, too. In the end, the Aryan and non-Aryan mutants are
“functioning”, (and functioning according to the definitions of proper function that
Plantinga is opposing), but no one would take their “functioning” to be proper
function.)562
Perhaps it will suffice to say that Millikan’s account, as also the accounts of
Neander, Wright, and Levin, entail that anything that functions properly would need to
have had ancestors. But, Plantinga wonders, isn’t it possible that something could be
functioning properly and also be the first of its kind (a telephone, Adam’s heart, etc.)?563
If so, analyses of proper function which involve a condition of ancestors will be too
strong (i.e., they involve a condition which is not necessary).564
Secondly, the conditions offered are not sufficient, either. For example, Plantinga
wonders whether his car continues to exist because it wrecked into a ditch before it would
have been destroyed by an unforeseen train. Is wrecking into a ditch the car’s function?
It seems to satisfy one of Levin’s conditions.565
Additionally, what if something functions for a different reason than the function
it had for the organism’s ancestors? It is, of course, possible that “a thing might persist
because of some feature that wasn’t its function or one of its functions …”.566 And what
if something is malfunctioning (e.g., a equine heart that is only beating 15 beats per
562
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minute), but, because of another factor that has nothing to do with its ancestors (e.g., a
perforated aorta), the explanation of the organism’s continued existence has to do with
the malfunctioning aspect?
There is more to say, of course, and Plantinga analyzed other accounts (especially
in Warrant and Proper Function), but one may perhaps begin to see why Plantinga
would be led to conclude:
As far as I know, no one has been able to come up with a naturalistic analysis of
proper function that is anywhere nearly adequate or accurate, and by now the
project is beginning to look uphopeful. The fundamental reason, I suggest, is that
this notion, the notion of function or proper function, essentially involves the aims
and intentions of one or more conscious and intelligent designers. The notion of
proper function really implies the idea of design by conscious, intentional, and
intelligent designers. But that means that the organs and parts of plants, animals,
and human beings can function properly (or improperly) only if they are designed
and cause to be by one or more conscious, intelligent agents.567
Now it is clear why Plantinga does not think that an adherent of N&E will be
able to even tell a story that can get a RA out of the Humean dialectical loop once inside
of it. With that in hand, let’s take a last look back at some of the analogies that he uses to
try to establish Premise (10). Here he perhaps leans most heavily upon the XX drug
analogy. However, other analogies that he used to make this point included the cases of
the Mysterious Radio Device, the Questionable Sphygmomanometer, the Irradiated
Widgets, and the Dubious Thermometer.
In the thought-experiment about the radio device, you come upon an instrument
about which you don’t know the origins. At first, you think that it is emitting what you
believe to be true English sentences, but upon reflection you realize that you have no
567
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reason to believe that the device is reliable. This is because you don’t know anything
about the intentions of the maker(s) of the device. Therefore, you cannot take for granted
anymore the idea that the sentences that you hear are true. You don’t know what to think
about the truth status of the sentences.
Now, it would be great if you could find out about whether the intentions of the
developer of the radio device (if there even was a developer) were nefarious or not. In
such a position, is there any other evidence you could gather, or any other way to find out
if you should trust any truth claims contained in the sentences emitted by the device?
Someone might venture that one could select the statements that were supposedly
empirically testable, test them, and make some conclusions by way of induction. Of
course, this procedure might be shortened at the very beginning by making a mistake in
trusting the device regarding a statement like “that foodstuff is not fatally poisonous …
you can eat it.” Also, even though depending upon such an empirical procedure might
pragmatically work for a while, how could one know that one wasn’t being deviously set
up to trust the device, only to be devastated later? And what about all the statements that
couldn’t be empirically tested (like metaphysical statements about naturalism, etc.)? So,
lack of dependable information about the origins of the device does seem to give one
quiet a problem.
Here there do seem to be several relevant ties to EAAN. It seems imperative to
know the intentions of the developer; there doesn’t seem to be a way, short of knowing
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the intentions of the maker(s) of the radio device to determine the dependability of the
device. But how could one gain the necessary information?
Given N&E, one cannot know the intentions of the maker of one’s cognitive
faculties because there is no volitionally capable maker of one’s cognitive faculties who
could have intentions. The origin of one’s cognitive faculties involves a long chain of
adaptations that aren’t “concerned” that one’s faculties be pointed at the truth, but only
adaptive behavior. (Here Plantinga is, of course, depending upon arguments made earlier
outside of the thought experiment.)
The sphygmomanometer example runs likewise, where something you thought
you knew (that the device is reliable) gets taken away from you when you are presented
with a proposition that makes you question your original trust in its reliability (the
information about the factory owner and his agenda against the medical instrument
industry).
The irradiated widgets story works in the same way. Your original thought is that
the widgets are red, but someone tells you something that makes you question your
original belief … you learn that the widgets are being irradiated by a red light. Or have
you learned this? Do you know that you can trust the source of your new information?
Your original belief is in danger, but so is your later belief.
The XX drug story also works similarly, but is probably Plantinga’s closet
analogous case, because it is about one’s cognitive faculties (rather than an instrument, a
radio, etc.). You have an initial belief in the reliability of your cognitive faculties, but
202

this gets put into question when you somehow acquire the belief that you have taken XX.
And, given that the source of all your beliefs is in question, how is one to restore the
knowledge of R that you once had?
We looked in some detail (in Chapter 7 concerning Michael Bergmann’s
criticisms) at how this example is supposed to work.568 What is it that makes the XX case
and EAAN analogous? To repeat what was said earlier, Plantinga thinks that what makes
the cases analogous is that in both cases we notice that a person has been put in a scenario
that a rational outside observer can just see that the person has lost warrant for the belief
in R. In the XX case, it is the usual effect of the drug that dissipates warrant. In the case
of the RA apprised of EAAN, it is in noticing that one has an undefeated defeater because
of the propositions that are associated with N when conjoined with E.
What if someone does not buy Plantinga’s analogies? Is it possible that some
other analogies could be developed which are more persuasive? His analogies trade upon
intuitions about the rational thing to do in the situations portrayed along with intuitions
about how rationality and proper function are related. Perhaps the analogies used to
establish Premise (10) should revolve around situations involving whether or not one can
rationally believe something that has a non-rational source. After all, that was one of the
reasons used to establish Premise (3), so it is built into the argument to be available as
support for Premise (10). That is why, in Chapter Six, I looked in some detail at the
similar arguments of Lewis and Taylor which seem to traffic in the same types of
intuitions upon which Plantinga is depending.
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Say that the Radio Device analogy is adjusted to include that you now do know
that origins of the device, but those origins are (who knows how) non-rational. Also, say
the sphygmomanometer analogy is similarly adjusted so that you now know the origins
of these particular sphygmomanometers to be non-rational. Perhaps they were being
made to be dummies, or non-working models, but the machinery malfunctioned in such a
way that the devices do actually give readings some of the time; so, the origins of these
units are machine-caused, rather than the end intended by the machine programmers.
Given these changes, it seems more intuitively obvious that one’s beliefs that the
instruments are reliable has been taken away, i.e., are no longer warranted. That doesn’t
mean that your beliefs are always wrong (e.g., the readings or utterances of the devices
could luckily be correct), but still, your right to believe that they are has been
undermined.
After Premise (10), there are other premises which could be controversial. But, to
my mind, there really does not seem to be too much compelling criticism about the
remaining premises, save Premise (17). However, Plantinga’s responses to Bergmann’s
concerns569 seemed enough to give him Premise (17). Therefore, I conclude that
Plantinga’s argument revolves mainly around the intuitions involved in Premise (10).
And now, it seems as though the analogies used by Plantinga to establish Premise (10)
can be strengthened to include the Intuition about Non-rational Origins.
The whole argument seems to come down mainly to this one intuition … the
Intuition about Non-rational Origins. It seems like a very reasonable intuition to grant,
especially as we use it heavily in discrediting information that comes to us via non569
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rational sources in everyday life. As long as there are people who share Plantinga’s
intuitions in those matters, I expect the basics of his argument to continue to survive in
some form (as long as the concepts and categories involved in the formulation of the
premises stay substantially the same).
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